comparative analysis (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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comparative analysis in Arizona

14 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2021 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
State of Arizona v. Efren Medinagreen
ariz · 2013 · cited in 4 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2014–2021
2 sentences

2021However, courts are not required to employ a comparative analysis when reviewing Batson claims, see Medina, 232 Ariz. at 404– 05 ¶¶ 48–49 (rejecting the argument that a comparative juror analysis is a constitutionally required aspect of Batson review), and this Court “decline[s] to do so when the similarities between peremptorily stricken jurors and those remaining on the panel were not raised at trial,” id. at 405 ¶ 48.

2021However, courts are not required to employ a comparative analysis when reviewing Batson claims, see Medina, 232 Ariz. at 404– 05 ¶¶ 48–49 (rejecting the argument that a comparative juror analysis is a constitutionally required aspect of Batson review), and this Court “decline[s] to do so when the similarities between peremptorily stricken jurors and those remaining on the panel were not raised at trial,” id. at 405 ¶ 48.

24
Snyder v. Louisianagreen
scotus · 2008 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2020–2021
2 sentences

2021Medina, 232 Ariz. at 405, ¶ 49 ; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483 (2008) (“[A] retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at trial.”).

2020See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 , 1749–50 (2016) (acknowledging that it made an “independent examination of the record,” but not requiring a comparative analysis where it was not raised before the trial court); Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483 (“[A] retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at trial.”); Medina, 232 Ariz. at 404–05 ¶¶ 48–49 (finding comparative analysis not required where defendant did not raise it before the trial court); Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 272 ¶ 37 (same).

22
State v. Bartlettgreen
ariz · 1992 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995A comparative analysis of defendant’s sentence with others in Arizona and across the nation is “ ‘appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” See id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 , 111 S.Ct. at 2707 ). “[I]n weighing the gravity of an offense against the severity of a penalty,” consideration should be given to “‘the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender— For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crime

1995A comparative analysis of defendant’s sentence with others in Arizona and across the nation is “ ‘appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” See id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 , 111 S.Ct. at 2707 ). “[I]n weighing the gravity of an offense against the severity of a penalty,” consideration should be given to “‘the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender— For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crime

12
State v. Currygreen
orctapp · 2019 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020And although Flowers explained that a comparative analysis may be relevant in addressing a Batson challenge, it did not require such an analysis for the first time on appeal. 139 S. Ct. at 2247–49; see State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7, 11 (Or.

2020And although Flowers explained that a comparative analysis may be relevant in addressing a Batson challenge, it did not require such an analysis for the first time on appeal. 139 S. Ct. at 2247–49; see State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7, 11 (Or.

11
Foster v. Chatmangreen
scotus · 2016 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 , 1749–50 (2016) (acknowledging that it made an “independent examination of the record,” but not requiring a comparative analysis where it was not raised before the trial court); Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483 (“[A] retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at trial.”); Medina, 232 Ariz. at 404–05 ¶¶ 48–49 (finding comparative analysis not required where defendant did not raise it before the trial court); Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 272 ¶ 37 (same).

11
State v. Newtongreen
ariz · 2001 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See State v. Newton, 200 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 3 (2001) (“A basic principle of criminal law requires that an offender be sentenced under the laws in effect at the time he committed the offense for which he is being sentenced.”); State v. Johnson, 240 Ariz. 402, 406, ¶ 18 (App. 2016) (noting the legislature’s rejection of a comparative analysis for out-of-state convictions).

11
State v. Johnsongreen
arizctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019See State v. Newton, 200 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 3 (2001) (“A basic principle of criminal law requires that an offender be sentenced under the laws in effect at the time he committed the offense for which he is being sentenced.”); State v. Johnson, 240 Ariz. 402, 406, ¶ 18 (App. 2016) (noting the legislature’s rejection of a comparative analysis for out-of-state convictions).

11
Maher v. Urmangreen
arizctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See State v. Churchill, 82 Ariz. 375, 380 (1957) (“Good cause means substantial reason, that is, one that [a]ffords a legal excuse.”); cf. Maher v. Urman, 211 Ariz. 543, 548, ¶ 14 (App. 2005) (“In order to show good cause to extend time for service, a plaintiff must demonstrate he or she exercised due diligence in trying to serve the defendant.”) (citing Snow v. Steele, 121 Ariz. 82, 83 (1979)).

11
Snow v. Steelegreen
ariz · 1978 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See State v. Churchill, 82 Ariz. 375, 380 (1957) (“Good cause means substantial reason, that is, one that [a]ffords a legal excuse.”); cf. Maher v. Urman, 211 Ariz. 543, 548, ¶ 14 (App. 2005) (“In order to show good cause to extend time for service, a plaintiff must demonstrate he or she exercised due diligence in trying to serve the defendant.”) (citing Snow v. Steele, 121 Ariz. 82, 83 (1979)).

11
State v. Churchillgreen
ariz · 1957 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See State v. Churchill, 82 Ariz. 375, 380 (1957) (“Good cause means substantial reason, that is, one that [a]ffords a legal excuse.”); cf. Maher v. Urman, 211 Ariz. 543, 548, ¶ 14 (App. 2005) (“In order to show good cause to extend time for service, a plaintiff must demonstrate he or she exercised due diligence in trying to serve the defendant.”) (citing Snow v. Steele, 121 Ariz. 82, 83 (1979)).

11
State of Arizona v. Scott Alan Colvingreen
arizctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See State v. Colvin, 231 Ariz. 269, ¶ 9 , 293 P.3d 545, 548-49 (App.2013).

2014See State v. Colvin, 231 Ariz. 269, ¶ 9 , 293 P.3d 545, 548-49 (App.2013).

11
Dart v. Wiebe Manufacturing, Inc.green
ariz · 1985 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994Because misuse is a comparative defense, the trial court in this case erred in instructing the jury that misuse was to be considered a defense only if the misuse was the sole proximate cause of Gibbs’s injuries and in refusing to give comparative fault instructions with respect to the misuse defense. “[Wjhere the challenged instructions cut to the very heart of the case and misapply the applicable legal theories, the error must be considered prejudicial.” Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 250 , 709 P.2d 876, 884 (1985).

1994Because misuse is a comparative defense, the trial court in this case erred in instructing the jury that misuse was to be considered a defense only if the misuse was the sole proximate cause of Gibbs’s injuries and in refusing to give comparative fault instructions with respect to the misuse defense. “[Wjhere the challenged instructions cut to the very heart of the case and misapply the applicable legal theories, the error must be considered prejudicial.” Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 250 , 709 P.2d 876, 884 (1985).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
Harmelin v. Michigan green
scotus · 1991
2 sentences

1995A comparative analysis of defendant’s sentence with others in Arizona and across the nation is “ ‘appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” See id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 , 111 S.Ct. at 2707 ). “[I]n weighing the gravity of an offense against the severity of a penalty,” consideration should be given to “‘the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender— For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crime

1995A comparative analysis of defendant’s sentence with others in Arizona and across the nation is “ ‘appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” See id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 , 111 S.Ct. at 2707 ). “[I]n weighing the gravity of an offense against the severity of a penalty,” consideration should be given to “‘the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender— For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crime

31995–2011
State of Arizona v. Joel Randu Escalante-Orozco green
ariz · 2017
1 sentence

2020See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 , 1749–50 (2016) (acknowledging that it made an “independent examination of the record,” but not requiring a comparative analysis where it was not raised before the trial court); Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483 (“[A] retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at trial.”); Medina, 232 Ariz. at 404–05 ¶¶ 48–49 (finding comparative analysis not required where defendant did not raise it before the trial court); Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 272 ¶ 37 (same).

12020–2020
Flowers v. Mississippi green
scotus · 2019
2 sentences

2020And although Flowers explained that a comparative analysis may be relevant in addressing a Batson challenge, it did not require such an analysis for the first time on appeal. 139 S. Ct. at 2247–49; see State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7, 11 (Or.

2020And although Flowers explained that a comparative analysis may be relevant in addressing a Batson challenge, it did not require such an analysis for the first time on appeal. 139 S. Ct. at 2247–49; see State v. Curry, 447 P.3d 7, 11 (Or.

12020–2020
State of Arizona v. Rodney Eugene Hardy green
ariz · 2012
1 sentence

2013In Hardy , we examined similarities between dismissed minority jurors and non-minority jurors who remained on the panel, which were both raised by the defendant and addressed by the prosecutor at trial. 230 Ariz. at 286 ¶¶ 13-14, 283 P.3d at 17 .

12013–2013
Ewing v. California green
scotus · 2003
2 sentences

2011We conclude that Kasie’s sentences, viewed individually and in the aggregate, further Arizona’s “penological goals and thus reflect[ ] ‘a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference.’ ” Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, ¶ 17 , 134 P.3d at 382 , quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). ¶ 27 And because our “threshold comparison of the erime[s] committed and the sen-tenee[s] imposed [has not led] us to an inference of gross disproportionality,” there is no need to conduct a comparative analysis of Kasie’s sentences with others in Arizona or across the

2011We conclude that Kasie’s sentences, viewed individually and in the aggregate, further Arizona’s “penological goals and thus reflect[ ] ‘a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference.’ ” Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, ¶ 17 , 134 P.3d at 382 , quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). ¶ 27 And because our “threshold comparison of the erime[s] committed and the sen-tenee[s] imposed [has not led] us to an inference of gross disproportionality,” there is no need to conduct a comparative analysis of Kasie’s sentences with others in Arizona or across the

12011–2011
State v. Berger green
ariz · 2006
2 sentences

2011We conclude that Kasie’s sentences, viewed individually and in the aggregate, further Arizona’s “penological goals and thus reflect[ ] ‘a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference.’ ” Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, ¶ 17 , 134 P.3d at 382 , quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). ¶ 27 And because our “threshold comparison of the erime[s] committed and the sen-tenee[s] imposed [has not led] us to an inference of gross disproportionality,” there is no need to conduct a comparative analysis of Kasie’s sentences with others in Arizona or across the

2011We conclude that Kasie’s sentences, viewed individually and in the aggregate, further Arizona’s “penological goals and thus reflect[ ] ‘a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference.’ ” Berger, 212 Ariz. 473, ¶ 17 , 134 P.3d at 382 , quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). ¶ 27 And because our “threshold comparison of the erime[s] committed and the sen-tenee[s] imposed [has not led] us to an inference of gross disproportionality,” there is no need to conduct a comparative analysis of Kasie’s sentences with others in Arizona or across the

12011–2011
Solem v. Helm red
scotus · 1983
2 sentences

1995A comparative analysis of defendant’s sentence with others in Arizona and across the nation is “ ‘appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” See id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 , 111 S.Ct. at 2707 ). “[I]n weighing the gravity of an offense against the severity of a penalty,” consideration should be given to “‘the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender— For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crime

1995A comparative analysis of defendant’s sentence with others in Arizona and across the nation is “ ‘appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” See id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 , 111 S.Ct. at 2707 ). “[I]n weighing the gravity of an offense against the severity of a penalty,” consideration should be given to “‘the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender— For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crime

11995–1995
George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc. green
scotus · 1992
1 sentence

1995State v. Bartlett, 171 Ariz. 302, 304, 830 P.2d 823, 825 (“Bartlett II) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 , 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2707 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) ce rt. denied, 506 U.S. 992 , 113 S.Ct. 511 , 121 L.Ed.2d 445 (1992).

11995–1995
Arizona v. Bartlett green
scotus · 1992
1 sentence

1995State v. Bartlett, 171 Ariz. 302, 304, 830 P.2d 823, 825 (“Bartlett II) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 , 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2707 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) ce rt. denied, 506 U.S. 992 , 113 S.Ct. 511 , 121 L.Ed.2d 445 (1992).

11995–1995
Adams ex rel. Ridgell v. Children's Mercy Hospital green
scotus · 1992
1 sentence

1995State v. Bartlett, 171 Ariz. 302, 304, 830 P.2d 823, 825 (“Bartlett II) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 , 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2707 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) ce rt. denied, 506 U.S. 992 , 113 S.Ct. 511 , 121 L.Ed.2d 445 (1992).

11995–1995
State v. Watson green
ariz · 1982
2 sentences

1984Under State v. Watson, 134 Ariz. 1 , 653 P.2d 351 (1982), counsel is not held to a comparative standard of performance.

1984Under State v. Watson, 134 Ariz. 1 , 653 P.2d 351 (1982), counsel is not held to a comparative standard of performance.

11984–1984
Blickenstaff v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA green
arizctapp · 1977
2 sentences

1979Id. at 339 , 569 P.2d at 281 .

1979Id. at 339 , 569 P.2d at 281 .

11979–1979

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 132 (1967–2026) TX 126 (1984–2026) NJ 36 (1959–2025) IL 28 (1981–2026) PA 24 (1976–2026) NY 22 (1927–2025) OH 17 (1988–2025) MI 15 (1973–2024) AZ 14 (1979–2021) MD 13 (1983–2021) AL 13 (1988–2018) KS 13 (1973–2026) TN 12 (1924–2018) NC 12 (1977–2024) FL 11 (1979–2012) LA 10 (1985–2015) NM 9 (1973–2018) MA 8 (1968–2020) NE 8 (1973–2026) IN 7 (1991–2024) MS 7 (1997–2022) AK 7 (1970–2020) VA 6 (1996–2024) CT 5 (2016–2019) WV 5 (1983–2013) ME 4 (1979–2007) RI 4 (1993–2012) MO 4 (1987–2020) WA 4 (1963–2019) ID 3 (2014–2020) MN 3 (2003–2013) IA 2 (2015–2015) SD 2 (1989–2010) PR 2 (1939–1963) DC 2 (1988–2026) UT 2 (2022–2024) HI 2 (2016–2016) AR 2 (1995–1995) SC 2 (2013–2024) VT 2 (2010–2016) WI 2 (2003–2019) KY 2 (2011–2025) CO 2 (2001–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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