comparative analysis in California

2022(See Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 248 [when a proffered reason also applies to “other panel members, most of them white, none of them struck, [it] is evidence of pretext.].) “ ‘As our high court has explained, for a comparative analysis to be probative, a seated juror must have a “ ‘substantially similar combination of responses,’ in all material respects” to an excused juror. [Citation.] “Although jurors need not be completely identical for a comparison to be probative 9 [citation], ‘they must be materially similar in the respects significant to the prosecutor’s stated basis for t

2017Pretext is established, however, when the compared jurors have expressed "a substantially similar combination of responses," in all material respects, to the jurors excused. ( People v. DeHoyos , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 107 , 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 , 303 P.3d 1 , italics added.) Although jurors need not be completely identical for a comparison to be probative (see Miller - El v. Dretke , supra , 545 U.S. at p. 247, fn. 6, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ), "they must be materially similar in the respects significant to the prosecutor's stated basis for the challenge." ( DeHoyos , at p. 107, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 ,

2021(People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622, fn. 15 ; People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 350 [“Whatever use comparative juror analysis might have in a third-stage case for determining whether a prosecutor’s proffered justifications for his [or her] strikes are pretextual, it has little or no use where the analysis does not hinge on the prosecution’s actual proffered rationales, and we thus decline to engage in a comparative analysis here.”].) 8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2016Whatever use comparative juror analysis might have in a third-stage case for determining whether a prosecutor’s proffered justifications for his strikes are pretextual, it has little or no use where the analysis does not hinge on the prosecution’s actual proffered rationales, and we thus decline to engage in a comparative analysis here.” ( Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 350.) Bonilla’s reliance on Bell was misplaced.

2023(Id. at pp. 427-429.)” (People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 972 ; see also People v. Garcia (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 941, 952 [describing the “three analytical techniques” under Lynch].) A lengthy sentence is cruel and unusual under the California Constitution if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” ( Lynch, supra, at p. 424 .) Thus, under both the federal and the state frameworks, we consider the gravity or nature of the offense and engage in a comparative analysis.

2013(In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 16 . 524, 542 (Coley).) “‘“In the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality” the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. [Citation.] If this comparative analysis “validate[s] an initial judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence is cruel and unusual.’” (Id. at p. 542, citing Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 , ___, 13

2021(People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622, fn. 15 ; People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 350 [“Whatever use comparative juror analysis might have in a third-stage case for determining whether a prosecutor’s proffered justifications for his [or her] strikes are pretextual, it has little or no use where the analysis does not hinge on the prosecution’s actual proffered rationales, and we thus decline to engage in a comparative analysis here.”].) 8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2020Comparative juror analysis allows the court to “ ‘compare the responses of the challenged jurors with those of similar unchallenged jurors who were not members of the challenged jurors’ racial group.’” (People v. Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 77 .) “[E]vidence of 38 comparative juror analysis must be considered in the trial court and even for the first time on appeal if relied upon by the defendant and the record is adequate to permit the urged comparisons.” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622 ; see People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1174 .) However, the trial court here neve

2023(Id. at pp. 427-429.)” (People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 972 ; see also People v. Garcia (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 941, 952 [describing the “three analytical techniques” under Lynch].) A lengthy sentence is cruel and unusual under the California Constitution if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” ( Lynch, supra, at p. 424 .) Thus, under both the federal and the state frameworks, we consider the gravity or nature of the offense and engage in a comparative analysis.

2023(Id. at pp. 427-429.)” (People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 972 ; see also People v. Garcia (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 941, 952 [describing the “three analytical techniques” under Lynch].) A lengthy sentence is cruel and unusual under the California Constitution if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” ( Lynch, supra, at p. 424 .) Thus, under both the federal and the state frameworks, we consider the gravity or nature of the offense and engage in a comparative analysis.

1997As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ [Citations.]” (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 365 [ 11 S.Ct. 1859 , 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 ].) Even if we were to engage in a comparative analysis of the responses given by the prospective jurors, defendant would not prevail.

1997As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ [Citations.]” (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 365 [ 11 S.Ct. 1859 , 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 ].) Even if we were to engage in a comparative analysis of the responses given by the prospective jurors, defendant would not prevail.

2023Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 24 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ].) Applying this principle, “ ‘[a] court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and severity of the sentence. [Citation.] “[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality” the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdic

2023Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 24 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ].) Applying this principle, “ ‘[a] court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and severity of the sentence. [Citation.] “[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality” the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdic

2016We have concluded that Miller-El v. Dretke[, supra,] 545 U.S. 231 .. . does not mandate comparative juror analysis in these circumstances (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 601), and thus we are not compelled to conduct a comparative analysis here.

2016We have concluded that Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 3 545 U.S. 231 does not mandate comparative juror analysis in these circumstances (People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 601 ), and thus we are not compelled to conduct a comparative analysis here.

2016“Where, as here, the comparative analysis was not made at trial, ‘the prosecutor generally has not provided, and was not asked to provide, an explanation for nonchallenges.’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘an appellate court must be mindful that an exploration of the alleged similarities at the time of trial might have shown that the jurors in question were not really comparable.’ 12 [Citation.]” (O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 976 , quoting People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346 , 365 and Snyder v. Louisiana, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 483 .) As a consequence, “[w]hen a defendant asks for comparative ju

2016(Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241 [ 162 L.Ed.2d 196 , 125 S.Ct. 2317 ] (Miller-El) [“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”].) “[Comparative juror analysis *976 is but one form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, on the issue of intentional discrimination.” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622 .) Where, as here, the comparativ

2015We do not engage in a comparative analysis of various juror responses to evaluate the good faith of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing a particular juror “because comparative 12. analysis of jurors unrealistically ignores ‘the variety of factors and considerations that go into a lawyer’s decision to select certain jurors while challenging others that appear to be similar.’” ( Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 714–715, quoting Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 1219, 1220.) “The purpose of peremptory challenges is to allow a party to exclude prospective jurors who the party believes may

2015We do not engage in a comparative analysis of various juror responses to evaluate the good faith of the prosecutor’s stated reasons for excusing a particular juror “because comparative analysis of jurors unrealistically ignores ‘the variety of factors and considerations that go into a lawyer’s decision to select certain jurors while challenging others that appear to be similar.’” ( Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 714-715, quoting Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 1219, 1220.) “The purpose of peremptory challenges is to allow a party to exclude prospective jurors who the party believes may be c

2014(See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 616-617 .) Since the defense did not make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, a comparative analysis was not relevant in the trial court; further, as we agree with the trial court that no prima facie showing was made, it is equally irrelevant here.

2013(See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 616 [no inference of discriminatory purpose where review of the record disclosed race-neutral reasons for excusing an African-American prospective juror].) Finally, defendant argues that the trial court should not have credited the prosecutor’s proffered explanation for excusing the prospective juror—her asserted lack of candor in responding to questions about her prior jury service—and suggests that a comparative analysis also undermines the prosecutor’s explanation.

2015While a comparative analysis must be considered on appeal when a defendant relies on that evidence and the record is adequate to permit the comparisons (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 662 (Williams)), any such analysis is confined to the prospective jurors identified by the defendant, and is subject to other restrictions. ( Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 622-624.) “Defendants who wait until appeal to argue comparative … analysis must be mindful that such evidence will be considered in view of the deference accorded the trial court’s ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent.” (I

2015While a comparative analysis must be considered on appeal when a defendant relies on that evidence and the record is adequate to permit the comparisons (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 662 (Williams)), any such analysis is confined to the prospective jurors identified by the defendant, and is subject to other restrictions. ( Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 622-624.) “Defendants who wait until appeal to argue comparative … analysis must be mindful that such evidence will be considered in view of the deference accorded the trial court’s ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent.” (I

2009(See In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1084 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 ] [“[Determination of suitability for parole involves a paramount assessment of the public safety risk posed by the particular offender, without regard to a comparative analysis of similar offenses committed by other persons.”].) As the California Supreme Court recently noted, “[flocus upon whether a petitioner’s crime was ‘particularly egregious’ in comparison to other murders in other cases is not called for by the statutes, which contemplate an individualized assessment of an inmate’s suitability for paro

2009(See In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1084 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 ] [“[Determination of suitability for parole involves a paramount assessment of the public safety risk posed by the particular offender, without regard to a comparative analysis of similar offenses committed by other persons.”].) As the California Supreme Court recently noted, “[flocus upon whether a petitioner’s crime was ‘particularly egregious’ in comparison to other murders in other cases is not called for by the statutes, which contemplate an individualized assessment of an inmate’s suitability for paro

2005We disapproved of performing for the first time on appeal such a comparative analysis in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1221 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ].

2005We disapproved of performing for the first time on appeal such a comparative analysis in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1221 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ].

2023“Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 (Martinez).) Additionally, the doctrine of separation of powers requires significant deference to 10 matters “which are uniquely in the domain of the Legislature,” which include “the definition of crime and the determination of punishment.” (People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174 .) “Only in the rarest of cases could a court declare that the length of a sentenc

2023“Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 (Martinez).) Additionally, the doctrine of separation of powers requires significant deference to matters “which are uniquely in the domain of the Legislature,” which include “the definition of crime and the determination of punishment.” (People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174 .) “Only in the rarest of cases could a court declare that the length of a 16 sentenc

2023Under the Eighth Amendment, “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences” are reviewed by first “comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” ( Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 59-60, discussing Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957 .) “‘[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality’ the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. [Citation.]

2023The two differ in that, under the federal inquiry, we proceed to the comparative analysis only if the “‘threshold’” analysis concerning the gravity of the offense “‘leads to an inference of gross disproportionality’” (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 60 ), whereas the state inquiry always involves the comparative analysis.

2023Under the Eighth Amendment, “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences” are reviewed by first “comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” ( Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 59-60, discussing Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957 .) “‘[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality’ the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. [Citation.]

2023Under the Eighth Amendment, “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences” are reviewed by first “comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” ( Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 59-60, discussing Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957 .) “‘[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality’ the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. [Citation.]

2022Third, the trial court must determine whether the 7 prosecution’s offered justification is credible and whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant has shown purposeful race discrimination. [Citation.] “The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the [defendant].” ’ ” (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1211 .) Appellant contends that when a prima facie case is found and the prosecutor states his or her reasons for dismissing the juror, “courts are required to apply a comparative analysis.” This is a slight

2020Comparative juror analysis allows the court to “ ‘compare the responses of the challenged jurors with those of similar unchallenged jurors who were not members of the challenged jurors’ racial group.’” (People v. Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 77 .) “[E]vidence of 38 comparative juror analysis must be considered in the trial court and even for the first time on appeal if relied upon by the defendant and the record is adequate to permit the urged comparisons.” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622 ; see People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1174 .) However, the trial court here neve

2016“Where, as here, the comparative analysis was not made at trial, ‘the prosecutor generally has not provided, and was not asked to provide, an explanation for nonchallenges.’ [Citation.] Therefore, ‘an appellate court must be mindful that an exploration of the alleged similarities at the time of trial might have shown that the jurors in question were not really comparable.’ 12 [Citation.]” (O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 976 , quoting People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346 , 365 and Snyder v. Louisiana, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 483 .) As a consequence, “[w]hen a defendant asks for comparative ju

2016(Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241 [ 162 L.Ed.2d 196 , 125 S.Ct. 2317 ] (Miller-El) [“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”].) “[Comparative juror analysis *976 is but one form of circumstantial evidence that is relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, on the issue of intentional discrimination.” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 622 .) Where, as here, the comparativ

2023“A comparative analysis of each side’s respective litigation costs” is “a useful check on the 39 reasonableness of any fee request.” (Donahue v. Donahue, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 272 .) Sabella also complains that Wilkinson billed for tasks that Mayer Brown could have handled itself, for example, taking client instruction, dealing with local witnesses, or communicating with the client.

2016It was only after deciding to reduce the hours claimed on this basis that the court observed that the reduced total (228.21 hours) “more closely approximates defense counsel’s purported 224 hours worked, which serves as a ‘cross-check’ for the claimed hours.” (See Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 ] [“A comparative analysis of each side’s respective litigation costs may be a useful check on the reasonableness of any fee request.”].) Thus, the trial court did not start from a mistaken premise in evaluating the hours spent by the Mountjoys’ attorneys. *274

2023I, § 17.) To decide whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime under the Eighth Amendment, a court “ ‘begin[s] by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence. [Citation.] “[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality” the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. [Citation.] If this comparative analysis “validate[s] an initial judgment

2023Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 24 [ 155 L.Ed.2d 108 ].) Applying this principle, “ ‘[a] court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and severity of the sentence. [Citation.] “[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality” the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdic

2008(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 654 [“the governing statute provides that the Board must grant parole unless it determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of incarceration for the individual because of the gravity of the offense underlying the conviction”]; Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1083, 1084, 1098 [“the suitability determination should focus upon the public safety risk posed by ‘this individual’ ” (italics added); “the determination of suitability for parole involves a paramount assessment of the public safety risk posed by the particular offender, without reg

2007(Italics added.) The court recognized in In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 598 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 905 ] (Scott II) that Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1061 , and Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, require that the commitment offense be compared to the minimal elements necessary for conviction, as opposed to the court engaging in a comparative analysis with other second degree murders, in determining its egregiousness.

2025The high court has held that comparative analysis may be probative of purposeful discrimination at Batson’s third stage. [Citation.]” (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1173 .) When, as here, “a defendant asks for comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, we have held that ‘such evidence will be considered in view of the deference accorded the trial court’s ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent.’ ” (People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 976 .) Furthermore, when we engage in a comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, we focus our review on the

2023The trial court, after hearing argument from both trial counsel and the prosecutor, specified its reasons for denying the first Batson/Wheeler motion. ( Baker, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 1077‒1078.) The trial court concluded, “[A]ppellate courts have recognized a valid reason in excusing individuals for employment stereotypes, as well as youth reasons or prospective jurors being young” and that it “has appreciated the comparative analysis conducted by [the prosecutor] in explaining that those reasons have been relied on by her to release individuals other than or in addition to the two prospecti