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14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1950–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Imagistics International, Inc. v. Department of General Servicesgreen2 sentences2016This forfeits any further consideration of these suggestions (Imagistics Internat., Inc. v. Department of General Services (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 581, 593 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 ] (Imagistics)). which are also unavailing in any event. 2016This forfeits any further consideration of these suggestions (Imagistics Internat., Inc. v. Department of General Services (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 581, 593 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 ] (Imagistics)). which are also unavailing in any event. | 2 | 2 |
Roark v. State Bargreen2 sentences1961Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. [Citations.] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such ‘improper’ evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff’s offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. ’ ’ See also to the effect that error occurring in an administrative proceeding does not vitiate the ruling unless shown to have been actually prejudicial to the appellan 1961Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. [Citations.] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such ‘improper’ evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff’s offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. ’ ’ See also to the effect that error occurring in an administrative proceeding does not vitiate the ruling unless shown to have been actually prejudicial to the appellan | 2 | 2 |
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2024(See also Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163 [“It is well established that ‘California 32 courts have “a policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits where the authorization does not prejudice the substantial rights of others”’”].) In any event, the operative complaint here also alleged tort claims, namely, the conversion and fraud claims against Patricia as an alter ego of Hannibal Classics. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ortizgreen1 sentence2020(People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1370 [rejecting defendant's claim that the title to an instruction was misleading and inferring the jury followed the substance of the instruction].) Based on the foregoing, we conclude it is not reasonably likely the jury instructions, viewed as a whole, caused the jury to misapply the law. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2013(People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 803 [“To the extent a discrepancy exists between the written and oral versions of jury instructions, the written instructions provided to the jury will control”].) Three, defendant argues that CALCRIM No. 375 was wrongly pronounced and written because while referencing the uncharged act as possession of methamphetamine, the body of the instruction referred to “acts,” namely: “You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the acts.” Defendant rhetorically asks, “Whi | 1 | 1 |
Baldwin v. State of Californiagreen1 sentence2012(Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 429.) Nonetheless, the court’s framing of the “crucial question” in the body of its analysis again demonstrated that its focus was on the design’s operation over time when conditions change at the public property. | 1 | 1 |
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allengreen2 sentences2001(Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 [ 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-2225 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 ]; see also Gamble, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 454-455.) As the court in Gamble found, “the language of CALJIC No. 2.15 contemplates its use for far more than knowingly receiving stolen property charges, for in the body of the instruction is a blank for insertion of the named charge” to which it applies. 2001(Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 [ 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-2225 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 ]; see also Gamble, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 454-455.) As the court in Gamble found, “the language of CALJIC No. 2.15 contemplates its use for far more than knowingly receiving stolen property charges, for in the body of the instruction is a blank for insertion of the named charge” to which it applies. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Langgreen2 sentences1994First, the instruction is appropriate when the crime charged is theft, robbery or knowingly receiving stolen property. “ ‘It is settled that when a person is shown to be in possession of recently stolen property slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances which tend to show guilt supports the conviction of robbery.’ (People v. Sorrentino (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 149, 160 [ 303 P.2d 859 ].)” (People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 542 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 235 ]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [guilt of robbery inferred because of 1994First, the instruction is appropriate when the crime charged is theft, robbery or knowingly receiving stolen property. “ ‘It is settled that when a person is shown to be in possession of recently stolen property slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances which tend to show guilt supports the conviction of robbery.’ (People v. Sorrentino (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 149, 160 [ 303 P.2d 859 ].)” (People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 542 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 235 ]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [guilt of robbery inferred because of | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mulqueengreen2 sentences1994First, the instruction is appropriate when the crime charged is theft, robbery or knowingly receiving stolen property. “ ‘It is settled that when a person is shown to be in possession of recently stolen property slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances which tend to show guilt supports the conviction of robbery.’ (People v. Sorrentino (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 149, 160 [ 303 P.2d 859 ].)” (People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 542 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 235 ]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [guilt of robbery inferred because of 1994First, the instruction is appropriate when the crime charged is theft, robbery or knowingly receiving stolen property. “ ‘It is settled that when a person is shown to be in possession of recently stolen property slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances which tend to show guilt supports the conviction of robbery.’ (People v. Sorrentino (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 149, 160 [ 303 P.2d 859 ].)” (People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 542 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 235 ]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [guilt of robbery inferred because of | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sorrentinogreen2 sentences1994First, the instruction is appropriate when the crime charged is theft, robbery or knowingly receiving stolen property. “ ‘It is settled that when a person is shown to be in possession of recently stolen property slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances which tend to show guilt supports the conviction of robbery.’ (People v. Sorrentino (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 149, 160 [ 303 P.2d 859 ].)” (People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 542 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 235 ]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [guilt of robbery inferred because of 1994First, the instruction is appropriate when the crime charged is theft, robbery or knowingly receiving stolen property. “ ‘It is settled that when a person is shown to be in possession of recently stolen property slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances which tend to show guilt supports the conviction of robbery.’ (People v. Sorrentino (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 149, 160 [ 303 P.2d 859 ].)” (People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 542 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 235 ]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] [guilt of robbery inferred because of | 1 | 1 |
Swenson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989Bill No. 3830 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.).) 15 We respectfully disagree with the suggestion contained in Swenson v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 348, 350 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 340 ], that the 10 days provided for in Local Rule 1104.1 was simply in anticipation of mail delays and that the reference to Augustyn in the body of the rule was to put parties on notice that a peremptory challenge to an assigned judge had to be given “at the earliest possible moment.” (Id., at p. 350.) In our view, the more reasonable explanation of the reference to Augustyn was to demonstrate that the rule drafters had r 1989Bill No. 3830 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.).) 15 We respectfully disagree with the suggestion contained in Swenson v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 348, 350 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 340 ], that the 10 days provided for in Local Rule 1104.1 was simply in anticipation of mail delays and that the reference to Augustyn in the body of the rule was to put parties on notice that a peremptory challenge to an assigned judge had to be given “at the earliest possible moment.” (Id., at p. 350.) In our view, the more reasonable explanation of the reference to Augustyn was to demonstrate that the rule drafters had r | 1 | 1 |
Koenig v. Coegreen2 sentences1971(Koenig v. Coe, 163 Cal.App.2d 429, 431-434 ( 329 P.2d 721 ].) Since then the body of the instruction has been modified and contains the qualifying clause, “and in the absence of reasonable cause for thinking otherwise.” While it is now repetitious and redundant to give the added portion of the instruction, the error in doing so is not of the prejudicial quality which warrants a reversal of the judgment. 1971(Koenig v. Coe, 163 Cal.App.2d 429, 431-434 ( 329 P.2d 721 ].) Since then the body of the instruction has been modified and contains the qualifying clause, “and in the absence of reasonable cause for thinking otherwise.” While it is now repetitious and redundant to give the added portion of the instruction, the error in doing so is not of the prejudicial quality which warrants a reversal of the judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Maryland C. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.green2 sentences1961Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. [Citations.] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such ‘improper’ evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff’s offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. ’ ’ See also to the effect that error occurring in an administrative proceeding does not vitiate the ruling unless shown to have been actually prejudicial to the appellan 1961Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. [Citations.] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such ‘improper’ evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff’s offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. ’ ’ See also to the effect that error occurring in an administrative proceeding does not vitiate the ruling unless shown to have been actually prejudicial to the appellan | 1 | 1 |
Brewer v. Railroad Commissiongreen2 sentences1961Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. [Citations.] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such ‘improper’ evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff’s offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. ’ ’ See also to the effect that error occurring in an administrative proceeding does not vitiate the ruling unless shown to have been actually prejudicial to the appellan 1961Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. [Citations.] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such ‘improper’ evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff’s offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. ’ ’ See also to the effect that error occurring in an administrative proceeding does not vitiate the ruling unless shown to have been actually prejudicial to the appellan | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. McFarland
green
2 sentences2001(Gamble, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 .) Such deduction is supported by the Use Note to CALJIC No. 2.15 (6th ed. 1996) page 57, which provides that such instruction “will serve to cover the effect of possession of recently stolen property in [the offenses of] robbery, burglary, theft and receiving stolen property,” and by the court’s observation in McFarland that the inference “is applicable whether the crime charged is theft, burglary, or knowingly receiving stolen property. [Citation.]” (McF arland, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 755 .) Further, “it is not just the inference as to defendant’s kno 1994And the use note adds, “This instruction will serve to cover the effect of possession of recently stolen property in robbery, burglary, theft and receiving stolen property.” This is supported by the case heavily relied on by appellant, People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748 , in which the court said the inference is applicable “whether the crime charged is theft, burglary, or knowingly receiving stolen property. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 755.) Second, it is not just the inference as to defendant’s knowledge that the property was stolen that may be drawn, but in the context of theft crimes oth | 2 | 1994–2001 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence2021The definition of ‘deadly weapon’ at the end of the instruction was unlikely to be interpreted as meaning any other standard applied, as discussed in the following paragraph, and thus it would not prevent the jurors from simply doing what the numbered paragraphs of CALCRIM No. 875 told them to do, which is to inquire whether the defendant’s actions would ‘probably’ lead to a ‘slight touching.’ [¶] The definition of ‘deadly weapon’ in CALCRIM No. 875 does not cure this problem because the definition is written in a way that merely asks the jury to consider the hypothetical uses of a weapon, ins | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2021The definition of ‘deadly weapon’ at the end of the instruction was unlikely to be interpreted as meaning any other standard applied, as discussed in the following paragraph, and thus it would not prevent the jurors from simply doing what the numbered paragraphs of CALCRIM No. 875 told them to do, which is to inquire whether the defendant’s actions would ‘probably’ lead to a ‘slight touching.’ [¶] The definition of ‘deadly weapon’ in CALCRIM No. 875 does not cure this problem because the definition is written in a way that merely asks the jury to consider the hypothetical uses of a weapon, ins | 1 | 2021–2021 |
City of Bellflower v. Cohen
green
1 sentence2016Our decision in City of Bellflower v. Cohen (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 438 , remittitur issued May 3, 2016 (Bellflower), renders moot any need for a declaration in the present action that the administrative diversion of future local tax revenues violates a 6 In this context, the City mentions a violation of due process in a heading, and adverts in passing to interference with a vested interest in the body of its analysis, but does not develop either argument. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Gamble
green
2 sentences2001(Gamble, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 .) Such deduction is supported by the Use Note to CALJIC No. 2.15 (6th ed. 1996) page 57, which provides that such instruction “will serve to cover the effect of possession of recently stolen property in [the offenses of] robbery, burglary, theft and receiving stolen property,” and by the court’s observation in McFarland that the inference “is applicable whether the crime charged is theft, burglary, or knowingly receiving stolen property. [Citation.]” (McF arland, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 755 .) Further, “it is not just the inference as to defendant’s kno 2001(Gamble, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 453 .) Such deduction is supported by the Use Note to CALJIC No. 2.15 (6th ed. 1996) page 57, which provides that such instruction “will serve to cover the effect of possession of recently stolen property in [the offenses of] robbery, burglary, theft and receiving stolen property,” and by the court’s observation in McFarland that the inference “is applicable whether the crime charged is theft, burglary, or knowingly receiving stolen property. [Citation.]” (McF arland, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 755 .) Further, “it is not just the inference as to defendant’s kno | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Zdonek v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1989Bill No. 3830 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.).) 15 We respectfully disagree with the suggestion contained in Swenson v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 348, 350 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 340 ], that the 10 days provided for in Local Rule 1104.1 was simply in anticipation of mail delays and that the reference to Augustyn in the body of the rule was to put parties on notice that a peremptory challenge to an assigned judge had to be given “at the earliest possible moment.” (Id., at p. 350.) In our view, the more reasonable explanation of the reference to Augustyn was to demonstrate that the rule drafters had r | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Brock v. Fouchy
green
2 sentences1950Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. ( Brock v. Fouchy, 76 Cal. App.2d 363 [ 172 P.2d 945 ]; Cordi v. Garcia, 56 Cal. App.2d 584 [ 132 P.2d 887 ].) [7] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such "improper" evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff's offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. [8] Furthermore, since the proceeding in the trial court must be con 1950Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. ( Brock v. Fouchy, 76 Cal. App.2d 363 [ 172 P.2d 945 ]; Cordi v. Garcia, 56 Cal. App.2d 584 [ 132 P.2d 887 ].) [7] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such "improper" evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff's offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. [8] Furthermore, since the proceeding in the trial court must be con | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Cordi v. Garcia
green
2 sentences1950Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. ( Brock v. Fouchy, 76 Cal. App.2d 363 [ 172 P.2d 945 ]; Cordi v. Garcia, 56 Cal. App.2d 584 [ 132 P.2d 887 ].) [7] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such "improper" evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff's offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. [8] Furthermore, since the proceeding in the trial court must be con 1950Moreover, it is presumed on appeal that the court, sitting without a jury, did not base its finding on irrelevant evidence where there is competent evidence to support it. ( Brock v. Fouchy, 76 Cal. App.2d 363 [ 172 P.2d 945 ]; Cordi v. Garcia, 56 Cal. App.2d 584 [ 132 P.2d 887 ].) [7] There being competent evidence to support the judgment without such "improper" evidence, and the court not having based its findings on the latter, it is not important that plaintiff's offer of proof in rebuttal thereof was denied by the board. [8] Furthermore, since the proceeding in the trial court must be con | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.