14 California opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruengreen2 sentences2024Finally, Rhode Island has a suitability requirement, [citation], but the Rhode Island Supreme Court has flatly denied that the ‘[d]emonstration of a proper showing of need’ is a component of that requirement.” (Bruen, 597 U.S. at p. 13, fn. 1 .) We agree with Mosqueda’s conclusion: “The Bruen court’s citation to these statutes as ‘shall issue’ statutes demonstrated the court was not facially condemning licensing schemes based solely on their use of ‘may issue’ language or the exercise of discretion. 2024The court’s language that these jurisdictions ‘appear to operate like “shall-issue” jurisdictions’ (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 13, fn. 1 ) indicates that, unless it can be determined from the face of the provision, whether a licensing scheme vests an amount of discretion in licensing authorities that exceeds what the Second Amendment allows is an issue best decided in as- applied challenges, not facial challenges. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gomezgreen1 sentence2024(See People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 290 [permissive inferences are constitutionally suspect when there is no rational way trier of fact could make the connection permitted by the inference].) He asserts the error was prejudicial under any standard. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2019(People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 [“Franklin made clear that the sentencing hearing has newfound import in providing the juvenile with an opportunity to place on the record the kinds of information that ‘will be relevant to the [parole board] as it fulfills its statutory obligations’”]; see People v. Tran (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 561, 570 .) We simply cannot assume defense counsel at a sentencing hearing that preceded Franklin anticipated the extent to which evidence of youth-related factors was a critical component of the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Trangreen1 sentence2019(People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 819 [“Franklin made clear that the sentencing hearing has newfound import in providing the juvenile with an opportunity to place on the record the kinds of information that ‘will be relevant to the [parole board] as it fulfills its statutory obligations’”]; see People v. Tran (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 561, 570 .) We simply cannot assume defense counsel at a sentencing hearing that preceded Franklin anticipated the extent to which evidence of youth-related factors was a critical component of the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.green2 sentences2016Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31 (Waller).) “ ‘The burden . . . is on the party claiming a waiver of a right to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that does not leave the matter to speculation, and “doubtful cases will be decided against a waiver” [citation].’ ” (Id. at p. 31, quoting City of Ukiah v. Fones (1966) 64 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 .) A key component of the doctrine of waiver is intent; consequently, the mere failure to call attention in a denial letter to an exclusion or limitations provision is not enough to bar the insurer from asserting such a defense. ( Waller, supra, at 2016Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31 (Waller).) “ ‘The burden . . . is on the party claiming a waiver of a right to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that does not leave the matter to speculation, and “doubtful cases will be decided against a waiver” [citation].’ ” (Id. at p. 31, quoting City of Ukiah v. Fones (1966) 64 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 .) A key component of the doctrine of waiver is intent; consequently, the mere failure to call attention in a denial letter to an exclusion or limitations provision is not enough to bar the insurer from asserting such a defense. ( Waller, supra, at | 1 | 1 |
Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2016Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 689 [“waiver exists whenever an insurer intentionally relinquishes its right to rely on the limitations provision”]; Velasquez v. Truck Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Badie v. Bank of Americagreen2 sentences2013(Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 716 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 ] [points not raised on appeal are forfeited]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784—785 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 ] [party waives points not raised on appeal and points not supported with reasoned argument].) Moreover, even if this theory is not forfeited because of Anna’s failure to assert it both in the trial court and on appeal, I do not see how we can ground our opinion on the issue of a conflict between the right to counsel admonition component of the rule and the aforementioned statutes withou 2013(Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 716 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 ] [points not raised on appeal are forfeited]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784—785 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 ] [party waives points not raised on appeal and points not supported with reasoned argument].) Moreover, even if this theory is not forfeited because of Anna’s failure to assert it both in the trial court and on appeal, I do not see how we can ground our opinion on the issue of a conflict between the right to counsel admonition component of the rule and the aforementioned statutes withou | 1 | 1 |
Browne v. County of Tehamagreen2 sentences2013(Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 716 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 ] [points not raised on appeal are forfeited]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784—785 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 ] [party waives points not raised on appeal and points not supported with reasoned argument].) Moreover, even if this theory is not forfeited because of Anna’s failure to assert it both in the trial court and on appeal, I do not see how we can ground our opinion on the issue of a conflict between the right to counsel admonition component of the rule and the aforementioned statutes withou 2013(Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 716 [ 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 ] [points not raised on appeal are forfeited]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779 , 784—785 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 ] [party waives points not raised on appeal and points not supported with reasoned argument].) Moreover, even if this theory is not forfeited because of Anna’s failure to assert it both in the trial court and on appeal, I do not see how we can ground our opinion on the issue of a conflict between the right to counsel admonition component of the rule and the aforementioned statutes withou | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Merriman
green
2 sentences2025A trial court only exceeds its discretion if it acts in “ ‘ “an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that result[s] in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 74 .) No such manifest miscarriage of justice has been shown here. 2025A trial court only exceeds its discretion if it acts in “ ‘ “an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that result[s] in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 74 .) No such manifest miscarriage of justice has been shown here. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Sun v. City of Oakland
green
1 sentence2024(See Sun, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183 , quoting § 835 [“a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes . . . that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition”]; see also CACI No. 1100 (Dangerous Condition on Public Property—Essential Factual Elements (Gov. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2024On appeal, defendant asserts the court erred in admitting his statement to police because it was taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) because a critical component of the warning was lost in the translation process. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
City of Ukiah v. Fones
green
1 sentence2016Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31 (Waller).) “ ‘The burden . . . is on the party claiming a waiver of a right to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that does not leave the matter to speculation, and “doubtful cases will be decided against a waiver” [citation].’ ” (Id. at p. 31, quoting City of Ukiah v. Fones (1966) 64 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 .) A key component of the doctrine of waiver is intent; consequently, the mere failure to call attention in a denial letter to an exclusion or limitations provision is not enough to bar the insurer from asserting such a defense. ( Waller, supra, at | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Babcock
green
1 sentence2016There was no application of force to prevent the victim from crying out (as in People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372 ), or from escaping so that the offensive groping could begin or continue (as in People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784 ; People v. Babcock (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 383 ; and People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Neel
green
1 sentence2016There was no application of force to prevent the victim from crying out (as in People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372 ), or from escaping so that the offensive groping could begin or continue (as in People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784 ; People v. Babcock (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 383 ; and People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Gilbert
green
1 sentence2016There was no application of force to prevent the victim from crying out (as in People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372 ), or from escaping so that the offensive groping could begin or continue (as in People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784 ; People v. Babcock (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 383 ; and People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Stark
green
1 sentence2016There was no application of force to prevent the victim from crying out (as in People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372 ), or from escaping so that the offensive groping could begin or continue (as in People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784 ; People v. Babcock (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 383 ; and People v. Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ramirez v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences2016Brauer asserts that the court in In re Marriage of Ramirez, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 336 , indicated that section 2033, subdivision (b), requires only a declaration stating the encumbering party’s belief as to fair market value, and not supporting documentation. 15 Brauer argues, “If documentation was an important component or requirement, one would think the Ramirez court would have said so. 2016Brauer asserts that the court in In re Marriage of Ramirez, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 336 , indicated that section 2033, subdivision (b), requires only a declaration stating the encumbering party’s belief as to fair market value, and not supporting documentation. 15 Brauer argues, “If documentation was an important component or requirement, one would think the Ramirez court would have said so. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Soto
green
1 sentence2016Our Supreme Court has held that the “level of force . . . necessary to support . . . the harsher penal consequences of a conviction under section 288(b) [is that] . . . the force 4 used . . . be ‘substantially different from or substantially greater than that necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.’ ” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 242 .) The evidence received at the preliminary examination demonstrates, as Judge Medvigy initially concluded, that force was not a component of the violation of section 288. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commission
green
1 sentence2015Quoting extensively from the Supreme Court opinion in Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158 , the court stated that the Supreme Court “has made it clear that the requirement of ripeness, as a component of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions.” The court held that the questions presented by the complaint for determination “made sense when there was a concrete subtenant, 24 Hour Fitness, that wanted to sublease the leased premises. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
San Dieguito Union High School District v. Commission on Professional Competence
green
2 sentences2013(See San Dieguito Union High School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 278 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 203 ],) 7 D. 2013(See San Dieguito Union High School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 278 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 203 ],) 7 D. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp.
green
2 sentences2000Spoliation plaintiffs such as Penn also have some difficulty showing that they have relied on the law as it existed prior to Cedars-Sinai In determining whether a new precedent should be subject to any exception to the usual rule requiring retroactivity, a major component of the analysis focuses on the extent of reliance by litigants on existing law. ( Newman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 989 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 772 P.2d 1059 .) Such reliance is most compelling "when a party has acquired a vested right or entered into a contract based on the former rule, and we are more reluctant to apply our deci 2000Spoliation plaintiffs such as Penn also have some difficulty showing that they have relied on the law as it existed prior to Cedars-Sinai In determining whether a new precedent should be subject to any exception to the usual rule requiring retroactivity, a major component of the analysis focuses on the extent of reliance by litigants on existing law. ( Newman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 989 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 772 P.2d 1059 .) Such reliance is most compelling "when a party has acquired a vested right or entered into a contract based on the former rule, and we are more reluctant to apply our deci | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.