defendant without a general waiver in California

2012Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” (§ 1382, subd. (a), italics added.) 5 applies an „abuse of discretion‟ standard.” (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 546 , fn. omitted.) With respect to the defendant whose counsel had been engaged in another trial, we distinguished a continuance resulting from unforeseen consequences from a continuance resulting from the state‟s failure to provide enough p

2009Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter." (§ 1382(a)(2)(B), italics added.) The limitation periods set forth in section 1382(a)(2) for bringing a case to trial are not absolute, and an accused may be "brought to trial" beyond the applicable period "(1) for good cause , (2) at the request of the defendant, (3) with the defendant's consent, either express or implied, or (4) when the defendant fails

2002Under . . . section 1382, subdivision (a)(3)(B), `[w]henever a case is set for trial beyond the 30-day or 45-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.' It is the language of the statute, not the agreement of the parties, which controls the determination of what is the last day for trial. ( People v. Griffin (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1740, 1745-1748 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 620 ] [(Griffin)}.) The last day to which [Bailon] consented was December 26, 2001.

2002Under . . . section 1382, subdivision (a)(3)(B), `[w]henever a case is set for trial beyond the 30-day or 45-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.' It is the language of the statute, not the agreement of the parties, which controls the determination of what is the last day for trial. ( People v. Griffin (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1740, 1745-1748 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 620 ] [(Griffin)}.) The last day to which [Bailon] consented was December 26, 2001.

2018Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” 41 The statutory speedy trial rights provided in section 1382 and related sections of the Penal Code “ ‘are supplementary to and a construction of’ the state constitutional speedy trial guarantee.” (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 766 .) “[S]ection 1382 constitutes a legislative endorsement of dismissal as a proper judicial sanction for violatio

2018Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” 41 The statutory speedy trial rights provided in section 1382 and related sections of the Penal Code “ ‘are supplementary to and a construction of’ the state constitutional speedy trial guarantee.” (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 766 .) “[S]ection 1382 constitutes a legislative endorsement of dismissal as a proper judicial sanction for violatio

2013As such, the statute requires dismissal if trial is not commenced within 60 days of declaration of mistrial, unless good cause is found or the defendant consents to waive time, in which case he may be brought to trial on or within 10 days after the date of his consent. (§ 1382, subd. (a)(2)(B); see also People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 628-629 .) Thus, “[t]he 10-day period does not begin to run until the defendant announces ready for trial on the date to which the trial was continued, or on tried again following a mistrial, . . . within 60 days after the mistrial has been declared . . .

2010(Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 629 ; see People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 561 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 ] (Johnson); see also People v. Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 545 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 , 227 P.3d 437 ] (Sutton).) We first consider whether defendant could have been “brought to trial” on July 28, 2008, in the Indio courtroom under the circumstances reflected in the record.

2012Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” (§ 1382, subd. (a), italics added.) 5 applies an „abuse of discretion‟ standard.” (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 546 , fn. omitted.) With respect to the defendant whose counsel had been engaged in another trial, we distinguished a continuance resulting from unforeseen consequences from a continuance resulting from the state‟s failure to provide enough p

2012Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” (§ 1382, subd. (a), italics added.) 5 applies an „abuse of discretion‟ standard.” (Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 546 , fn. omitted.) With respect to the defendant whose counsel had been engaged in another trial, we distinguished a continuance resulting from unforeseen consequences from a continuance resulting from the state‟s failure to provide enough p

1995Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” In Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 780-782 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 251 , 543 P.2d 619 ], our Supreme Court held that because section 1382 was enacted to supplement and define the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the statutory right to be tried within 60 days was not of a fundamental character and thus could be waived by defense counsel ove

1995Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.” In Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 780-782 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 251 , 543 P.2d 619 ], our Supreme Court held that because section 1382 was enacted to supplement and define the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the statutory right to be tried within 60 days was not of a fundamental character and thus could be waived by defense counsel ove

2013The action will not be dismissed for delay beyond the specified period, however, if the defendant enters a general time waiver or ‘requests or consents to the setting of a trial date beyond the [statutorily prescribed] period.’ (§ 1382, subd. (a)(2)(B) [felony] . . . .) But ‘[w]henever a case is set for trial beyond the [initial statutorily prescribed] period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter.’ (§ 1382 (a)(2)(B), 3(B), italics added.)” (Barsamyan

2009Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter." (§ 1382(a)(2)(B), italics added.) The limitation periods set forth in section 1382(a)(2) for bringing a case to trial are not absolute, and an accused may be "brought to trial" beyond the applicable period "(1) for good cause , (2) at the request of the defendant, (3) with the defendant's consent, either express or implied, or (4) when the defendant fails

2009Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter." (§ 1382(a)(2)(B), italics added.) The limitation periods set forth in section 1382(a)(2) for bringing a case to trial are not absolute, and an accused may be "brought to trial" beyond the applicable period "(1) for good cause , (2) at the request of the defendant, (3) with the defendant's consent, either express or implied, or (4) when the defendant fails

2009Whenever a case is set for trial beyond the 60-day period by request or consent, expressed or implied, of the defendant without a general waiver, the defendant shall be brought to trial on the date set for trial or within 10 days thereafter." (§ 1382(a)(2)(B), italics added.) The limitation periods set forth in section 1382(a)(2) for bringing a case to trial are not absolute, and an accused may be "brought to trial" beyond the applicable period "(1) for good cause , (2) at the request of the defendant, (3) with the defendant's consent, either express or implied, or (4) when the defendant fails

2008The word “thereafter” refers back to the date the case was set with the defendant’s consent.’ ” (Townsend, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 783 , quoting Tudman v. Superior Court (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 129, 132-133 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 391 ]; see also Bryant, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489-490.) Reviewing courts routinely examine the record for the last date to which the defendant consented for the purpose of initiating the 10-day period— even, in some instances, when the defendant already had announced readiness for trial at some earlier point.

2008The word “thereafter” refers back to the date the case was set with the defendant’s consent.’ ” (Townsend, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 783 , quoting Tudman v. Superior Court (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 129, 132-133 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 391 ]; see also Bryant, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489-490.) Reviewing courts routinely examine the record for the last date to which the defendant consented for the purpose of initiating the 10-day period— even, in some instances, when the defendant already had announced readiness for trial at some earlier point.

2008(See People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 869 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 785 , 135 P.3d 32 ]; People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 689 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 , 50 P.3d 355 ].) A As can be seen from the face of the statute, a defendant’s consent to or request for postponement of trial is critical to identifying the governing 10-day grace period.

2008(See People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 869 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 785 , 135 P.3d 32 ]; People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 689 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 , 50 P.3d 355 ].) A As can be seen from the face of the statute, a defendant’s consent to or request for postponement of trial is critical to identifying the governing 10-day grace period.

2008(See People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 869 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 785 , 135 P.3d 32 ]; People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 689 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 , 50 P.3d 355 ].) A As can be seen from the face of the statute, a defendant’s consent to or request for postponement of trial is critical to identifying the governing 10-day grace period.

2008(See People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 869 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 785 , 135 P.3d 32 ]; People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 689 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 , 50 P.3d 355 ].) A As can be seen from the face of the statute, a defendant’s consent to or request for postponement of trial is critical to identifying the governing 10-day grace period.

2005At the penalty phase, defendant testified that he thought he would obtain a postponement of his trial if he told Dr. Maloney he wanted to gouge the prosecutor’s eyes out. 5 Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that there was an “unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.’ ” (Morris v. Slappy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 610 , 103 S.Ct. 1610 ].) [6] 6 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 465 P.2d 44 ] (Marsden). 1 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ] (Farett

2005At the penalty phase, defendant testified that he thought he would obtain a postponement of his trial if he told Dr. Maloney he wanted to gouge the prosecutor’s eyes out. 5 Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that there was an “unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.’ ” (Morris v. Slappy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 610 , 103 S.Ct. 1610 ].) [6] 6 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 465 P.2d 44 ] (Marsden). 1 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ] (Farett

2000(Bryant v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 483, 488-499 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 777 ].) The 10-day period is “automatic” by operation of Penal *1287 Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B), and cannot be unilaterally waived by a defendant.

2000(Bryant v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 483, 488-499 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 777 ].) The 10-day period is “automatic” by operation of Penal *1287 Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B), and cannot be unilaterally waived by a defendant.