equalization hearing in California

1976It requires the citation of no authority to establish the principle that tax proceedings are in invitum and are necessarily strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer.” {Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 227 .) “Compliance with the constitutional requirement for an equalization hearing is not met unless the substance as well as the form of the hearing is granted to the complaining taxpayer. {Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 227.) Typical illustrations of the denial of procedural due process which have been held to invalidate purported equalizat

1952XIII, § 9; Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 230 [ 82 P.2d 185 ], and eases cited therein.) After the assessment has been equalized, or the taxpayer has failed to avail himself of the right to an equalization hearing, and the tax levied against the property has become final,- the taxpayer has no further right to an equalization hearing.

2019Co. (7th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3d 200, 206 .) Among other things, the railyard at issue was “included in a Superfund site,” a report available to the subsequent owner “described contamination at the railyard,” the owner’s “own engineers had noted that the railyard might require extensive cleanup,” and the owner “knew of EPA investigations in the area.” (Ibid.; see also In re Manville Forest Products Corp. (2d Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 125 , 129 [“future environmental liability was actually or presumedly contemplated by the parties upon their signing of the indemnification agreements”]; In re Cool Fuel, Inc

2019Co. (7th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3d 200, 206 .) Among other things, the railyard at issue was “included in a Superfund site,” a report available to the subsequent owner “described contamination at the railyard,” the owner’s “own engineers had noted that the railyard might require extensive cleanup,” and the owner “knew of EPA investigations in the area.” (Ibid.; see also In re Manville Forest Products Corp. (2d Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 125 , 129 [“future environmental liability was actually or presumedly contemplated by the parties upon their signing of the indemnification agreements”]; In re Cool Fuel, Inc

2019Co. (7th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3d 200, 206 .) Among other things, the railyard at issue was “included in a Superfund site,” a report available to the subsequent owner “described contamination at the railyard,” the owner’s “own engineers had noted that the railyard might require extensive cleanup,” and the owner “knew of EPA investigations in the area.” (Ibid.; see also In re Manville Forest Products Corp. (2d Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 125 , 129 [“future environmental liability was actually or presumedly contemplated by the parties upon their signing of the indemnification agreements”]; In re Cool Fuel, Inc

2019Co. (7th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3d 200, 206 .) Among other things, the railyard at issue was “included in a Superfund site,” a report available to the subsequent owner “described contamination at the railyard,” the owner’s “own engineers had noted that the railyard might require extensive cleanup,” and the owner “knew of EPA investigations in the area.” (Ibid.; see also In re Manville Forest Products Corp. (2d Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 125 , 129 [“future environmental liability was actually or presumedly contemplated by the parties upon their signing of the indemnification agreements”]; In re Cool Fuel, Inc

2018(See *621 Mission Housing Development Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 55 , 88, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 185 ["By its own terms, section 5152 only applies where the assessor should have utilized the procedures set forth under section 538."].) As for the last of these three elements, the subjective belief of the assessor may be demonstrated through statements made by the assessor or objective facts which evidence the assessor's subjective state of mind.

2018(See *621 Mission Housing Development Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 55 , 88, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 185 ["By its own terms, section 5152 only applies where the assessor should have utilized the procedures set forth under section 538."].) As for the last of these three elements, the subjective belief of the assessor may be demonstrated through statements made by the assessor or objective facts which evidence the assessor's subjective state of mind.

1997Oil Co. v. Byram, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 361 .) “Form” includes proper notice.

1976Oil Co. v. Byram, supra, 25 Cal.2d 353,361.) As regards Government Code section 31000.7, the issue reduces itself to a question of whether or not the statute contemplates a difference between “advising” and “representing” a board.

2018In Prudential , the plaintiff purchased a hotel property and, as part of the transaction, assumed a loan owed by the seller to Bank of America at a below market rate. ( Prudential, supra , 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 1146 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 869 .) The assessor placed a value on the hotel based on an inflated purchase price. ( Ibid . ) In doing so, it erroneously disregarded a State Board of Equalization rule which required the loan to be discounted to its cash equivalent. ( Id . at pp. 1148-1149, 236 Cal.Rptr. 869 .) On appeal, the court upheld an award of attorney fees under section 5251. ( Prudential

2018In Prudential , the plaintiff purchased a hotel property and, as part of the transaction, assumed a loan owed by the seller to Bank of America at a below market rate. ( Prudential, supra , 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 1146 , 236 Cal.Rptr. 869 .) The assessor placed a value on the hotel based on an inflated purchase price. ( Ibid . ) In doing so, it erroneously disregarded a State Board of Equalization rule which required the loan to be discounted to its cash equivalent. ( Id . at pp. 1148-1149, 236 Cal.Rptr. 869 .) On appeal, the court upheld an award of attorney fees under section 5251. ( Prudential

2018There, the court upheld the denial of attorney fees under section 5152 because "[t]here [was] no indication in the record that the assessor believed [the rule at issue] was unconstitutional or invalid." ( Phillips Petroleum, supra , 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 198 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 .) It rejected the notion that section 5152 attorney fees are implicated any time an assessor fails to apply a statute or regulation because he or she believes it inapplicable when it is, in fact, applicable. ( Phillips Petroleum , at p. 198, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 .) In addition, it emphasized the importance of a "factual

2018There, the court upheld the denial of attorney fees under section 5152 because "[t]here [was] no indication in the record that the assessor believed [the rule at issue] was unconstitutional or invalid." ( Phillips Petroleum, supra , 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 198 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 .) It rejected the notion that section 5152 attorney fees are implicated any time an assessor fails to apply a statute or regulation because he or she believes it inapplicable when it is, in fact, applicable. ( Phillips Petroleum , at p. 198, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 .) In addition, it emphasized the importance of a "factual

1981Code, tit. 18, § 8, subd. (c)): “The amount to be capitalized is the net return which a reasonably well informed owner and reasonably well informed buyers may anticipate on the lien date that the taxable property existing on that date will yield under prudent management and subject to such legally enforceable restrictions as such persons may foresee as of that date.” Rule 8(c) is based on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1955) 45 Cal.2d 546, 564-566 [ 290 P.2d 544 ]. “... the value of the property is the sum of anticipated future installments

1981Code, tit. 18, § 8, subd. (c)): “The amount to be capitalized is the net return which a reasonably well informed owner and reasonably well informed buyers may anticipate on the lien date that the taxable property existing on that date will yield under prudent management and subject to such legally enforceable restrictions as such persons may foresee as of that date.” Rule 8(c) is based on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1955) 45 Cal.2d 546, 564-566 [ 290 P.2d 544 ]. “... the value of the property is the sum of anticipated future installments

1976It requires the citation of no authority to establish the principle that tax proceedings are in invitum and are necessarily strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer.” {Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 227 .) “Compliance with the constitutional requirement for an equalization hearing is not met unless the substance as well as the form of the hearing is granted to the complaining taxpayer. {Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 227.) Typical illustrations of the denial of procedural due process which have been held to invalidate purported equalizat

1976It requires the citation of no authority to establish the principle that tax proceedings are in invitum and are necessarily strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer.” {Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 227 .) “Compliance with the constitutional requirement for an equalization hearing is not met unless the substance as well as the form of the hearing is granted to the complaining taxpayer. {Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 227.) Typical illustrations of the denial of procedural due process which have been held to invalidate purported equalizat

1975(See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 376 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 364 P.2d 266 ].) He further argues that by enacting section 1606, the Legislature has indicated that the taxpayer is not entitled to additional information gathered by the assessor solely for the equalization hearing unless the taxpayer is willing to reciprocate and provide the assessor with like information regarding his case.

1975(See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 376 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 364 P.2d 266 ].) He further argues that by enacting section 1606, the Legislature has indicated that the taxpayer is not entitled to additional information gathered by the assessor solely for the equalization hearing unless the taxpayer is willing to reciprocate and provide the assessor with like information regarding his case.

1975Section 6 of the Revenue and Taxation Code specifically provides as follows: “Division, part, chapter, article, and section headings do not in any manner affect the scope, meaning, or intent of the provisions of this code.” (See also In re Halcomb (1942) 21 Cal.2d 126, 130 [ 130 P.2d 384 ].) Secondly, the assessor maintains that to give independent meaning to section 408 as a valid alternative to obtaining information after a request for a reduction has been made, places the assessor at a “distinct disadvantage.” He argues the taxpayer gets the opportunity to review in advance the case which t

1975Section 6 of the Revenue and Taxation Code specifically provides as follows: “Division, part, chapter, article, and section headings do not in any manner affect the scope, meaning, or intent of the provisions of this code.” (See also In re Halcomb (1942) 21 Cal.2d 126, 130 [ 130 P.2d 384 ].) Secondly, the assessor maintains that to give independent meaning to section 408 as a valid alternative to obtaining information after a request for a reduction has been made, places the assessor at a “distinct disadvantage.” He argues the taxpayer gets the opportunity to review in advance the case which t

1944(Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 230; Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 [ 28 S.Ct. 708 , 52 L.Ed. 1103 ].) [4] As any tax proceeding is in invitum in nature, each step must be taken in compliance with law or the proceeding is void.

1944(Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 230; Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 [ 28 S.Ct. 708 , 52 L.Ed. 1103 ].) [4] As any tax proceeding is in invitum in nature, each step must be taken in compliance with law or the proceeding is void.

1944(Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 227.) Typical illustrations of the denial of procedural due process which have been held to invalidate purported equalization determinations are: One man hearings (Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at pp. 228-230); the taking of evidence without the presence of the taxpayer or his representative (Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 577 [ 158 P. 218 ] ; Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 231); the refusal to allow reasonable opportunity for cross-examination (Interstate Commerce Com. v. Louisville a Nash

1944(Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 227.) Typical illustrations of the denial of procedural due process which have been held to invalidate purported equalization determinations are: One man hearings (Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at pp. 228-230); the taking of evidence without the presence of the taxpayer or his representative (Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 577 [ 158 P. 218 ] ; Bandini Estate Co. v. Los Angeles County, supra, at p. 231); the refusal to allow reasonable opportunity for cross-examination (Interstate Commerce Com. v. Louisville a Nash