equitable conversion doctrine in California

2014The vendor is regarded as holding the legal title in trust for the purchaser; the purchaser, in turn, is considered the trustee of the purchase money for the benefit of the vendor.” (Mamula v. McCulloch (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 184, 193-194 ; see generally Estate of Reid (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 362 , 367- 370.) The equitable conversion doctrine “‘is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.’ [Citation.]” (Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v.

2014(See Estate of Dwyer (1911) 159 Cal. 664, 675 ; Estate of Reid, supra, 26 Cal.App.2d at p. 368 .) Although its effect may not become apparent until a subsequent event, such as condemnation in Alhambra Redevelopment or the foreclosure sale in Rogers, the purchaser nevertheless acquires equitable title at the time the agreement is made.

1954The doctrine of equitable conversion “is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.” (19 Am.Jur., §2, p. 2.) An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675 [ 115 P. 235

1954The doctrine of equitable conversion “is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.” (19 Am.Jur., §2, p. 2.) An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675 [ 115 P. 235

1958(Los Angeles T. & S. Bank v. Bortenstein, 47 Cal.App. 421, 423 [ 190 P. 850 ]; Pomona College v. Dunn, 7 Cal.App.2d 227, 232 [ 46 P.2d 270 ].) Notwithstanding the doctrine of equitable conversion, the filing of a lis pendens is completely ineffectual as a protection for the rights of the parties with respect to the money deposited with the clerk of the superior court in payment of the condemnation award.

1958(Los Angeles T. & S. Bank v. Bortenstein, 47 Cal.App. 421, 423 [ 190 P. 850 ]; Pomona College v. Dunn, 7 Cal.App.2d 227, 232 [ 46 P.2d 270 ].) Notwithstanding the doctrine of equitable conversion, the filing of a lis pendens is completely ineffectual as a protection for the rights of the parties with respect to the money deposited with the clerk of the superior court in payment of the condemnation award.

1954The doctrine of equitable conversion “is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.” (19 Am.Jur., §2, p. 2.) An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675 [ 115 P. 235

1954The doctrine of equitable conversion “is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.” (19 Am.Jur., §2, p. 2.) An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675 [ 115 P. 235

2014(Cornelison v. Kornbluth (1975) 15 Cal.3d 590, 598, fn. 3, 599 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 557 , 542 P.2d 981 ] (Cornelison); id. at p. 604, fn. 9 [“actions by mortgagees against nonpossessing third parties for tortious impairment of security are not affected by the antideficiency legislation”].) Also, Highland sued Appellant, seeking declaratory relief that it is entitled to a judicially imposed lien under the terms of its deed of trust and related note, and/or under the doctrine of equitable conversion, upon any recovery that Appellant might eventually obtain from the third party tortfeasors.

2014(Cornelison v. Kornbluth (1975) 15 Cal.3d 590, 598, fn. 3, 599 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 557 , 542 P.2d 981 ] (Cornelison); id. at p. 604, fn. 9 [“actions by mortgagees against nonpossessing third parties for tortious impairment of security are not affected by the antideficiency legislation”].) Also, Highland sued Appellant, seeking declaratory relief that it is entitled to a judicially imposed lien under the terms of its deed of trust and related note, and/or under the doctrine of equitable conversion, upon any recovery that Appellant might eventually obtain from the third party tortfeasors.

2014(See Redingler v. Imperial Savings & Loan Assn. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 48, 50-51 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] (Redingler) [creditor could collect on insurance policy named as additional security for mortgage, up to the amount of the indebtedness remaining after the foreclosure sale].) In Sampsell,. supra, 51 Cal.App.2d 180, 186 , the foreclosing creditor could collect on the debtor’s assignment of rental income, because “the sale of the real property under the deed of trust does not wipe out the indebtedness nor prevent the creditor from proceeding to recover upon any other security . . . .” Highland l

2014(See Redingler v. Imperial Savings & Loan Assn. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 48, 50-51 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 575 ] (Redingler) [creditor could collect on insurance policy named as additional security for mortgage, up to the amount of the indebtedness remaining after the foreclosure sale].) In Sampsell,. supra, 51 Cal.App.2d 180, 186 , the foreclosing creditor could collect on the debtor’s assignment of rental income, because “the sale of the real property under the deed of trust does not wipe out the indebtedness nor prevent the creditor from proceeding to recover upon any other security . . . .” Highland l

2014III EQUITABLE CONVERSION A. Law Equitable conversion theory will permit a lender to recover from the borrower’s tort damages fund, up to the amount that its security was damaged. *406 (American Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Leeds, supra, 68 Cal.2d 611, 614, fn. 2 .) The theory is that condemnation of an entire mortgaged property “in effect substitutes a money award for the security of the land mortgaged, and the mortgagee is ordinarily entitled to as much of the award as is necessary to satisfy the debt.” (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Security Transactions in Real.

2014III EQUITABLE CONVERSION A. Law Equitable conversion theory will permit a lender to recover from the borrower’s tort damages fund, up to the amount that its security was damaged. *406 (American Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Leeds, supra, 68 Cal.2d 611, 614, fn. 2 .) The theory is that condemnation of an entire mortgaged property “in effect substitutes a money award for the security of the land mortgaged, and the mortgagee is ordinarily entitled to as much of the award as is necessary to satisfy the debt.” (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Security Transactions in Real.

2014The vendor is regarded as holding the legal title in trust for the purchaser; the purchaser, in turn, is considered the trustee of the purchase money for the benefit of the vendor.” (Mamula v. McCulloch (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 184, 193-194 ; see generally Estate of Reid (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 362 , 367- 370.) The equitable conversion doctrine “‘is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.’ [Citation.]” (Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v.

2014The vendor is regarded as holding the legal title in trust for the purchaser; the purchaser, in turn, is considered the trustee of the purchase money for the benefit of the vendor.” (Mamula v. McCulloch (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 184, 193-194 ; see generally Estate of Reid (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 362 , 367- 370.) The equitable conversion doctrine “‘is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.’ [Citation.]” (Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v.

2014As noted above, the equitable conversion doctrine will not apply “when ‘it would compel an inequitable result . . . .’ [Citation].” (Ocean Avenue LLC v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 .) The court’s ruling did not produce an inequitable result; indeed, a contrary result would appear to be inequitable.

2014The vendor is regarded as holding the legal title in trust for the purchaser; the purchaser, in turn, is considered the trustee of the purchase money for the benefit of the vendor.” (Mamula v. McCulloch (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 184, 193-194 ; see generally Estate of Reid (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 362 , 367- 370.) The equitable conversion doctrine “‘is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.’ [Citation.]” (Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v.

2014(See Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Boyd, supra, 43 Cal.2d at pp. 165-166 [equitable conversion applies “‘where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.’”].) We see no reason why Mohammad’s efforts to sell the Hesperia parcels should render the equitable conversion doctrine inapplicable and necessarily preclude him from obtaining the proceeds from that sale when both he and Touryalai agreed to the sale to the City.

1994A., Inc. v. Minnesota (1946) 327 U.S. 558, 565 [ 90 L.Ed. 851, 857 , 66 S.Ct. 749, 754 ].) Here, as the equitable owners of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale, 6 plaintiffs would be entitled, in equity, to the sales proceeds under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1994A., Inc. v. Minnesota (1946) 327 U.S. 558, 565 [ 90 L.Ed. 851, 857 , 66 S.Ct. 749, 754 ].) Here, as the equitable owners of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale, 6 plaintiffs would be entitled, in equity, to the sales proceeds under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1994It no longer being possible to convey the entire property, the fund which represents the part conveyed belongs to the lessee, as purchaser.” ( 170 N.E. at p. 637 .) Although the facts of this case, involving loss of the property through a foreclosure sale with a portion of the sales proceeds remaining after payment of the trust deed beneficiaries, are not directly on point with any other cases involving equitable conversion which we have found, “California recognizes that: ‘Equity does not wait upon precedent which exactly squares with the facts in controversy, but will assert itself in those

1994It no longer being possible to convey the entire property, the fund which represents the part conveyed belongs to the lessee, as purchaser.” ( 170 N.E. at p. 637 .) Although the facts of this case, involving loss of the property through a foreclosure sale with a portion of the sales proceeds remaining after payment of the trust deed beneficiaries, are not directly on point with any other cases involving equitable conversion which we have found, “California recognizes that: ‘Equity does not wait upon precedent which exactly squares with the facts in controversy, but will assert itself in those

1994(See, e.g., Cinmark Investment Co. v. Reichard (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 498, 503 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], citing with approval Cullen & Vaughn Co. v. Bender Co. (1930) 122 Ohio St. 82 [ 170 N.E. 633 , 68 A.L.R. 1332 ].) In Cullen & Vaughn Co., supra, a lessee had an option to purchase, for a stated price, the leased property at any time during the lease period.

1994(See, e.g., Cinmark Investment Co. v. Reichard (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 498, 503 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], citing with approval Cullen & Vaughn Co. v. Bender Co. (1930) 122 Ohio St. 82 [ 170 N.E. 633 , 68 A.L.R. 1332 ].) In Cullen & Vaughn Co., supra, a lessee had an option to purchase, for a stated price, the leased property at any time during the lease period.

1990There the court held the vendee could require the vendor “to specifically perform the contract as to the property *577 owned by him and as to which he had the right to call for legal title.” (Id. at p. 550; see also Milkes v. Smith, supra, 91 Cal.App.2d at p. 81 ; Pomeroy, A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts (3d ed. 1926) Specific Performance of Contracts, § 295, p. 667, fn.) The application of the above cases to enforcement of a sale by a vendee to a subpurchaser is usually described as based upon the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1958(Los Angeles T. & S. Bank v. Bortenstein, 47 Cal.App. 421, 423 [ 190 P. 850 ]; Pomona College v. Dunn, 7 Cal.App.2d 227, 232 [ 46 P.2d 270 ].) Notwithstanding the doctrine of equitable conversion, the filing of a lis pendens is completely ineffectual as a protection for the rights of the parties with respect to the money deposited with the clerk of the superior court in payment of the condemnation award.

1958(Los Angeles T. & S. Bank v. Bortenstein, 47 Cal.App. 421, 423 [ 190 P. 850 ]; Pomona College v. Dunn, 7 Cal.App.2d 227, 232 [ 46 P.2d 270 ].) Notwithstanding the doctrine of equitable conversion, the filing of a lis pendens is completely ineffectual as a protection for the rights of the parties with respect to the money deposited with the clerk of the superior court in payment of the condemnation award.

1954(See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 187 [ 64 S.Ct. 908 , 88 L.Ed. 1209 ]; Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581, 584-585 [ 262 P. 314 ]; Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655, 664-665 [ 292 P. 539 ].) There now remains the principal issue of whether the challenged tax assessments may be supported under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1954(See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 187 [ 64 S.Ct. 908 , 88 L.Ed. 1209 ]; Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581, 584-585 [ 262 P. 314 ]; Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655, 664-665 [ 292 P. 539 ].) There now remains the principal issue of whether the challenged tax assessments may be supported under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1954The doctrine of equitable conversion “is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.” (19 Am.Jur., §2, p. 2.) An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675 [ 115 P. 235

1954The doctrine of equitable conversion “is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.” (19 Am.Jur., §2, p. 2.) An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675 [ 115 P. 235

1954(See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 187 [ 64 S.Ct. 908 , 88 L.Ed. 1209 ]; Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581, 584-585 [ 262 P. 314 ]; Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655, 664-665 [ 292 P. 539 ].) There now remains the principal issue of whether the challenged tax assessments may be supported under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1954(See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 187 [ 64 S.Ct. 908 , 88 L.Ed. 1209 ]; Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581, 584-585 [ 262 P. 314 ]; Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655, 664-665 [ 292 P. 539 ].) There now remains the principal issue of whether the challenged tax assessments may be supported under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1954(See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 187 [ 64 S.Ct. 908 , 88 L.Ed. 1209 ]; Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581, 584-585 [ 262 P. 314 ]; Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655, 664-665 [ 292 P. 539 ].) There now remains the principal issue of whether the challenged tax assessments may be supported under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1954(See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 187 [ 64 S.Ct. 908 , 88 L.Ed. 1209 ]; Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581, 584-585 [ 262 P. 314 ]; Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655, 664-665 [ 292 P. 539 ].) There now remains the principal issue of whether the challenged tax assessments may be supported under the doctrine of equitable conversion.

1954The doctrine of equitable conversion “is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.” (19 Am.Jur., §2, p. 2.) An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675 [ 115 P. 235

1954The doctrine of equitable conversion “is a mere fiction resting upon the principle that equity regards things which are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.” (19 Am.Jur., §2, p. 2.) An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 664, 675 [ 115 P. 235