federal common law doctrine in California

2017(See Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3d 998 , 1005, 1017-1018.) This immunity doctrine, developed by the federal courts in the context of Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ( Section 1983 ), deriving it from the common law with no statutory foundation, is purely judge-made. ( Anderson v. Creighton (1987) 483 U.S. 635 , 645, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 ( Anderson ); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800 , 813-819, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 ; Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547 , 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 .) Citing Venegas v. County of

2017(See Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3d 998 , 1005, 1017-1018.) This immunity doctrine, developed by the federal courts in the context of Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ( Section 1983 ), deriving it from the common law with no statutory foundation, is purely judge-made. ( Anderson v. Creighton (1987) 483 U.S. 635 , 645, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 ( Anderson ); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800 , 813-819, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 ; Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547 , 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 .) Citing Venegas v. County of

2017(See Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3d 998 , 1005, 1017-1018.) This immunity doctrine, developed by the federal courts in the context of Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ( Section 1983 ), deriving it from the common law with no statutory foundation, is purely judge-made. ( Anderson v. Creighton (1987) 483 U.S. 635 , 645, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 ( Anderson ); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800 , 813-819, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 ; Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547 , 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 .) Citing Venegas v. County of

2017(See Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3d 998 , 1005, 1017-1018.) This immunity doctrine, developed by the federal courts in the context of Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ( Section 1983 ), deriving it from the common law with no statutory foundation, is purely judge-made. ( Anderson v. Creighton (1987) 483 U.S. 635 , 645, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 ( Anderson ); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800 , 813-819, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 ; Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547 , 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 .) Citing Venegas v. County of

2025Even assuming the rule was “primarily procedural,” the court held that “federal courts sitting in diversity may [not] disregard it.” (County of Orange, supra, 784 F.3d at p. 530 .) It determined there was “no federal rule that governs the validity of a pre-dispute jury trial waiver when state law is more protective than federal law of the jury trial right,” and thus “Erie’s federalism principle directs us to import state law as the federal rule rather than construct a new federal common law rule.” (Id. at p. 531.) Although County of Orange involved a federal rather than a California forum, its

2017(See Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3d 998 , 1005, 1017-1018.) This immunity doctrine, developed by the federal courts in the context of Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ( Section 1983 ), deriving it from the common law with no statutory foundation, is purely judge-made. ( Anderson v. Creighton (1987) 483 U.S. 635 , 645, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 ( Anderson ); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 800 , 813-819, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 ; Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547 , 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 .) Citing Venegas v. County of

2005Preemption or no, the rule of decision to be applied would come from a doctrine of federal common law. *1050 “Federal common law is truly federal law in the sense that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, it is binding on state courts” (19 Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure (2d ed. 1996) Federal Common Law, § 4514, p. 453, fn. omitted; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964) 376 U.S. 398, 426 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 804 , 84 S.Ct. 923 ]; Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express (9th Cir. 2002) 294 F.3d 1179, 1184 ).

2003(Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc. (7th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 282, 287 [“Even if we assume that a federal common law rule with respect to punitive damages would be uniform nationally, the punitive damages remedy would displace the package of remedies that the Interstate Commerce Act contains, and would allow precisely the uncertainty the Carmack Amendment was designed to bar”]; Cleveland v. Beltman North American Co., Inc. (2d Cir. 1994) 30 F.3d 373, 380 , citing Massachusetts Mut.

2002As explained in Deiro v. American Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1987) 816 F.2d 1360, 1365 , “[U]nder the federal common law governing common carriers, carriers may partially limit their liability for injury, loss, or destruction of baggage on a ‘released valuation’ basis. [Citation.] . . . [I]n exchange for a low carriage rate, the passenger-shipper is deemed to have released the carrier from liability beyond a stated amount.” The federal courts have, however, restricted the application of this doctrine to cases where the carriers give “customers a fair opportunity to choose between higher or lower

2001It held: “The federal common law rule cannot control the statutes of this state.” (Tinsley, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 881 .) Background This matter arises from the complex web of for-profit and nonprofit organizations that carry out the business of the NFL, an unincorporated nonprofit association of 30 (now 31) football clubs, including the Raiders. *579 The NFL is governed by a constitution that generally requires a three-quarters vote for action.

2000Recently, in Syposs v. U.S. (W.D.N.Y. 1998) 179 F.R.D. 406 , a federal district court rejected a claim that it should recognize a new federal common law privilege for hospital peer review materials.

1998The principal issue on defendant’s appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that as a matter of law plaintiff was entitled to a deficiency judgment against Shlens in that Shlens’s state law defenses were barred under the federal common law doctrine known as the D’Oench, Duhme doctrine (D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C. (1942) 315 U.S. 447 [ 62 S.Ct. 676 , 86 L.Ed. 956 ]), or under the doctrine’s “partial codification” (Weber v. New West Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 97, 99 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 ]) in the federal statutes at 12 United States Code section 1823 (e)

1998The principal issue on defendant’s appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that as a matter of law plaintiff was entitled to a deficiency judgment against Shlens in that Shlens’s state law defenses were barred under the federal common law doctrine known as the D’Oench, Duhme doctrine (D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C. (1942) 315 U.S. 447 [ 62 S.Ct. 676 , 86 L.Ed. 956 ]), or under the doctrine’s “partial codification” (Weber v. New West Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 97, 99 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 ]) in the federal statutes at 12 United States Code section 1823 (e)

1979In Call v. Alcan Pacific Co. (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 763 ], the court did entertain what appeared to be an untimely appeal from a judgment in favor of a surety which had been entered more than three months prior to the judgment in favor of the principal from which a timely appeal was perfected.

1979In Call v. Alcan Pacific Co. (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 763 ], the court did entertain what appeared to be an untimely appeal from a judgment in favor of a surety which had been entered more than three months prior to the judgment in favor of the principal from which a timely appeal was perfected.

1973The position of a state court exercising its concurrent jurisdiction over a cause of action based on an act of Congress (e.g., Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 ), or a federal common law doctrine (e.g., the doctrine of unseaworthiness) is fluently described in Intagliata v. Shipowners & Mer. etc. Co., supra, 26 Cal.2d 365, 371-375 .