foregone conclusion defense in California

2026Such a submission is ‘tantamount to a plea of guilty’ because ‘the guilt of the defendant [is] apparent on the basis of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and ... conviction [is] a foregone conclusion if no defense [is] offered.’ ” (People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 496 (Wright), abrogated on other grounds in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360 .) If a defendant enters a slow plea, the court must advise the defendant and obtain waivers of his constitutional rights.

2023(Id. at p. 116.) In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (11th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3d 1335 , the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held: “Where the location, existence, and authenticity of the purported evidence is known with reasonable particularity, the contents of the individual’s mind are not used against him [or her], and therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is available.” (Id. at p. 1344, fn. omitted.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the foregone conclusion doctrine “allows for circumvention of the self-incrimination privilege if the government alre

2023(Id. at p. 116.) In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (11th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3d 1335 , the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held: “Where the location, existence, and authenticity of the purported evidence is known with reasonable particularity, the contents of the individual’s mind are not used against him [or her], and therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is available.” (Id. at p. 1344, fn. omitted.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the foregone conclusion doctrine “allows for circumvention of the self-incrimination privilege if the government alre

2023(Id. at p. 116.) In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (11th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3d 1335 , the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held: “Where the location, existence, and authenticity of the purported evidence is known with reasonable particularity, the contents of the individual’s mind are not used against him [or her], and therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is available.” (Id. at p. 1344, fn. omitted.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the foregone conclusion doctrine “allows for circumvention of the self-incrimination privilege if the government alre

2023(Id. at p. 116.) In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (11th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3d 1335 , the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held: “Where the location, existence, and authenticity of the purported evidence is known with reasonable particularity, the contents of the individual’s mind are not used against him [or her], and therefore no Fifth Amendment protection is available.” (Id. at p. 1344, fn. omitted.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the foregone conclusion doctrine “allows for circumvention of the self-incrimination privilege if the government alre

2023Background on Slow Pleas Our Supreme Court recently explained that “[w]e have defined a slow plea as an ‘ “ ‘agreed-upon disposition . . . which does not require the defendant to admit guilt but results in a finding of guilt . . . usually, for a promised punishment.’ ” ’ [Citation.] A recognizable example of a slow plea ‘is a bargained- for submission on the transcript of a preliminary hearing in which the only evidence is the victim’s credible testimony, and the defendant does not testify and counsel presents no evidence or argument on defendant’s behalf.’ [Citation.] This type of 6 submissio

2023For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Greenfield (2nd Cir. 2016) 831 F.3d 106 (Greenfield), held that the prosecution must establish “ ‘with reasonable particularity’ ” that it knew of the existence and control of the compelled evidence for the foregone conclusion doctrine to apply.

2023(Greenfield, supra, 831 F.3d at p. 116 .) Even assuming defendant’s act of producing his finger to unlock the phone had some marginal testimonial quality, the prosecution demonstrated that law enforcement “already ha[d] the information it [was] seeking to compel,” and thus the foregone conclusion doctrine applies.

2021(See 64 People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1190 .) Likewise, reasonably competent counsel also could have determined in light of Baltezor’s admissions coupled with S.B.’s testimony that a guilty verdict as to numerous accounts was a foregone conclusion and the defense could retain some credibility by focusing its defense against certain, more vulnerable counts.

2015(Adams, at pp. 580-583.)” (People v. Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171 ; People v. Epps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 645 , 652; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329 ; People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 .) Citing Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th 570 , the Supreme Court has said “a defendant validly may ‘stipulate to one or more, but not all, of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense . . . ,’ without first having received such advisements.” (People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 415 , overruled on other grounds as stated in Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th

2015(Adams, at pp. 580-583.)” (People v. Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171 ; People v. Epps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 645 , 652; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329 ; People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 .) Citing Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th 570 , the Supreme Court has said “a defendant validly may ‘stipulate to one or more, but not all, of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense . . . ,’ without first having received such advisements.” (People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 415 , overruled on other grounds as stated in Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th

2015(Adams, at pp. 580-583.)” (People v. Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171 ; People v. Epps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 645 , 652; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329 ; People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 .) Citing Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th 570 , the Supreme Court has said “a defendant validly may ‘stipulate to one or more, but not all, of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense . . . ,’ without first having received such advisements.” (People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 415 , overruled on other grounds as stated in Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th

2015(Adams, at pp. 580-583.)” (People v. Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171 ; People v. Epps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 645 , 652; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329 ; People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 .) Citing Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th 570 , the Supreme Court has said “a defendant validly may ‘stipulate to one or more, but not all, of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense . . . ,’ without first having received such advisements.” (People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 415 , overruled on other grounds as stated in Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th

2015(Adams, at pp. 580-583.)” (People v. Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171 ; People v. Epps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 645 , 652; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329 ; People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 .) Citing Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th 570 , the Supreme Court has said “a defendant validly may ‘stipulate to one or more, but not all, of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense . . . ,’ without first having received such advisements.” (People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 415 , overruled on other grounds as stated in Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th

2015(Adams, at pp. 580-583.)” (People v. Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 171 ; People v. Epps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 645 , 652; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329 ; People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 .) Citing Adams, supra, 6 Cal.4th 570 , the Supreme Court has said “a defendant validly may ‘stipulate to one or more, but not all, of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense . . . ,’ without first having received such advisements.” (People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 415 , overruled on other grounds as stated in Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th

2015(In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-926, fn. 10 ; People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648, 653 .) “The phrase ‘“tantamount to a plea of guilty”’ [was used in In re Mosley, supra, 1 Cal.3d 913 ] ‘to explain [the] extension of the Boykin-Tahl requirements to submissions in which the guilt of the defendant was apparent on the basis of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and in which conviction was a foregone conclusion if no defense was offered.’ (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 602 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ] (Bunnell).)” (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal

2014(People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487 , 496 . . . .)" (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 28 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) 11 "Dependency proceedings are not designed to prosecute parents. [Citations.] In a dependency proceeding, the state is empowered to intervene because a parent's inadequacy puts a child at risk." (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1238 .) "In the dependency context, the juvenile court intervenes to protect a child, not to punish the parent.

1978In brief, the seeds for the rule were sown before Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d *1024 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ], and after Li it was almost a foregone conclusion that the doctrine would soon become law. 3 And in the recent case of Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ], the court applied the principles of comparative negligence expressed in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804 , to actions founded on strict products liability.

1978In brief, the seeds for the rule were sown before Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d *1024 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ], and after Li it was almost a foregone conclusion that the doctrine would soon become law. 3 And in the recent case of Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ], the court applied the principles of comparative negligence expressed in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804 , to actions founded on strict products liability.

1978In brief, the seeds for the rule were sown before Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d *1024 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ], and after Li it was almost a foregone conclusion that the doctrine would soon become law. 3 And in the recent case of Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ], the court applied the principles of comparative negligence expressed in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804 , to actions founded on strict products liability.

1978In brief, the seeds for the rule were sown before Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d *1024 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ], and after Li it was almost a foregone conclusion that the doctrine would soon become law. 3 And in the recent case of Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ], the court applied the principles of comparative negligence expressed in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804 , to actions founded on strict products liability.

1975In Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. 238 , the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant who pleads guilty must be shown to have *603 done so voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the offense charged, of the consequences of this plea, and that he thereby waived his rights to trial by jury, to confrontation by adverse witnesses, and against compulsory self-incrimination.