insured tenders defense in California

2012Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 863 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 ], italics added.) 5 Interpreting this language, our Supreme Court has held that an insurer’s duty to defend includes a duty to pay investigative expenses “if, and only if,” the investigation is “conducted within the temporal limits of the insurer’s duty to defend, i.e., between tender of the defense and conclusion of the action.” (Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 60-61 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 , 948 P.2d 909 ], italics added.) The court later explained the reason for this temporal limitation:

2012Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 863 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 ], italics added.) 5 Interpreting this language, our Supreme Court has held that an insurer’s duty to defend includes a duty to pay investigative expenses “if, and only if,” the investigation is “conducted within the temporal limits of the insurer’s duty to defend, i.e., between tender of the defense and conclusion of the action.” (Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 60-61 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 , 948 P.2d 909 ], italics added.) The court later explained the reason for this temporal limitation:

2015(Id. at p. 591; see Frake, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 .) When *1290 determining whether a duty to defend exists, the court looks to all of the facts available to the insurer at the time the insured tenders its claim for a defense.

2015(Id. at p. 591; see also Frake, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 .) When determining whether a duty to defend exists, the court looks to all of the facts available to the insurer at the time the insured tenders its claim for a defense.

2012Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 863 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 ], italics added.) 5 Interpreting this language, our Supreme Court has held that an insurer’s duty to defend includes a duty to pay investigative expenses “if, and only if,” the investigation is “conducted within the temporal limits of the insurer’s duty to defend, i.e., between tender of the defense and conclusion of the action.” (Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 60-61 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 , 948 P.2d 909 ], italics added.) The court later explained the reason for this temporal limitation:

2012Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 863 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 ], italics added.) 5 Interpreting this language, our Supreme Court has held that an insurer’s duty to defend includes a duty to pay investigative expenses “if, and only if,” the investigation is “conducted within the temporal limits of the insurer’s duty to defend, i.e., between tender of the defense and conclusion of the action.” (Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 60-61 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 , 948 P.2d 909 ], italics added.) The court later explained the reason for this temporal limitation:

2015(Vann v. Travelers Companies (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1610, 1614-1615 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 ].) Initially, the court compares the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy.

2015(Vann v. Travelers Companies (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1610, 1614-1615 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 ].) Initially, the court compares the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy.

1995Any seeming disparity in the respective burdens merely reflects the substantive law.” (Montrose I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300 , italics in original.) A duty to defend does not exist where the underlying complaint “ “can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue which would bring it within the policy coverage.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 276, fn. 15 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ], italics in original.) In determining whether a duty to defend exists, courts look to all the facts available to the insurer at the time the insured tenders its claim

1995Any seeming disparity in the respective burdens merely reflects the substantive law.” (Montrose I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300 , italics in original.) A duty to defend does not exist where the underlying complaint “ “can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue which would bring it within the policy coverage.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 276, fn. 15 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ], italics in original.) In determining whether a duty to defend exists, courts look to all the facts available to the insurer at the time the insured tenders its claim

2023Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1546 (Low) [enforcing NVP provision in “the rare case where the insured tenders the defense and then negotiates a settlement on its own, leaving the insurer in the dark”].) In Jamestown Builders, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 341 , the court applied an NVP provision in a third-party comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance contract to bar an indemnity claim.

2015Fund (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1106 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ].) “[W]hen an insurer seeks summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded, the burden is on the insurer to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion.” (Brodkin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 210, 216 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 710 ].) In contrast, “[a]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within the scope of the policy’s basic coverage, even where the insurer brings a motion for summary judgment.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1407 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 ].) “In

2015Fund (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1106 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ].) “[W]hen an insurer seeks summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded, the burden is on the insurer to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion.” (Brodkin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 210, 216 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 710 ].) In contrast, “[a]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within the scope of the policy’s basic coverage, even where the insurer brings a motion for summary judgment.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1407 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 ].) “In

2015Fund (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1106 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ].) “[W]hen an insurer seeks summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded, the burden is on the insurer to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion.” (Brodkin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 210, 216 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 710 ].) In contrast, “[a]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within the scope of the policy’s basic coverage, even where the insurer brings a motion for summary judgment.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1407 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 ].) “In

2015(Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 46 (Buss); OneBeacon America Ins.

2015Fund (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1106 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ].) “[W]hen an insurer seeks summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded, the burden is on the insurer to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion.” (Brodkin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 210, 216 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 710 ].) In contrast, “[a]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within the scope of the policy’s basic coverage, even where the insurer brings a motion for summary judgment.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1407 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 ].) “In

2015Fund (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1106 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 133 ].) “[W]hen an insurer seeks summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded, the burden is on the insurer to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion.” (Brodkin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 210, 216 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 710 ].) In contrast, “[a]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within the scope of the policy’s basic coverage, even where the insurer brings a motion for summary judgment.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1407 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 ].) “In

2009Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 869 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 ] . . . .) Phrased somewhat differently, ‘ “[t]he duty to defend arises when the insured tenders defense of the third party lawsuit to the insurer.” ’ [Citation.] The ‘temporal limits of the insurer’s duty to defend [fall] between tender of the defense and conclusion of the action.’ [Citation.]” (Unigard, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 976 ; see also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 61 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 , 948 P.2d 909 ] (Aerojet-General) [temporal duty to defend insured runs from tender of

2009Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 869 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 , 959 P.2d 265 ] . . . .) Phrased somewhat differently, ‘ “[t]he duty to defend arises when the insured tenders defense of the third party lawsuit to the insurer.” ’ [Citation.] The ‘temporal limits of the insurer’s duty to defend [fall] between tender of the defense and conclusion of the action.’ [Citation.]” (Unigard, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 976 ; see also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 61 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 , 948 P.2d 909 ] (Aerojet-General) [temporal duty to defend insured runs from tender of

2000“If the insurer is obliged to take up the defense of its insured, it must do so as soon as possible, both to protect the interests of the insured, and. to limit its own exposure to loss. . . . [T]he duty to defend must be assessed at the outset of the case.” (CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) It follows that a belated offer to pay the costs of defense may mitigate damages but will not cure the initial breach of duty; c.

2000“If the insurer is obliged to take up the defense of its insured, it must do so as soon as possible, both to protect the interests of the insured, and. to limit its own exposure to loss. . . . [T]he duty to defend must be assessed at the outset of the case.” (CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) It follows that a belated offer to pay the costs of defense may mitigate damages but will not cure the initial breach of duty; c.

2000Co., supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 54 .) On the other hand, “[i]f the insurer’s refusal to defend is reasonable, no liability will result.” (Campbell v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1321 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 ].) The insurer’s duty to defend must be determined on the basis of facts available to the insurer at the time the insured tenders the defense.

2000Co., supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 54 .) On the other hand, “[i]f the insurer’s refusal to defend is reasonable, no liability will result.” (Campbell v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1321 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 ].) The insurer’s duty to defend must be determined on the basis of facts available to the insurer at the time the insured tenders the defense.

1999(See Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation, supra, ^ 7:604, p. 7B-25 [“The duty to defend arises when the insured tenders defense of the third party lawsuit to the insurer.”].) Finally, this issue of whether a third party’s potential claim for indemnity from the insured means that a duty of good faith is owed to the third party was resolved in Republic Indemnity Co. v. Schofield (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 220, 226-227 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 637 ] and Alex Robertson Co. v. Imperial *933 Casualty & Indemnity Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 338 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 ].

1999(See Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation, supra, ^ 7:604, p. 7B-25 [“The duty to defend arises when the insured tenders defense of the third party lawsuit to the insurer.”].) Finally, this issue of whether a third party’s potential claim for indemnity from the insured means that a duty of good faith is owed to the third party was resolved in Republic Indemnity Co. v. Schofield (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 220, 226-227 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 637 ] and Alex Robertson Co. v. Imperial *933 Casualty & Indemnity Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 338 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 ].

1995Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ], italics in original.) “Any doubt as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured’s favor.” (Id. at p. 1081.) In comparing the policy language with the facts pled in the underlying suit, we note the complaint contains only vague allegations concerning the nature of the acts causing the alleged contamination and Vann’s knowledge, expectation or intent in connection with such acts.

1995Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ], italics in original.) “Any doubt as to whether the facts give rise to a duty to defend is resolved in the insured’s favor.” (Id. at p. 1081.) In comparing the policy language with the facts pled in the underlying suit, we note the complaint contains only vague allegations concerning the nature of the acts causing the alleged contamination and Vann’s knowledge, expectation or intent in connection with such acts.

1995Any seeming disparity in the respective burdens merely reflects the substantive law.” (Montrose I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300 , italics in original.) A duty to defend does not exist where the underlying complaint “ “can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue which would bring it within the policy coverage.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 276, fn. 15 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ], italics in original.) In determining whether a duty to defend exists, courts look to all the facts available to the insurer at the time the insured tenders its claim

1995Any seeming disparity in the respective burdens merely reflects the substantive law.” (Montrose I, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300 , italics in original.) A duty to defend does not exist where the underlying complaint “ “can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue which would bring it within the policy coverage.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 276, fn. 15 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ], italics in original.) In determining whether a duty to defend exists, courts look to all the facts available to the insurer at the time the insured tenders its claim