landlord claim in California

2022(See Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 412 .) If a landlord has the right and ability to cure the dangerous condition, then breach of that duty of care could render the landlord liable to a third party for damages for injuries suffered.

2021Accordingly, we will vacate the order granting Landlord’s motion for attorney fees and expenses and reverse the judgment.12 A. Law “Under the American rule, each party to a lawsuit ordinarily pays its own attorney fees.” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751 .) Nonetheless, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 “permits parties to ‘ “contract out” of the American rule’ by executing an agreement that allocates attorney fees.” (Mountain Air, at p. 751.) In the present action, Landlord requested an award of attorney fees authorized by a contract between

2021Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(1) requires a determination of “the party prevailing on the contract.” As our Supreme Court explained, for purposes of this requirement, the prevailing party can be determined “only 14 upon final resolution of the contract claims.”17 (Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 876 .) Here, however, at the time Landlord filed its motion, a case management conference had been scheduled in response to Appeal 1’s order that the court resolve the remaining issues.

2021(Hsu, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 876 .) Here, once again because there was no final resolution of the contract claims at the time of the briefing or ruling on Landlord’s motion, Tenant was prejudiced by the court’s consideration of, and ruling on, the motion. 19 III.

2020(Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 340 .) Landlord’s claim that the summary judgment is void as to Polina fails.

2015(Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 , italics omitted [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494 ]; accord, Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal.4th 309, 319 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 288 , 196 P.3d 1094 ].) The “ ‘meaning of “gravamen” is clear; “gravamen” means the “material part of a grievance, charge, etc.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] In the context of the anti-SLAPP statute, the ‘gravamen is defined by the acts on which liability is based.’ [Citation.] The ‘focus is on the principal thrust or gravamen of the causes of action, i.e., the allegedly wrongful a

2015(Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 , italics omitted [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 494 ]; accord, Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal.4th 309, 319 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 288 , 196 P.3d 1094 ].) The “ ‘meaning of “gravamen” is clear; “gravamen” means the “material part of a grievance, charge, etc.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] In the context of the anti-SLAPP statute, the ‘gravamen is defined by the acts on which liability is based.’ [Citation.] The ‘focus is on the principal thrust or gravamen of the causes of action, i.e., the allegedly wrongful a

2013It says Bayshore Executive Plaza Partnership v. FDIC (11th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 1290 is on point.

2013It ignores the language of the case stating that, after lease disaffirmance, a landlord has no claim for future rents or sums owing based on an acceleration clause, and “simply cannot recover future rents from any party or against any property.” (Id. at p. 1387.) California Bank also cites Unisys Finance Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (7th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 609 .

2013(See PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096 .) In opposing Landlord's motion, Lessees challenged some of the billings, but also argued that the Landlord's request for fees for Slater's pretrial and trial work was severely 15 inflated considering Landlord's previous argument that Lessees' counsel should have only billed $27,045 for litigating the matter.

2013(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140 .) And, " ' "[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown." ' " (Ibid.) Here, we have the benefit of a good record on which to evaluate Landlord's claim.

2007"The assignee . . . became the legal owner of the claims and the hens which secured their payment." [7] ( Ibid. ) • Adjustment Corp. v. Marco (1929) 100 Cal.App. 338 , 279 P. 1006 held that an assignment by a landlord of a claim for $2,000 in rent due included the right to recover the attorney fees provided in the lease: "The right to such fees in that event [a suit to enforce the lessor's rights] was an incident to the demand, and a valuable one." ( Id. at p. 341, 279 P. 1006 .) The assignee was entitled to recover the fee "in precisely the same manner as his assignors could have done." ( Id

2007For example, it is "uniformly held that the transfer of the note without mention of the security carries with it the benefit of the security." ( Adjustment Corp. v. Marco, supra, 100 Cal.App. at p. 341 , 279 P. 1006 .) • Essex, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1252 , 45 Cal. Rptr.3d 362 , 137 P.3d 192 , held that when an insured assigned a bad faith cause of action against an insurer, the assignee received the assignor's right to recover the policy benefits in full, including attorney fees incurred in prosecuting the assigned claim.

2007For example, it is "uniformly held that the transfer of the note without mention of the security carries with it the benefit of the security." ( Adjustment Corp. v. Marco, supra, 100 Cal.App. at p. 341 , 279 P. 1006 .) • Essex, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1252 , 45 Cal. Rptr.3d 362 , 137 P.3d 192 , held that when an insured assigned a bad faith cause of action against an insurer, the assignee received the assignor's right to recover the policy benefits in full, including attorney fees incurred in prosecuting the assigned claim.

1995(See Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1118, 1125 .) "In determining intent, we look first to the words themselves. [Citations.] When the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. [Citations.] When the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citati

1995(See Prudential Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1118, 1125 .) “In determining intent, we look first to the words themselves. [Citations.] When the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. [Citations.] When the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citati

1985(Cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 262 ; Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 623, 627.) A landlord, like defendant owning numerous units, is not engaged in isolated acts within the enterprise but plays a substantial role.

1985(Cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 262 ; Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 623, 627.) A landlord, like defendant owning numerous units, is not engaged in isolated acts within the enterprise but plays a substantial role.

1926The landlord under the rule is entitled to have his title to the premises litigated from the vantage ground of possession, but if he chooses to litigate his title *326 in the same action it would, as held in the case of Jochen v. Tibbells, 50 Mich. 33 [ 14 N. W. 690 ], supra, give him an undue advantage, for the reason if when the landlord voluntarily puts Ms title in issue, the tenant is estopped from denying the same, the judgment entered therein would become a bar to any subsequent assertion of title by the tenant and work a forfeiture or disseizin of Ms property, if any ownership he had in

1926The landlord under the rule is entitled to have his title to the premises litigated from the vantage ground of possession, but if he chooses to litigate his title *326 in the same action it would, as held in the case of Jochen v. Tibbells, 50 Mich. 33 [ 14 N. W. 690 ], supra, give him an undue advantage, for the reason if when the landlord voluntarily puts Ms title in issue, the tenant is estopped from denying the same, the judgment entered therein would become a bar to any subsequent assertion of title by the tenant and work a forfeiture or disseizin of Ms property, if any ownership he had in

1926In McKie v. Anderson, supra, the law applying to the case at bar is thus stated by the supreme court of Texas: “The rule, that a tenant cannot deny his landlord’s title, is limited to suits for possession only, and does not apply in an action of trespass to try title and for partition, in which the title itself is put in issue.” In Hambey v. Wise, 181 Cal. 286 [ 184 Pac. 9 ], the supreme court of this state, in considering the exception to the rule limiting defenses that may be made by a tenant, which we are here considering, held as follows: “Even if it be conceded that on March 17, 1916, Woo

1926In McKie v. Anderson, supra, the law applying to the case at bar is thus stated by the supreme court of Texas: “The rule, that a tenant cannot deny his landlord’s title, is limited to suits for possession only, and does not apply in an action of trespass to try title and for partition, in which the title itself is put in issue.” In Hambey v. Wise, 181 Cal. 286 [ 184 Pac. 9 ], the supreme court of this state, in considering the exception to the rule limiting defenses that may be made by a tenant, which we are here considering, held as follows: “Even if it be conceded that on March 17, 1916, Woo

1926In McKie v. Anderson, supra, the law applying to the case at bar is thus stated by the supreme court of Texas: “The rule, that a tenant cannot deny his landlord’s title, is limited to suits for possession only, and does not apply in an action of trespass to try title and for partition, in which the title itself is put in issue.” In Hambey v. Wise, 181 Cal. 286 [ 184 Pac. 9 ], the supreme court of this state, in considering the exception to the rule limiting defenses that may be made by a tenant, which we are here considering, held as follows: “Even if it be conceded that on March 17, 1916, Woo

1926In McKie v. Anderson, supra, the law applying to the case at bar is thus stated by the supreme court of Texas: “The rule, that a tenant cannot deny his landlord’s title, is limited to suits for possession only, and does not apply in an action of trespass to try title and for partition, in which the title itself is put in issue.” In Hambey v. Wise, 181 Cal. 286 [ 184 Pac. 9 ], the supreme court of this state, in considering the exception to the rule limiting defenses that may be made by a tenant, which we are here considering, held as follows: “Even if it be conceded that on March 17, 1916, Woo

1923If there be, a tenancy in common arises, at least in such products as are to be divided.’ ” In discussing the same question here presented, the court in Fuhrman v. Interior Warehouse Co., 64 Wash. 159 [37 L.

1899The case of Skaggs v. Emerson, 50 Cal. 3 , decided simply that while a landlord in violation of his lease withheld part of the premises from the possession of his tenant he could have no remedy in the courts against him.