leading case doctrine in California

2010Jordan v. Friedman [(1946)] 72 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 165 P.2d 728 ].

1993The leading case for the rule that arbitration must be demanded within the time agreed upon by the parties is a 1946 decision by the Court of Appeal in Jordan v. Friedman, supra, 72 Cal.App.2d 726 .

1960Co., 248 N.Y. 339 [ 162 N.E. 99 , 59 A.L.R. 1253 ], where Justice Cardozo recognized actionable negligence as involved in proceeding at reckless speed through a crowded city street, but stated at page 100: ‘If the same act were to be committed on a speedway or race course, it would lose its wrongful quality.

1960Co., 248 N.Y. 339 [ 162 N.E. 99 , 59 A.L.R. 1253 ], where Justice Cardozo recognized actionable negligence as involved in proceeding at reckless speed through a crowded city street, but stated at page 100: ‘If the same act were to be committed on a speedway or race course, it would lose its wrongful quality.

2014This is complicated by the fact that defendant did not raise any ex post facto claim below, so the parties may not have had an incentive to develop the evidence relevant to this issue. 5 The leading case on the standard of review under these circumstances is People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253 .

2010Section 3 of the Penal Code provides: "No part [of the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." This statute has been construed to mean "`[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise. [Citation.]' ( People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 783 P.2d 719 ].)" ( People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 , 171 P.3d 32 ].) "To ascertain whether a statute should be applied retroactively, legisl

2010Section 3 of the Penal Code provides: "No part [of the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." This statute has been construed to mean "`[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise. [Citation.]' ( People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 132 , 783 P.2d 719 ].)" ( People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 , 171 P.3d 32 ].) "To ascertain whether a statute should be applied retroactively, legisl

2010Jordan v. Friedman [(1946)] 72 Cal.App.2d 726 [ 165 P.2d 728 ].

2007Because the superior court’s findings are based solely upon documentary evidence, we independently review the record. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677 .) In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616 , the leading case on the standard of judicial review, the California Supreme Court held that “the judicial branch is authorized to review the factual basis of a decision of the Board [determining parole suitability and setting a parole date] in order to ensure that the decision comports with the requirements of due process of law, but that in conducting such a review, the court may inquire only

2007Because the superior court’s findings are based solely upon documentary evidence, we independently review the record. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677 .) In Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616 , the leading case on the standard of judicial review, the California Supreme Court held that “the judicial branch is authorized to review the factual basis of a decision of the Board [determining parole suitability and setting a parole date] in order to ensure that the decision comports with the requirements of due process of law, but that in conducting such a review, the court may inquire only

2003(Saddler, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 684 .) Before reviewing the evidence in this case to determine whether or not it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Lamer would have been reached if the court had not given CALJIC No. 2.62, it is useful to examine the California Supreme Court’s harmless error analysis in Saddler , which is the leading case on this instruction.

1996The general rule was stated only last year in U.S. v. Williamson (10th Cir.1995) 53 F.3d 1500 , 1511: "There is no question but that the sort of conduct alleged here, i.e., the admission by counsel of his client's guilt to the jury, *778 represents a paradigmatic example of the sort of breakdown in the adversarial process that triggers a presumption of prejudice. [Citations.]" [33] The leading case applying this rule is U.S. v. Swanson (9th Cir.1991) 943 F.2d 1070 (hereafter Swanson ).

1996The general rule was stated only last year in U.S. v. Williamson (10th Cir. 1995) 53 F.3d 1500 , 1511: “There is no question but that the sort of conduct alleged here, i.e., the admission by counsel of his client’s guilt to the jury, represents a paradigmatic example of the sort of breakdown in the adversarial process that triggers a presumption of prejudice. [Citations.]” 33 The leading case applying this rule is U.S. v. Swanson (9th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 1070 (hereafter Swanson).

1996The general rule was stated only last year in U.S. v. Williamson (10th Cir.1995) 53 F.3d 1500 , 1511: "There is no question but that the sort of conduct alleged here, i.e., the admission by counsel of his client's guilt to the jury, *778 represents a paradigmatic example of the sort of breakdown in the adversarial process that triggers a presumption of prejudice. [Citations.]" [33] The leading case applying this rule is U.S. v. Swanson (9th Cir.1991) 943 F.2d 1070 (hereafter Swanson ).

1996The general rule was stated only last year in U.S. v. Williamson (10th Cir. 1995) 53 F.3d 1500 , 1511: “There is no question but that the sort of conduct alleged here, i.e., the admission by counsel of his client’s guilt to the jury, represents a paradigmatic example of the sort of breakdown in the adversarial process that triggers a presumption of prejudice. [Citations.]” 33 The leading case applying this rule is U.S. v. Swanson (9th Cir. 1991) 943 F.2d 1070 (hereafter Swanson).

1995The leading case on waiver of appeal is People v. Charles (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 552 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 402 ].

1995The leading case on waiver of appeal is People v. Charles (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 552 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 402 ].

1992Hooper (2d Cir. 1932) 60 F.2d 737 , 740, where Learned Hand wrote that “in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.

1989Should EEOC choose not to pursue the charge, it issues the complainant a right to sue letter (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)), which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action in the federal district court. {Patterson v. General Motors Corp. (7th Cir. 1980) 631 F.2d 476 , 486.) The leading case on the standard under which the allegations of the EEOC charge limit the scope of a subsequent action is Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc. (5th Cir. 1970) 431 F.2d 455 .

1989Should EEOC choose not to pursue the charge, it issues the complainant a right to sue letter (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)), which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action in the federal district court. {Patterson v. General Motors Corp. (7th Cir. 1980) 631 F.2d 476 , 486.) The leading case on the standard under which the allegations of the EEOC charge limit the scope of a subsequent action is Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc. (5th Cir. 1970) 431 F.2d 455 .

1968McNally was overruled in Peyton v. Rowe (1968) 391 U.S. 54 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 426 , 88 S.Ct. 1549 ].

1968McNally was overruled in Peyton v. Rowe (1968) 391 U.S. 54 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 426 , 88 S.Ct. 1549 ].

1948When, in reliance thereon, work upon the building is actually commenced and liabilities are incurred for work and material, the owner acquires a vested property right to the protection of which he is entitled.” Pelham View Apartments v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545 [ 224 N.Y.S. 56 ], is a leading case where the principle was applied.

1948When, in reliance thereon, work upon the building is actually commenced and liabilities are incurred for work and material, the owner acquires a vested property right to the protection of which he is entitled.” Pelham View Apartments v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545 [ 224 N.Y.S. 56 ], is a leading case where the principle was applied.