multiple punishment claim in California

2015(See, e.g., Monarrez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 714; People v. Briones (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 524, 529 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 232 ] [convictions for possessing, both heroin and methamphetamine for sale where it could be inferred that defendant intended multiple sales to different customers]; Adams, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 635 [“In each of the drug possession cases, the defendant’s possession may or may not have been motivated by a single intent and objective, for one may possess drugs for a variety of reasons. . . . [Ajlthough we do not disapprove the multiple punishment rule invoked in the drug po

2015(See, e.g., Monarrez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 714 ; People v. Briones (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 524, 529 [convictions for possessing both heroin and methamphetamine for sale where it could be inferred that defendant intended multiple sales to different customers]; Adams, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 635 [“In each of the drug possession cases, the defendant’s possession may or may not have been motivated by a single intent and objective, for one may possess drugs for a variety of reasons. . . . [A]lthough we do not disapprove the multiple punishment rule invoked in the drug possession cases relied u

2015(See, e.g., Monarrez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 714; People v. Briones (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 524, 529 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 232 ] [convictions for possessing, both heroin and methamphetamine for sale where it could be inferred that defendant intended multiple sales to different customers]; Adams, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 635 [“In each of the drug possession cases, the defendant’s possession may or may not have been motivated by a single intent and objective, for one may possess drugs for a variety of reasons. . . . [Ajlthough we do not disapprove the multiple punishment rule invoked in the drug po

2015(See, e.g., Monarrez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 714; People v. Briones (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 524, 529 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 232 ] [convictions for possessing, both heroin and methamphetamine for sale where it could be inferred that defendant intended multiple sales to different customers]; Adams, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 635 [“In each of the drug possession cases, the defendant’s possession may or may not have been motivated by a single intent and objective, for one may possess drugs for a variety of reasons. . . . [Ajlthough we do not disapprove the multiple punishment rule invoked in the drug po

2015(See, e.g., Monarrez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 714; People v. Briones (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 524, 529 [ 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 232 ] [convictions for possessing, both heroin and methamphetamine for sale where it could be inferred that defendant intended multiple sales to different customers]; Adams, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 635 [“In each of the drug possession cases, the defendant’s possession may or may not have been motivated by a single intent and objective, for one may possess drugs for a variety of reasons. . . . [Ajlthough we do not disapprove the multiple punishment rule invoked in the drug po

2015(See, e.g., Monarrez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 714 ; People v. Briones (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 524, 529 [convictions for possessing both heroin and methamphetamine for sale where it could be inferred that defendant intended multiple sales to different customers]; Adams, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 635 [“In each of the drug possession cases, the defendant’s possession may or may not have been motivated by a single intent and objective, for one may possess drugs for a variety of reasons. . . . [A]lthough we do not disapprove the multiple punishment rule invoked in the drug possession cases relied u

1971(Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ].) *451 However, as emphasized in Lobaugh , “The unlawful act denounced by the Vehicle Code is the ‘mere act of driving a vehicle upon a public highway while intoxicated’; the act is either a misdemeanor [citation], or a felony [citation], depending on whether personal injuries result therefrom. [Citations.]” (Pp. 79-80.) As pointed out in the concurring opinion, “The question of ‘bodily injury’ is only of materiality in that it aggravates the offense.” (P. 84.) Also cited by the Attorney General in Lobaugh , as w

1971(Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ].) *451 However, as emphasized in Lobaugh , “The unlawful act denounced by the Vehicle Code is the ‘mere act of driving a vehicle upon a public highway while intoxicated’; the act is either a misdemeanor [citation], or a felony [citation], depending on whether personal injuries result therefrom. [Citations.]” (Pp. 79-80.) As pointed out in the concurring opinion, “The question of ‘bodily injury’ is only of materiality in that it aggravates the offense.” (P. 84.) Also cited by the Attorney General in Lobaugh , as w

2012Section 654 jurisprudence speaks in terms of the “intent and objective of the actor.” (People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 213 P.3d 647 ], italics omitted.) This indicates that the actor’s “subjective” intent is the touchstone for the multiple punishment inquiry. 2 We question whether a sentencing court, an appellate court, or even a forensic psychiatrist or psychologist can, in reality, reliably determine the subjective intent of an insane person.

2012Section 654 jurisprudence speaks in terms of the “intent and objective of the actor.” (People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 213 P.3d 647 ], italics omitted.) This indicates that the actor’s “subjective” intent is the touchstone for the multiple punishment inquiry. 2 We question whether a sentencing court, an appellate court, or even a forensic psychiatrist or psychologist can, in reality, reliably determine the subjective intent of an insane person.

2012In a jurisdiction without a multiple punishment rule like that of Penal Code section 654, this ‘distinct evil’ test might aid the courts in ascertaining whether the Legislature intended cumulative punishments for simultaneous violations of statutes like Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 23102. [Citations.] In California, however, when the rule of section 654 precluding multiple punishment applies, the courts cannot invoke the ‘distinct evil’ test to evade that statutory rule.” {Hayes, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 613 (dis. opn. of Traynor, C.

2012In a jurisdiction without a multiple punishment rule like that of Penal Code section 654, this ‗distinct evil‘ test might aid the courts in ascertaining whether the Legislature intended cumulative punishments for simultaneous violation of statutes like Vehicle Code sections 14601 and 23102. [Citations.] In California, however, when the rule of section 654 precluding multiple punishment applies, the courts cannot invoke the ‗distinct evil‘ test to evade that statutory rule.‖ (Hayes, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 613 (dis. opn. of Traynor, C.

2003We find their joint contention to be meritorious. *709 (See, e.g., People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682, 696 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 612 , 631 P.2d 46 ] [conviction of, but not punishment for, both felony murder and the related robbery proper]; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 575-576 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 738 ] [robbery sentence stayed under § 654 where robbery was crime underlying first degree felony murder conviction].) Bracamonte further contends his one-year weapon use enhancement on that count also must be stayed.

2003We find their joint contention to be meritorious. *709 (See, e.g., People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682, 696 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 612 , 631 P.2d 46 ] [conviction of, but not punishment for, both felony murder and the related robbery proper]; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 575-576 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 738 ] [robbery sentence stayed under § 654 where robbery was crime underlying first degree felony murder conviction].) Bracamonte further contends his one-year weapon use enhancement on that count also must be stayed.

2003We find their joint contention to be meritorious. *709 (See, e.g., People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682, 696 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 612 , 631 P.2d 46 ] [conviction of, but not punishment for, both felony murder and the related robbery proper]; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 575-576 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 738 ] [robbery sentence stayed under § 654 where robbery was crime underlying first degree felony murder conviction].) Bracamonte further contends his one-year weapon use enhancement on that count also must be stayed.

2003We find their joint contention to be meritorious. *709 (See, e.g., People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Cal.3d 682, 696 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 612 , 631 P.2d 46 ] [conviction of, but not punishment for, both felony murder and the related robbery proper]; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 575-576 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 738 ] [robbery sentence stayed under § 654 where robbery was crime underlying first degree felony murder conviction].) Bracamonte further contends his one-year weapon use enhancement on that count also must be stayed.

1996(United States v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. 435, 440 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496-497 ]; U.S. v. Morgan (2d Cir. 1995) 51 F.3d 1105 , cert, denied _ U.S. _ [ 133 L.Ed.2d 112 , 116 S.Ct. 171 ].) The alleged aggregate value of all the property in all four complaints was approximately $43,000, whereas affidavits submitted in support of the motion for entry of default in the forfeiture proceedings aver that Prince’s laboratory was capable of producing ten pounds of methamphetamine a day with a street value of approximately $100,000.

1996(United States v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. 435, 440 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496-497 ]; U.S. v. Morgan (2d Cir. 1995) 51 F.3d 1105 , cert, denied _ U.S. _ [ 133 L.Ed.2d 112 , 116 S.Ct. 171 ].) The alleged aggregate value of all the property in all four complaints was approximately $43,000, whereas affidavits submitted in support of the motion for entry of default in the forfeiture proceedings aver that Prince’s laboratory was capable of producing ten pounds of methamphetamine a day with a street value of approximately $100,000.

1988(E.g., People v. Reynolds (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 796, 809-810 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 826 ] [digital penetration (Pen.

1988(E.g., People v. Reynolds (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 796, 809-810 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 826 ] [digital penetration (Pen.

1988This latter category has sometimes been referred to as “undefined lewd acts.” (See People v. Hammon (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1084, 1091 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 822 ].) In People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 40 , 591 P.2d 63 ], a multiple sex offense case involving a single adult victim, the Supreme Court held that Penal Code section 654 did not preclude punishing each sex offense separately despite the fact it could be said the defendant possessed a single intent and objective of obtaining sexual gratification. (23 Cal.3d at pp. 552-553.) Later Court of Appeal decisions have relied on Pe

1988This latter category has sometimes been referred to as “undefined lewd acts.” (See People v. Hammon (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1084, 1091 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 822 ].) In People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 40 , 591 P.2d 63 ], a multiple sex offense case involving a single adult victim, the Supreme Court held that Penal Code section 654 did not preclude punishing each sex offense separately despite the fact it could be said the defendant possessed a single intent and objective of obtaining sexual gratification. (23 Cal.3d at pp. 552-553.) Later Court of Appeal decisions have relied on Pe

1975Indeed, some of the drug possession cases support the view that "separate legislative classification will support dual convictions." ( People v. Aguirre, supra, 10 Cal. App.3d 884, 893 ; see People v. Schroeder, supra, 264 Cal. App.2d 217, 228 .) Yet, by its very terms, section 654 prohibits multiple punishment of an act or omission "made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this Code...." If, as we have determined, only one "act" of transportation took place in this case, then only one punishment may be exacted for that act, and we conclude that petitioner may be punished f