offense allegedly committed violation (California) · Go Syfert
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offense allegedly committed violation in California

14 California opinions name it 4 courts 2003–2026 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Troppman v. Valverdegreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2018
2 sentences

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

34
People v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1972 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2023
2 sentences

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

25
People v. Roblesgreen
cal · 2000 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(See People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 [“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term.”]; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d 759, 766 [“[W]hen defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”]; cf. id. at p. 763, fn. 1 [“Although it could be argued that defendant impliedly consented to the search by not objecting to it, it is

2016(See People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 [“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term.”]; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d 759, 766 [“[W]hen defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”]; cf. id. at p. 763, fn. 1 [“Although it could be argued that defendant impliedly consented to the search by not objecting to it, it is

22
People v. Myersgreen
cal · 1972 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(See People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 [“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term.”]; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d 759, 766 [“[W]hen defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”]; cf. id. at p. 763, fn. 1 [“Although it could be argued that defendant impliedly consented to the search by not objecting to it, it is

2016(See People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 [“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term.”]; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d 759, 766 [“[W]hen defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”]; cf. id. at p. 763, fn. 1 [“Although it could be argued that defendant impliedly consented to the search by not objecting to it, it is

22
People v. Masongreen
cal · 1971 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(See People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 [“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term.”]; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d 759, 766 [“[W]hen defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”]; cf. id. at p. 763, fn. 1 [“Although it could be argued that defendant impliedly consented to the search by not objecting to it, it is

2016(See People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 [“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term.”]; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d 759, 766 [“[W]hen defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”]; cf. id. at p. 763, fn. 1 [“Although it could be argued that defendant impliedly consented to the search by not objecting to it, it is

22
Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen
cal · 1981 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 73, fn. 1 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ], italics omitted (Hernandez).) The California Supreme Court has held that “section 23612 applies broadly and generally to ‘those who drive’ — that is, to those who avail themselves of the public streets, roads, and highways to operate motor vehicles in this state.” (Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1139 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3d 328 ] (Troppman).) The Legislature adopted the implied consent law in 1966 in response to the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmer

2015(Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 73, fn. 1 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ], italics omitted (Hernandez).) The California Supreme Court has held that “section 23612 applies broadly and generally to ‘those who drive’ — that is, to those who avail themselves of the public streets, roads, and highways to operate motor vehicles in this state.” (Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1139 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3d 328 ] (Troppman).) The Legislature adopted the implied consent law in 1966 in response to the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmer

22
Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2018
2 sentences

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

14
Anderson v. Cozensgreen
calctapp · 1976 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 73, fn. 1 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ], italics omitted (Hernandez).) The California Supreme Court has held that “section 23612 applies broadly and generally to ‘those who drive’ — that is, to those who avail themselves of the public streets, roads, and highways to operate motor vehicles in this state.” (Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1139 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3d 328 ] (Troppman).) The Legislature adopted the implied consent law in 1966 in response to the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmer

2015(Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 73, fn. 1 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 566 , 634 P.2d 917 ], italics omitted (Hernandez).) The California Supreme Court has held that “section 23612 applies broadly and generally to ‘those who drive’ — that is, to those who avail themselves of the public streets, roads, and highways to operate motor vehicles in this state.” (Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1139 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3d 328 ] (Troppman).) The Legislature adopted the implied consent law in 1966 in response to the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmer

12
Bussard v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IN GENERAL California has enacted an implied consent statute providing noncriminal sanctions for an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 8 Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides in part: ‘“A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section

2016ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IN GENERAL California has enacted an implied consent statute providing noncriminal sanctions for an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 8 Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides in part: ‘“A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section

11
Daly v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen
calctapp · 1986 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IN GENERAL California has enacted an implied consent statute providing noncriminal sanctions for an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 8 Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides in part: ‘“A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section

2016ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IN GENERAL California has enacted an implied consent statute providing noncriminal sanctions for an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 8 Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides in part: ‘“A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section

11
People v. Harrisgreen
calappdeptsuper · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Vehicle Code section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(B) provides “[a] person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood for the purpose of determining the drug content of his of her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section . . . 23152 . . . .” (People v. Harris (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 8 [“To drive a motor vehicle on the highways of this state is a privilege subject to regulation, not a right . . ., and one such regulation is that any person who does so is statutorily ‘deemed to ha

11
People v. Stanleygreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003(People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 629 P.2d 961 ]; People v. Stanley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1551 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 ].) Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides, “A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.

2003(People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 629 P.2d 961 ]; People v. Stanley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1551 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 ].) Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides, “A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.

11
People v. Leybagreen
cal · 1981 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
2 sentences

2003(People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 629 P.2d 961 ]; People v. Stanley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1551 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 ].) Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides, “A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.

2003(People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 629 P.2d 961 ]; People v. Stanley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1551 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 89 ].) Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides, “A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) green
calctapp · 1982
2 sentences

2024(People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543, 545-546 ; People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 114, 119 .) Keukelaar argues there was no substantial evidence that he refused to take the test.

2023(People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 114 , 117– 119; CALCRIM No. 2130.) It was not objectively reasonable for Officer Yost to believe that the implied consent law even applied here. (§ 23612.) The only two subdivisions 18 of the statute deeming drivers to have given their consent to a blood draw are subdivisions (a)(1)(A) and (B), both of which apply only if the driver is “lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 213153.” Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(C) further states that “[t]he testing shall be incidental to a l

22023–2024
People v. Agnew neutral
calappdeptsuper · 2015
2 sentences

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

22018–2018
People v. Bravo green
cal · 1987
2 sentences

2016(See People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 [“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term.”]; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d 759, 766 [“[W]hen defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”]; cf. id. at p. 763, fn. 1 [“Although it could be argued that defendant impliedly consented to the search by not objecting to it, it is

2016(See People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795 [“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term.”]; People v. Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d 759, 766 [“[W]hen defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”]; cf. id. at p. 763, fn. 1 [“Although it could be argued that defendant impliedly consented to the search by not objecting to it, it is

22016–2016
Mueller v. Department of Motor Vehicles green
calctapp · 1985
1 sentence

2026That procedure includes holding an APS hearing at the request of the licensee. (§§ 13353, subd. (e); 13558.) For a first-time violation of sections 23140, 23152, and 23153, a 6 person’s refusal to submit to chemical testing under section 23612 subjects them to a driver’s license suspension “for a period of one year.” (§ 13353, subd. (a)(1).) “An essential condition to the application of Vehicle Code section 13353 is that the suspect be lawfully arrested on probable cause to believe that he was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.” (Mueller v. Department of Moto

12026–2026
People v. Sandoval green
cal · 2015
1 sentence

2026(People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 410 .) Vehicle Code section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A), the implied consent statute, provides that: “[a] person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.” “The testing shall be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered at the direction of a peace officer having reasonable cause to believe the

12026–2026
People v. Sudduth green
cal · 1966
1 sentence

2024(People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543, 545-546 ; People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 114, 119 .) Keukelaar argues there was no substantial evidence that he refused to take the test.

12024–2024
People v. Harris green
calctapp · 2015
1 sentence

2018On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings-whether express or implied-must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.' " ' " ( Id. at p. 690, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 198 .) Under section 23612, a "person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23612, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The statute "applies

12018–2018
People v. Curtis T. green
calctapp · 1989
2 sentences

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

12016–2016
In Re Smith green
cal · 2006
2 sentences

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

12016–2016
People v. Jaime P. green
cal · 2006
1 sentence

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

12016–2016
Arcade County Water District v. Arcade Fire District green
calctapp · 1970
2 sentences

2016(Black's Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 394, col. 2 ["A contract that the parties presumably intended as their tacit understanding, as inferred from their conduct and other circumstances."].) An "implied-in-law" contract, however, is not a real contract at all, but a "quasi-contract" imposed upon a party to remedy unjust enrichment or other inequity. ( Ibid. ["An implied-in-law contract is not actually a contract, but instead is a remedy that allows the plaintiff to recover a benefit conferred on the defendant."]; Arcade County Water Dist. v. Arcade Fire Dist. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 232 , 236, 85 C

2016(Black's Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 394, col. 2 ["A contract that the parties presumably intended as their tacit understanding, as inferred from their conduct and other circumstances."].) An "implied-in-law" contract, however, is not a real contract at all, but a "quasi-contract" imposed upon a party to remedy unjust enrichment or other inequity. ( Ibid. ["An implied-in-law contract is not actually a contract, but instead is a remedy that allows the plaintiff to recover a benefit conferred on the defendant."]; Arcade County Water Dist. v. Arcade Fire Dist. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 232 , 236, 85 C

12016–2016
People v. Tyrell J. red
cal · 1994
2 sentences

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

12016–2016
People v. Reyes green
cal · 1998
2 sentences

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

2016As pertinent here, section 23612 provides: "(a)(1)(A) A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.... "[¶] ... [¶] "(D) The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of Sectio

12016–2016

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Vehicle Code § 23612 (7) CA § Cal. Vehicle Code § 23152 (5) CA § Cal. Vehicle Code § 13353 (4) CA § Cal. Vehicle Code § 13384 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 14 (2003–2026) IL 2 (1980–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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