purpose underlying rule in California

2006It is not as though Bristol House Partnership, Ltd., who owned the Project when it was being developed, and the Association, as the transferee of interests in the Project, were making competing claims to the same damages. (b) Keru In Keru, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 1412 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 744 , Viljo Kaila sold an apartment building to a group of purchasers (the Moross Group) and took back a deed of trust. ( Id. at pp. 1414-1415, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 744 .) While the Moross Group owned the building, they hired a general contractor to perform certain seismic retrofit construction work. ( Id. at p. 1415, 74

2006It is not as though Bristol House Partnership, Ltd., which owned the Project when it was being developed, and the Association, as the transferee of interests in the Project, were making competing claims to the same damages. (b) Keru In Keru, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 1412 , Viljo Kaila sold an apartment building to a group of purchasers (the Moross Group) and took back a deed of trust.

2006Finally, as the Vaughn court stated: "The primary purpose underlying the requirement that an action be brought in the name of the real party in interest is to protect a defendant from a multiplicity of suits and the further annoyance and vexation at the hands of other claimants to the same demand. [Citation.]" ( Vaughn, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 149 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 261 .) Standard Fire has not told us how this primary purpose would be thwarted if the Association were construed to hold a cause of action against the developers in this matter.

2006Finally, as the Vaughn court stated: “The primary purpose underlying the requirement that an action be brought in the name of the real party in interest is to protect a defendant from a multiplicity of suits and the further annoyance and vexation at the hands of other claimants to the same demand. [Citation.]” (Vaughn, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 149 .) Standard Fire has not told us how this primary purpose would be thwarted if the Association were construed to hold a cause of action against the developers in this matter.

1971Cir. 1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures ‘to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.’ (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel’s function ánd role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases wit

1971Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1287, 1289-1290 .) For the present we merely reiterate what was suggested in Wade relative to the purpose underlying the rule: the presence of counsel at a lineup is required in the absence of other suitable protective measures `to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.' (388 U.S. at p. 227 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1157].) We assume that counsel's function and role at the lineup itself will be determined in future cases with

2020(See People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 223 .) The rule "governs the admissibility of evidence derived from new scientific techniques." (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 936 .) The rule applies only " 'to that limited class of expert testimony which is based, in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law.' [Citation.]" (People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 605 .) The purpose underlying the rule is to protect a jury from expert testimony that conveys a " 'misleading aura of certainty' " about a scientific technique. ( Kelly, s

2020(See People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 508 .) In People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1 (Duenas), the California Supreme Court explained that the admissibility of any evidence altered, generated, or otherwise analyzed by computer software depends on whether such evidence constitutes a "computer animation" or a "computer simulation." (Id. at pp. 20-21.) The court explained the difference between the two: " 'Animation is merely used to illustrate an expert's testimony while simulations contain scientific or physical principles requiring validation. [Citation.] Animations do not draw conclusions

2020(See People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 508 .) In People v. Duenas (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1 (Duenas), the California Supreme Court explained that the admissibility of any evidence altered, generated, or otherwise analyzed by computer software depends on whether such evidence constitutes a "computer animation" or a "computer simulation." (Id. at pp. 20-21.) The court explained the difference between the two: " 'Animation is merely used to illustrate an expert's testimony while simulations contain scientific or physical principles requiring validation. [Citation.] Animations do not draw conclusions

2020(See People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 223 .) The rule "governs the admissibility of evidence derived from new scientific techniques." (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 936 .) The rule applies only " 'to that limited class of expert testimony which is based, in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law.' [Citation.]" (People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 605 .) The purpose underlying the rule is to protect a jury from expert testimony that conveys a " 'misleading aura of certainty' " about a scientific technique. ( Kelly, s

2020(See People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 223 .) The rule "governs the admissibility of evidence derived from new scientific techniques." (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 936 .) The rule applies only " 'to that limited class of expert testimony which is based, in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law.' [Citation.]" (People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 605 .) The purpose underlying the rule is to protect a jury from expert testimony that conveys a " 'misleading aura of certainty' " about a scientific technique. ( Kelly, s

2020(See People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 223 .) The rule "governs the admissibility of evidence derived from new scientific techniques." (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 936 .) The rule applies only " 'to that limited class of expert testimony which is based, in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law.' [Citation.]" (People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 605 .) The purpose underlying the rule is to protect a jury from expert testimony that conveys a " 'misleading aura of certainty' " about a scientific technique. ( Kelly, s

2014(Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 2000) ¶¶ 15:265 to 15:271.) Thus, applying the forfeiture doctrine in the context of juror misconduct claims serves the purpose underlying that doctrine: “ ‘ “ ‘to encourage [parties] to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103 .) Plaintiff contends his trial counsel did not have sufficient information to object before the verdict was rendered because “[i]t was only later determined t

2006It is not as though Bristol House Partnership, Ltd., who owned the Project when it was being developed, and the Association, as the transferee of interests in the Project, were making competing claims to the same damages. (b) Keru In Keru, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 1412 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 744 , Viljo Kaila sold an apartment building to a group of purchasers (the Moross Group) and took back a deed of trust. ( Id. at pp. 1414-1415, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 744 .) While the Moross Group owned the building, they hired a general contractor to perform certain seismic retrofit construction work. ( Id. at p. 1415, 74

2006It is not as though Bristol House Partnership, Ltd., who owned the Project when it was being developed, and the Association, as the transferee of interests in the Project, were making competing claims to the same damages. (b) Keru In Keru, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 1412 , 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 744 , Viljo Kaila sold an apartment building to a group of purchasers (the Moross Group) and took back a deed of trust. ( Id. at pp. 1414-1415, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 744 .) While the Moross Group owned the building, they hired a general contractor to perform certain seismic retrofit construction work. ( Id. at p. 1415, 74

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993In looking to the purpose underlying the rule, we engaged in the same kind of analysis as the Fourth Circuit undertook in Watson . . . .” ( 618 F.2d at p. 558 .) 10 Having recast Martinez in Kennedy , the Ninth Circuit then confronted, in United States v. Dufur (9th Cir. 1980) 648 F.2d 512 , the very same problem Watson confronted—a defendant’s entitlement to two attorneys when indicted for a capital crime when there is no possibility of a death sentence.

1993In looking to the purpose underlying the rule, we engaged in the same kind of analysis as the Fourth Circuit undertook in Watson . . . .” ( 618 F.2d at p. 558 .) 10 Having recast Martinez in Kennedy , the Ninth Circuit then confronted, in United States v. Dufur (9th Cir. 1980) 648 F.2d 512 , the very same problem Watson confronted—a defendant’s entitlement to two attorneys when indicted for a capital crime when there is no possibility of a death sentence.

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1993(In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; In the Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) Accordingly, the right to refuse medical *736 treatment is equally “basic and fundamental” and integral to the concept of informed consent. 6 (Bouvia, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1137 ; Bartling, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 195 ; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 277 [111 L.Ed.2d at p. 241]] (Cruzan); In re Gardner, supra, 534 A.2d at p. 951 ; Brophy, supra, 398 Mass. 417 [ 497 N.E.2d at p. 633 ]; In the Matter of Conroy, supra, 98

1990(Powers v. Ashton, supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 783, 788 .) Here, there is no concern of a multiplicity of lawsuits from other claimants to the same demand.