purpose underlying privilege in Michigan

2026Id.

2025Accordingly, “[t]his ‘oneness’ of party and attorney explains the different language employed by the rule for criminal, as opposed to civil, actions and, when viewed in conjunction with the purpose underlying a challenge for cause as discussed above, militates against the argument advanced by [the] defendant.” Id.

2018“The purpose underlying the privilege is to protect the confidential nature of the physician- patient relationship, and to encourage patients to make full disclosure of their symptoms and conditions.” Landelius v Sackellares, 453 Mich 470, 474 ; 556 NW2d 472 (1996).

2018“The purpose underlying the privilege is to protect the confidential nature of the physician- patient relationship, and to encourage patients to make full disclosure of their symptoms and conditions.” Landelius v Sackellares, 453 Mich 470, 474 ; 556 NW2d 472 (1996).

2026The purpose underlying the rule allowing for sanctions for a frivolous defense is to deter parties and their lawyers from asserting defenses “that have not been sufficiently investigated and researched or that are intended to serve an improper purpose.” Id. at 732 .

2019Such gamesmanship directly contravenes the purpose underlying the doctrine of res judicata, which is to “prevent multiple suits litigating the same cause of action.” Adair, 470 Mich at 121 . -5- Additionally, plaintiff’s pursuit of two separate actions also violates the compulsory joinder rule of MCR 2.203(A), which provides: In a pleading that states a claim against an opposing party, the pleader must join every claim that the pleader has against that opposing party at the time of serving the pleading, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the action

2019Exercising reasonable diligence, Adair, 470 Mich at 121 , plaintiff could have presented her claim seeking declaratory relief with respect to the need for around-the-clock attendant care in the prior action.

2004Consequently, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court’s grant of the prosecutor’s *384 challenges for cause under MCR 2.511(D)(11). 2 Carines, supra. Defendant further argues that the trial court’s “hard and fast policy” of granting the prosecutor’s challenges under MCR 2.511(D)(11), despite the potential jurors having indicated their ability to be fair and impartial, resulted in a “systematic exclusion” of African-Americans from the jury panel. 3 In making this argument, defendant contends that because there is a higher incidence of arrest among African-Americans than any oth

1996Domako v Rowe, 438 Mich 347, 354 ; 475 NW2d 30 (1991). 5 The statute contains what is commonly referred to as a patient-litigator exception.

1996Domako v Rowe, 438 Mich 347, 354 ; 475 NW2d 30 (1991). 5 The statute contains what is commonly referred to as a patient-litigator exception.

1995As noted by the Arizona Supreme Court: The purpose underlying the doctrine of informed consent is defeated somewhat if, after receiving all information necessary to make an informed decision, the patient is forced to choose only from alternative methods of treatment and precluded from foregoing all treatment whatsoever. [Rasmussen v Fleming, 154 Ariz 207, 216; 741 P2d 667 (1987).]_ Thus, because we find that the common-law doctrine of informed consent allows a person to refuse life-sustaining treatment, we also decline the invitation to reach the propriety of the constitutional and statutory i

1995As noted by the Arizona Supreme Court: The purpose underlying the doctrine of informed consent is defeated somewhat if, after receiving all information necessary to make an informed decision, the patient is forced to choose only from alternative methods of treatment and precluded from foregoing all treatment whatsoever. [ Rasmussen v Fleming, 154 Ariz 207, 216; 741 P2d 667 (1987).] *217 Thus, because we find that the common-law doctrine of informed consent allows a person to refuse life-sustaining treatment, we also decline the invitation to reach the propriety of the constitutional and statut

1970As was stated in Felice v. Weinman (1964), 372 Mich 278 , 280: “The ban of the rule [preventing disclosure of insurance coverage] * * * applies to plaintiffs and defendants — and to their respective counsel — with equal force.