quality of his own defense in California

2023(Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46 [a defendant who elects to represent himself 3 cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of “effective assistance of counsel”].) Defendant also reiterates the argument he made before the trial court as to his firearm enhancements, where he argued that statutory amendments have given trial courts the discretion to strike the enhancements at resentencing.

2020Code, § 1237.5) to claim on appeal that the new law applied to him retroactively . . . .” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 692 .) The court first recognized the basic principle that a defendant’s “claim that seeks to avoid a 8 Defendant admitted a gang enhancement within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), as to only count 1. 9 “[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46 ; see People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.

1998To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him." ( 422 U.S. at p. 834 , 95 S.Ct. at p. 2540 .) [4] Ligda has been cited with apparent approval by the United States Supreme Court. ( Mireles v. Waco (1991) 502 U.S. 9, 12, fn. 2 , 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, fn. 2 , 116 L.Ed.2d 9 .) [5] The Littlefield majority also distinguished Ligda on the ground that the deputy public defender representing the defendant agreed to the standby representation and did not object—it was only his boss, the Solano County Public Defender, who later overruled his deputy and to

1998To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him." ( 422 U.S. at p. 834 , 95 S.Ct. at p. 2540 .) [4] Ligda has been cited with apparent approval by the United States Supreme Court. ( Mireles v. Waco (1991) 502 U.S. 9, 12, fn. 2 , 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, fn. 2 , 116 L.Ed.2d 9 .) [5] The Littlefield majority also distinguished Ligda on the ground that the deputy public defender representing the defendant agreed to the standby representation and did not object—it was only his boss, the Solano County Public Defender, who later overruled his deputy and to

2001Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel'" ( Faretta, supra, 422 U. S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581 ; see People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 574 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 (opn. of Gardner, P.J.) ["by choosing to represent himself, he will be throwing away one of the criminal defendant's favorite contentions on appeal"].) A defendant chooses to exercise the right of self-representat

2001Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel'" ( Faretta, supra, 422 U. S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581 ; see People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 574 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 (opn. of Gardner, P.J.) ["by choosing to represent himself, he will be throwing away one of the criminal defendant's favorite contentions on appeal"].) A defendant chooses to exercise the right of self-representat

2020Code, § 1237.5) to claim on appeal that the new law applied to him retroactively . . . .” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 692 .) The court first recognized the basic principle that a defendant’s “claim that seeks to avoid a 8 Defendant admitted a gang enhancement within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), as to only count 1. 9 “[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46 ; see People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.

2020Code, § 1237.5) to claim on appeal that the new law applied to him retroactively . . . .” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 692 .) The court first recognized the basic principle that a defendant’s “claim that seeks to avoid a 8 Defendant admitted a gang enhancement within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), as to only count 1. 9 “[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46 ; see People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.

2005(Cf. State v. Whalen (1997) 192 Ariz. 103 & fn. 5 [ 961 P.2d 1051, 1055 ].) The citation to Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. 337 , does not suggest otherwise.

2005(Cf. State v. Whalen (1997) 192 Ariz. 103 & fn. 5 [ 961 P.2d 1051, 1055 ].) The citation to Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. 337 , does not suggest otherwise.

1994If he chooses to defend himself, he must be content with the quality of that defense.” (U.S. v. Flewitt, supra, 874 F.2d 669, 674 .) Although a pro se defendant must be “able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol” (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168,173 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 122, 130 , 104 S.Ct. 944 ]), the term “abide” connotes a willingness “to accept without rejection,” “to conform,” or “to acquiesce in.” (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Diet. (1984) p. 44.) Indeed, were we to construe Faretta and its progeny as requiring the denial of pro se status merely on the basi

1994If he chooses to defend himself, he must be content with the quality of that defense.” (U.S. v. Flewitt, supra, 874 F.2d 669, 674 .) Although a pro se defendant must be “able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol” (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168,173 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 122, 130 , 104 S.Ct. 944 ]), the term “abide” connotes a willingness “to accept without rejection,” “to conform,” or “to acquiesce in.” (Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Diet. (1984) p. 44.) Indeed, were we to construe Faretta and its progeny as requiring the denial of pro se status merely on the basi

1988(Compare People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581-582 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) * Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

1988(Compare People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581-582 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) * Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

1984(People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 628-629 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 668 P.2d 769 ].) 2 Appellant filed two petitions with the court, one for habeas corpus and the other for a writ of mandate, neither of which appellant’s retained counsel was aware.

1984(People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 628-629 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 668 P.2d 769 ].) 2 Appellant filed two petitions with the court, one for habeas corpus and the other for a writ of mandate, neither of which appellant’s retained counsel was aware.

1976Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel.'" Under pre- Faretta authority, an accused is not entitled to have his case presented in court by both himself and counsel acting at the same time. ( People v. Sharp, supra, at p. 459 ; People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777, 783-788 [ 336 P.2d 937 ].) Petitioner contends that the issue of whether stand-by counsel should be appointed is premature for decision by this cour

1976Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel.'" Under pre- Faretta authority, an accused is not entitled to have his case presented in court by both himself and counsel acting at the same time. ( People v. Sharp, supra, at p. 459 ; People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777, 783-788 [ 336 P.2d 937 ].) Petitioner contends that the issue of whether stand-by counsel should be appointed is premature for decision by this cour

1976Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel.'" Under pre- Faretta authority, an accused is not entitled to have his case presented in court by both himself and counsel acting at the same time. ( People v. Sharp, supra, at p. 459 ; People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777, 783-788 [ 336 P.2d 937 ].) Petitioner contends that the issue of whether stand-by counsel should be appointed is premature for decision by this cour

1976Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel.'" Under pre- Faretta authority, an accused is not entitled to have his case presented in court by both himself and counsel acting at the same time. ( People v. Sharp, supra, at p. 459 ; People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777, 783-788 [ 336 P.2d 937 ].) Petitioner contends that the issue of whether stand-by counsel should be appointed is premature for decision by this cour