14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hensleygreen2 sentences2025In addition, the fact that defendant did not use all his allotted peremptory challenges “suggests defendant at trial believed the jury was fair and impartial.” (McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1080 ; see Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 796 [“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges . . . supports ‘a reasonable inference that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated jurors’ ”].) Finally, the fact that the jury deadlocked on three counts “tends to show that it was not prejudiced against [the defendant], but rather was able to fairly evaluate 2025In addition, the fact that defendant did not use all his allotted peremptory challenges “suggests defendant at trial believed the jury was fair and impartial.” (McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1080 ; see Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 796 [“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges . . . supports ‘a reasonable inference that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated jurors’ ”].) Finally, the fact that the jury deadlocked on three counts “tends to show that it was not prejudiced against [the defendant], but rather was able to fairly evaluate | 3 | 3 |
The People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2025In addition, the fact that defendant did not use all his allotted peremptory challenges “suggests defendant at trial believed the jury was fair and impartial.” (McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1080 ; see Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 796 [“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges . . . supports ‘a reasonable inference that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated jurors’ ”].) Finally, the fact that the jury deadlocked on three counts “tends to show that it was not prejudiced against [the defendant], but rather was able to fairly evaluate 2025In addition, the fact that defendant did not use all his allotted peremptory challenges “suggests defendant at trial believed the jury was fair and impartial.” (McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1080 ; see Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 796 [“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges . . . supports ‘a reasonable inference that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated jurors’ ”].) Finally, the fact that the jury deadlocked on three counts “tends to show that it was not prejudiced against [the defendant], but rather was able to fairly evaluate | 2 | 2 |
People v. Princegreen2 sentences2015“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges or renew his venue motion supports ‘a reasonable inference that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated jurors ....’” (People v. Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 796, quoting People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1216 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ].) C. 2015“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges or renew his venue motion supports ‘a reasonable inference that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated jurors ....’” (People v. Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 796, quoting People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1216 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ].) C. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Bonillagreen2 sentences2015We ordinarily review the trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion “deferentially, considering only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 .) However, in cases where it is unclear whether the trial court applied the correct standard in finding that the defendant failed to state a prima face case of discrimination, “‘we review the record independently’” to determine “‘“whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror” on a prohibited discriminatory basis.’” (Ibid.; see also People v. Howard (2008) 4 2008To do so, the defendant must make a "`showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citations.]" (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (Johnson ); see also People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 , 60 Cal. Rptr.3d 209 , 160 P.3d 84 (Bonilla).) Where, as here, it is not clear whether the trial court used the reasonable inference standard, rather than the recently disapproved "`strong likelihood' standard," we review the record independently. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Howardgreen1 sentence2015We ordinarily review the trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion “deferentially, considering only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions.” (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 .) However, in cases where it is unclear whether the trial court applied the correct standard in finding that the defendant failed to state a prima face case of discrimination, “‘we review the record independently’” to determine “‘“whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror” on a prohibited discriminatory basis.’” (Ibid.; see also People v. Howard (2008) 4 | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Californiagreen2 sentences2008To do so, the defendant must make a "`showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citations.]" (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (Johnson ); see also People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 , 60 Cal. Rptr.3d 209 , 160 P.3d 84 (Bonilla).) Where, as here, it is not clear whether the trial court used the reasonable inference standard, rather than the recently disapproved "`strong likelihood' standard," we review the record independently. 2008To do so, the defendant must make a "`showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citations.]" (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (Johnson ); see also People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 , 60 Cal. Rptr.3d 209 , 160 P.3d 84 (Bonilla).) Where, as here, it is not clear whether the trial court used the reasonable inference standard, rather than the recently disapproved "`strong likelihood' standard," we review the record independently. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2007Indeed, “ ‘[t]he failure to exhaust peremptories is a strong indication “that the jurors were fair and that the defense itself so concluded.” ’ ” (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 524 ; see also People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 623 ; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 46 .) Defendant urges that no rational inference that counsel was satisfied with the jury can be drawn from counsel’s failure to exhaust peremptory challenges. | 1 | 1 |
Holmes v. South Carolinagreen2 sentences2007(Holmes, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 323 [ 126 S.Ct. at p. 1730 ].) The trial court excluded the defendant’s evidence of third party culpability, concluding that such evidence was admissible if it “ ‘ “raise[s] a reasonable inference or presumption as to [the defendant’s] own innocence” ’ but is not admissible if it merely ‘ “cast[s] a bare suspicion upon another” ’ or ‘ “raise[s] a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 324 [ 126 S.Ct. at p. 1731 ].) The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “ ‘where there is strong evidence of a 2007(Holmes, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 323 [ 126 S.Ct. at p. 1730 ].) The trial court excluded the defendant’s evidence of third party culpability, concluding that such evidence was admissible if it “ ‘ “raise[s] a reasonable inference or presumption as to [the defendant’s] own innocence” ’ but is not admissible if it merely ‘ “cast[s] a bare suspicion upon another” ’ or ‘ “raise[s] a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 324 [ 126 S.Ct. at p. 1731 ].) The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “ ‘where there is strong evidence of a | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2006(See Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 133 , 569 P.2d 727 ] [trial court is presumed to follow established law absent evidence to the contrary].) Therefore, he asks that we independently determine whether he established a prima facie case of discrimination using the reasonable inference test under Batson. 2006(See Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 133 , 569 P.2d 727 ] [trial court is presumed to follow established law absent evidence to the contrary].) Therefore, he asks that we independently determine whether he established a prima facie case of discrimination using the reasonable inference test under Batson. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Huntergreen2 sentences1992(People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 580 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 817 P.2d 893 ]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 976 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) Indeed, the instruction told the jury that “if you unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder charged in Count 1, you must have your foreman date and sign such verdict and return them into court regardless of what may happen in your deliberations on any lesser included offenses . ...” A reasonable inference from this instruction is that the jury may deliberate 1992(People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 580 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 817 P.2d 893 ]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 976 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) Indeed, the instruction told the jury that “if you unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder charged in Count 1, you must have your foreman date and sign such verdict and return them into court regardless of what may happen in your deliberations on any lesser included offenses . ...” A reasonable inference from this instruction is that the jury may deliberate | 1 | 1 |
People v. Nicolausgreen2 sentences1992(People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 580 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 817 P.2d 893 ]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 976 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) Indeed, the instruction told the jury that “if you unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder charged in Count 1, you must have your foreman date and sign such verdict and return them into court regardless of what may happen in your deliberations on any lesser included offenses . ...” A reasonable inference from this instruction is that the jury may deliberate 1992(People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 580 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 628 , 817 P.2d 893 ]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 976 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 782 P.2d 608 ].) Indeed, the instruction told the jury that “if you unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder charged in Count 1, you must have your foreman date and sign such verdict and return them into court regardless of what may happen in your deliberations on any lesser included offenses . ...” A reasonable inference from this instruction is that the jury may deliberate | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. McCurdy
green
2 sentences2025In addition, the fact that defendant did not use all his allotted peremptory challenges “suggests defendant at trial believed the jury was fair and impartial.” (McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1080 ; see Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 796 [“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges . . . supports ‘a reasonable inference that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated jurors’ ”].) Finally, the fact that the jury deadlocked on three counts “tends to show that it was not prejudiced against [the defendant], but rather was able to fairly evaluate 2025In addition, the fact that defendant did not use all his allotted peremptory challenges “suggests defendant at trial believed the jury was fair and impartial.” (McCurdy, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1080 ; see Hensley, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 796 [“Defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges . . . supports ‘a reasonable inference that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated jurors’ ”].) Finally, the fact that the jury deadlocked on three counts “tends to show that it was not prejudiced against [the defendant], but rather was able to fairly evaluate | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2023(Id. at pp. 358-359.) The Ninth Circuit’s strict requirement the prosecution present proof the item bearing the defendant’s fingerprints was inaccessible to the defendant prior to the time of the commission of the crime was not followed by the Supreme Court in People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475 , a case not cited by Karels. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2021(Delgado, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 577; Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 .) The licensee must present some evidence that the demonstrated violation gives rise to a reasonable inference that the test results are unreliable. 2021(Delgado, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 577; Petricka, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 .) The licensee must present some evidence that the demonstrated violation gives rise to a reasonable inference that the test results are unreliable. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Rountree
green
1 sentence2015Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Carjacking Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the carjacking conviction, a first degree murder conviction predicated on the felony-murder rule based on carjacking, and the carjacking-murder special circumstance. ―To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a jury verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonabl | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Coffman
green
1 sentence2007Indeed, “ ‘[t]he failure to exhaust peremptories is a strong indication “that the jurors were fair and that the defense itself so concluded.” ’ ” (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 524 ; see also People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 623 ; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 46 .) Defendant urges that no rational inference that counsel was satisfied with the jury can be drawn from counsel’s failure to exhaust peremptory challenges. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Dennis
green
1 sentence2007Indeed, “ ‘[t]he failure to exhaust peremptories is a strong indication “that the jurors were fair and that the defense itself so concluded.” ’ ” (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 524 ; see also People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 623 ; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 46 .) Defendant urges that no rational inference that counsel was satisfied with the jury can be drawn from counsel’s failure to exhaust peremptory challenges. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Cornwell
green
1 sentence2006As in People v. Cornwell, “[r]egardless of the standard employed by the trial court, and even assuming without deciding that the trial court’s decision is not entitled to deference, we have reviewed the record and, like the United States Supreme Court in Johnson . . . [we] are able to apply the high court’s standard and resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.” (People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 73 .) We conclude the record fails to support “an inference that the prosecutor excused [any] juror on the | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Balderas
green
2 sentences1993Defendant relies on People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ], to argue his interpretation of Evidence Code section 788. 1993Defendant relies on People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ], to argue his interpretation of Evidence Code section 788. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Johnson
neutral
1 sentence1919“The evidence offered by accused as to the commission of the crime by another person must be limited to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence. ...” (16 Corpus Juris, 560, sec. 1085.) In People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 122 , the defendant and one Emerson had been jointly indicted for the crime of burglary. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.