reasonable inference presumption (Texas) · Go Syfert
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reasonable inference presumption in Texas

6 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Wiley v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024To present such evidence, the defendant must show a “nexus between the crime charged and the alleged ‘alternative perpetrator.’” Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Tex. Crim.

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Bender v. Stategreen
texapp · 1987 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See Bender v. State, 739 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d) (holding that officer’s description of addresses and intersections provided circumstantial evidence that arrest occurred in Houston, Texas).

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Commonwealth v. Loepergreen
pa · 1995 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1307 (9th Cir.1992) (person can fail all field sobriety tests even if blood alcohol concentration is less than 0.10%); Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393 , 663 A.2d 669, 673 (1995) (“[I]mpairment evidence is not relevant since it does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove that a defendant’s blood alcohol level was .10% or greater at the time that she drove her automobile, it does not tend to make such a fact more or less probable and it does not afford a basis for or support a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether a defendant

1999See McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1307 (9th Cir.1992) (person can fail all field sobriety tests even if blood alcohol concentration is less than 0.10%); Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393 , 663 A.2d 669, 673 (1995) (“[I]mpairment evidence is not relevant since it does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove that a defendant’s blood alcohol level was .10% or greater at the time that she drove her automobile, it does not tend to make such a fact more or less probable and it does not afford a basis for or support a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether a defendant

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Daricek v. Stategreen
texapp · 1994 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999But see Martin, 964 S.W.2d at 775-76 (holding that evidence of physical signs of intoxication and failed sobriety tests constitute “evidence suggesting ... the prohibited alcohol concentration”); Daricek v. State, 875 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, pet. ref'd) (“[E]vidence of [the defendant’s] failure to pass field sobriety tests immediately after driving his vehicle tends to make it more probable that the failed blood or breath test taken an hour later accurately reflect [sic] the driver’s condition at the time of the offense.”).

1999But see Martin, 964 S.W.2d at 775-76 (holding that evidence of physical signs of intoxication and failed sobriety tests constitute "evidence suggesting ... the prohibited alcohol concentration"); Daricek v. State, 875 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref'd) ("[E]vidence of [the defendant's] failure to pass field sobriety tests immediately after driving his vehicle tends to make it more probable that the failed blood or breath test taken an hour later accurately reflect [sic] the driver's condition at the time of the offense.").

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Patricia McLean v. John Moran, Sheriff of Clark County, Brian McKay Attorney General of State of Nevadagreen
ca9 · 1992 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1307 (9th Cir.1992) (person can fail all field sobriety tests even if blood alcohol concentration is less than 0.10%); Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393 , 663 A.2d 669, 673 (1995) (“[I]mpairment evidence is not relevant since it does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove that a defendant’s blood alcohol level was .10% or greater at the time that she drove her automobile, it does not tend to make such a fact more or less probable and it does not afford a basis for or support a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether a defendant

1999See McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1307 (9th Cir.1992) (person can fail all field sobriety tests even if blood alcohol concentration is less than 0.10%); Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393 , 663 A.2d 669, 673 (1995) ("[I]mpairment evidence is not relevant since it does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove that a defendant's blood alcohol level was .10% or greater at the time that she drove her automobile, it does not tend to make such a fact more or less probable and it does not afford a basis for or support a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether a defendant

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Commonwealth v. Gonzalezgreen
pa · 1988 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1307 (9th Cir.1992) (person can fail all field sobriety tests even if blood alcohol concentration is less than 0.10%); Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393 , 663 A.2d 669, 673 (1995) (“[I]mpairment evidence is not relevant since it does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove that a defendant’s blood alcohol level was .10% or greater at the time that she drove her automobile, it does not tend to make such a fact more or less probable and it does not afford a basis for or support a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether a defendant

1999See McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1307 (9th Cir.1992) (person can fail all field sobriety tests even if blood alcohol concentration is less than 0.10%); Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393 , 663 A.2d 669, 673 (1995) (“[I]mpairment evidence is not relevant since it does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove that a defendant’s blood alcohol level was .10% or greater at the time that she drove her automobile, it does not tend to make such a fact more or less probable and it does not afford a basis for or support a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether a defendant

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Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Martin v. Department of Public Safetygreen
texapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999But see Martin, 964 S.W.2d at 775-76 (holding that evidence of physical signs of intoxication and failed sobriety tests constitute “evidence suggesting ... the prohibited alcohol concentration”); Daricek v. State, 875 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, pet. ref'd) (“[E]vidence of [the defendant’s] failure to pass field sobriety tests immediately after driving his vehicle tends to make it more probable that the failed blood or breath test taken an hour later accurately reflect [sic] the driver’s condition at the time of the offense.”).

1999But see Martin, 964 S.W.2d at 775-76 (holding that evidence of physical signs of intoxication and failed sobriety tests constitute "evidence suggesting ... the prohibited alcohol concentration"); Daricek v. State, 875 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, pet. ref'd) ("[E]vidence of [the defendant's] failure to pass field sobriety tests immediately after driving his vehicle tends to make it more probable that the failed blood or breath test taken an hour later accurately reflect [sic] the driver's condition at the time of the offense.").

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Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Prible v. State green
texcrimapp · 2008
1 sentence

2024Such evidence is “admissible if it raises a reasonable inference or presumption as to the defendant’s innocence and is limited to facts that are inconsistent with his own guilt, but it is not admissible if it merely casts a bare suspicion upon another or raises a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another.” Id. at 469 .

12024–2024
Holmes v. South Carolina green
scotus · 2006
1 sentence

2008The trial court excluded Holmes' evidence pursuant to a state rule that allowed evidence of a third party's guilt if it "'raise[s] a reasonable inference or presumption as to [the defendant's] own innocence,'" but not if it merely "cast[s] a bare suspicion upon another'" or "'raise[s] a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another.'" Id . at 323-24, 126 S. Ct. at 1731 .

12008–2008
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe green
tex · 1995
1 sentence

1995Without further explanation, the majority declares, "The case before us is more like Boyles than Roark or Gulf." 903 S.W.2d at 355 .

11995–1995
Alejandro v. State green
texcrimapp · 1973
1 sentence

1988Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Crim.App.1973).

11988–1988

Where else courts name it

PA 369 (1986–2026) SC 19 (1986–2024) CA 14 (1919–2025) NC 9 (1988–2017) GA 6 (1992–2022) TX 6 (1988–2024) TN 4 (2005–2011) MN 4 (1994–2004) OH 4 (1936–2021) DE 3 (1983–1985) IL 2 (2004–2004)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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