satisfactory standard in California

2021As other courts have observed, ‘ “[m]uch ink has been spilt in an attempt to arrive at a satisfactory standard for telling where preparation ends and attempt begins.” ’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 8 .) “Although a definitive test has proved elusive,” our Supreme Court has “long recognized that ‘[w]henever the design of a person to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts in furtherance of the design will constitute an attempt.’ ” (Ibid.; People v. Dillon 29 PUBLIC—REDACTED OPINION (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 455 [“the plainer the intent to commit the offense, the more

2007As other courts have observed, "`[m]uch ink has been spilt in an attempt to arrive at a satisfactory standard for telling where preparation ends and attempt begins.' [Citation.] `Both as fascinating and as fruitless as the alchemists' quest for the philosopher's stone has been the search, by judges and writers, for a valid, single statement of doctrine to express when, under the law of guilt, preparation to commit a crime becomes a criminal attempt.'" ( Minshew v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1991) 594 So.2d 703, 709 ; accord, Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) p. 617.) Indeed, we have ourselve

1967(Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 60 [ 216 P.2d 859 ] ; People v. Ring, 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 771-772 [ 70 P.2d 281 ].) ” Moreover, as we shall see, Dr. Whitlow did not act or refrain from acting under a misunderstanding of the nature of his professional duties in issuing prescriptions for dangerous drugs.

1967(Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 60 [ 216 P.2d 859 ] ; People v. Ring, 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 771-772 [ 70 P.2d 281 ].) ” Moreover, as we shall see, Dr. Whitlow did not act or refrain from acting under a misunderstanding of the nature of his professional duties in issuing prescriptions for dangerous drugs.

1967A less satisfactory rule would permit many guilty persons to escape and would render it difficult to apprehend criminals who commit certain classes of crimes.” (Id., p. 42; and cf. Ex parte Blake (1909) 155 Cal. 586, 587-591 [ 102 P. 269 ] ; and Ex parte Dimmig (1887) 74 Cal. 164, 166 [ 15 P. 619 ].) In Van Zandt, suggestions that Blake and Dimmig required a contrary conclusion were disposed of by limiting them to requiring depositions only where the complaint was on information and belief.

1967A less satisfactory rule would permit many guilty persons to escape and would render it difficult to apprehend criminals who commit certain classes of crimes.” (Id., p. 42; and cf. Ex parte Blake (1909) 155 Cal. 586, 587-591 [ 102 P. 269 ] ; and Ex parte Dimmig (1887) 74 Cal. 164, 166 [ 15 P. 619 ].) In Van Zandt, suggestions that Blake and Dimmig required a contrary conclusion were disposed of by limiting them to requiring depositions only where the complaint was on information and belief.

1967A less satisfactory rule would permit many guilty persons to escape and would render it difficult to apprehend criminals who commit certain classes of crimes.” (Id., p. 42; and cf. Ex parte Blake (1909) 155 Cal. 586, 587-591 [ 102 P. 269 ] ; and Ex parte Dimmig (1887) 74 Cal. 164, 166 [ 15 P. 619 ].) In Van Zandt, suggestions that Blake and Dimmig required a contrary conclusion were disposed of by limiting them to requiring depositions only where the complaint was on information and belief.

1967A less satisfactory rule would permit many guilty persons to escape and would render it difficult to apprehend criminals who commit certain classes of crimes.” (Id., p. 42; and cf. Ex parte Blake (1909) 155 Cal. 586, 587-591 [ 102 P. 269 ] ; and Ex parte Dimmig (1887) 74 Cal. 164, 166 [ 15 P. 619 ].) In Van Zandt, suggestions that Blake and Dimmig required a contrary conclusion were disposed of by limiting them to requiring depositions only where the complaint was on information and belief.

1967(Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 60 [ 216 P.2d 859 ] ; People v. Ring, 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 771-772 [ 70 P.2d 281 ].) ” Moreover, as we shall see, Dr. Whitlow did not act or refrain from acting under a misunderstanding of the nature of his professional duties in issuing prescriptions for dangerous drugs.

1967(Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 60 [ 216 P.2d 859 ] ; People v. Ring, 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 771-772 [ 70 P.2d 281 ].) ” Moreover, as we shall see, Dr. Whitlow did not act or refrain from acting under a misunderstanding of the nature of his professional duties in issuing prescriptions for dangerous drugs.

2023(Cf. People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 606 (Smith) [where defense counsel said “that he could not disagree that the ‘relationship [has] broken down to the extent that I can no longer competently represent [defendant],’ ” it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant’s motion for new counsel as the trial court was not required to find that an irreconcilable conflict existed].) Ward argues the trial court erred in failing to “make a satisfactory inquiry to confirm an intact [attorney-client] relationship, ensure adequate representation, and create a record for review.” We disagree

2017(See e.g., People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606 [statute is not void despite difficulty in determining whether some marginal act is covered by its language] (Morgan).) As the Supreme Court has recognized, “ ‘[t]he law is replete with instances in which a person must, at his peril, govern his conduct by such nonmathematical standards as “reasonable,” “prudent,” “necessary and proper,” “substantial,” and the like.

2007As other courts have observed, "`[m]uch ink has been spilt in an attempt to arrive at a satisfactory standard for telling where preparation ends and attempt begins.' [Citation.] `Both as fascinating and as fruitless as the alchemists' quest for the philosopher's stone has been the search, by judges and writers, for a valid, single statement of doctrine to express when, under the law of guilt, preparation to commit a crime becomes a criminal attempt.'" ( Minshew v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1991) 594 So.2d 703, 709 ; accord, Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) p. 617.) Indeed, we have ourselve

2007As other courts have observed, "`[m]uch ink has been spilt in an attempt to arrive at a satisfactory standard for telling where preparation ends and attempt begins.' [Citation.] `Both as fascinating and as fruitless as the alchemists' quest for the philosopher's stone has been the search, by judges and writers, for a valid, single statement of doctrine to express when, under the law of guilt, preparation to commit a crime becomes a criminal attempt.'" ( Minshew v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1991) 594 So.2d 703, 709 ; accord, Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) p. 617.) Indeed, we have ourselve

2007As other courts have observed, "`[m]uch ink has been spilt in an attempt to arrive at a satisfactory standard for telling where preparation ends and attempt begins.' [Citation.] `Both as fascinating and as fruitless as the alchemists' quest for the philosopher's stone has been the search, by judges and writers, for a valid, single statement of doctrine to express when, under the law of guilt, preparation to commit a crime becomes a criminal attempt.'" ( Minshew v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1991) 594 So.2d 703, 709 ; accord, Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) p. 617.) Indeed, we have ourselve

2007As other courts have observed, "`[m]uch ink has been spilt in an attempt to arrive at a satisfactory standard for telling where preparation ends and attempt begins.' [Citation.] `Both as fascinating and as fruitless as the alchemists' quest for the philosopher's stone has been the search, by judges and writers, for a valid, single statement of doctrine to express when, under the law of guilt, preparation to commit a crime becomes a criminal attempt.'" ( Minshew v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1991) 594 So.2d 703, 709 ; accord, Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) p. 617.) Indeed, we have ourselve

2007As other courts have observed, "`[m]uch ink has been spilt in an attempt to arrive at a satisfactory standard for telling where preparation ends and attempt begins.' [Citation.] `Both as fascinating and as fruitless as the alchemists' quest for the philosopher's stone has been the search, by judges and writers, for a valid, single statement of doctrine to express when, under the law of guilt, preparation to commit a crime becomes a criminal attempt.'" ( Minshew v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1991) 594 So.2d 703, 709 ; accord, Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) p. 617.) Indeed, we have ourselve

2007As other courts have observed, "`[m]uch ink has been spilt in an attempt to arrive at a satisfactory standard for telling where preparation ends and attempt begins.' [Citation.] `Both as fascinating and as fruitless as the alchemists' quest for the philosopher's stone has been the search, by judges and writers, for a valid, single statement of doctrine to express when, under the law of guilt, preparation to commit a crime becomes a criminal attempt.'" ( Minshew v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1991) 594 So.2d 703, 709 ; accord, Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) p. 617.) Indeed, we have ourselve

1988Poeschl, Inc. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 694, 699 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 702 ] [suggesting that circumstances of that case warranted apportionment of loss between manufacturer and retailer of a defective product], discussed with approval in American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578, 595-597 .) 13 As discussed above, in the American Motorcycle decision our court reviewed past judicial attempts to formulate a satisfactory standard for determining under what circumstances liability should be totally shifted from one tortfeasor to another, and found that the task had been largely a futile one. {American Motorcy

1988Poeschl, Inc. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 694, 699 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 702 ] [suggesting that circumstances of that case warranted apportionment of loss between manufacturer and retailer of a defective product], discussed with approval in American Motorcycle, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578, 595-597 .) 13 As discussed above, in the American Motorcycle decision our court reviewed past judicial attempts to formulate a satisfactory standard for determining under what circumstances liability should be totally shifted from one tortfeasor to another, and found that the task had been largely a futile one. {American Motorcy

1959(People v. Bradbury, 155 Cal. 808, 814-815 [ 103 P. 215 ]; People v. Jones, 123 Cal. 299, 302 [ 55 P. 992 ] ; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31, 38-40 [ 89 P.2d 173 ]; 38 Cal.Jur.2d, Perjury, §§ 13-15, pp. 379-384.) However, a satisfactory test for materiality of testimony at a legislative hearing is whether the false statements concern a subject properly within the scope of the committee’s authority and could reasonably influence the outcome of the proceedings.

1959(People v. Bradbury, 155 Cal. 808, 814-815 [ 103 P. 215 ]; People v. Jones, 123 Cal. 299, 302 [ 55 P. 992 ] ; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31, 38-40 [ 89 P.2d 173 ]; 38 Cal.Jur.2d, Perjury, §§ 13-15, pp. 379-384.) However, a satisfactory test for materiality of testimony at a legislative hearing is whether the false statements concern a subject properly within the scope of the committee’s authority and could reasonably influence the outcome of the proceedings.

1959(People v. Bradbury, 155 Cal. 808, 814-815 [ 103 P. 215 ]; People v. Jones, 123 Cal. 299, 302 [ 55 P. 992 ] ; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31, 38-40 [ 89 P.2d 173 ]; 38 Cal.Jur.2d, Perjury, §§ 13-15, pp. 379-384.) However, a satisfactory test for materiality of testimony at a legislative hearing is whether the false statements concern a subject properly within the scope of the committee’s authority and could reasonably influence the outcome of the proceedings.

1959(People v. Bradbury, 155 Cal. 808, 814-815 [ 103 P. 215 ]; People v. Jones, 123 Cal. 299, 302 [ 55 P. 992 ] ; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31, 38-40 [ 89 P.2d 173 ]; 38 Cal.Jur.2d, Perjury, §§ 13-15, pp. 379-384.) However, a satisfactory test for materiality of testimony at a legislative hearing is whether the false statements concern a subject properly within the scope of the committee’s authority and could reasonably influence the outcome of the proceedings.

1959(See People v. Dunstan, 59 Cal.App. 574, 584 [ 211 P. 813 ]; 38 Cal.Jur.2d, Perjury, § 14, pp. 380-382.) The parties differ as to what proof of materiality was required under the indictment in the instant case.

1959(See People v. Dunstan, 59 Cal.App. 574, 584 [ 211 P. 813 ]; 38 Cal.Jur.2d, Perjury, § 14, pp. 380-382.) The parties differ as to what proof of materiality was required under the indictment in the instant case.

1959(People v. Bradbury, 155 Cal. 808, 814-815 [ 103 P. 215 ]; People v. Jones, 123 Cal. 299, 302 [ 55 P. 992 ] ; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31, 38-40 [ 89 P.2d 173 ]; 38 Cal.Jur.2d, Perjury, §§ 13-15, pp. 379-384.) However, a satisfactory test for materiality of testimony at a legislative hearing is whether the false statements concern a subject properly within the scope of the committee’s authority and could reasonably influence the outcome of the proceedings.