Soule factors in California

2026(Garrabrants v. Erhart, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 496.) In assessing prejudice from instructional error in civil cases, courts examine several factors, including “(1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was misled.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548 , 580–581, fn. omitted.) Defendants address only one of the Soule factors, contending plaintiffs’ counsel “seized on” the instruction’s misleading nature in closing argument by averring “the prior jury’s finding

2026(Garrabrants v. Erhart, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 496.) In assessing prejudice from instructional error in civil cases, courts examine several factors, including “(1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was misled.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548 , 580–581, fn. omitted.) Defendants address only one of the Soule factors, contending plaintiffs’ counsel “seized on” the instruction’s misleading nature in closing argument by averring “the prior jury’s finding

2024Because of the need to consider the particulars of the given case, rather than the type of error, the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] These principles are derived from the axiom that prejudice is not presumed and the burden is on the appealing party to demonstrate that prejudice has occurred.” (Adams v. MHC Colony Park, L.P. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 614 (Adams).) “ ‘Where any error is relied on for a reversal it is not sufficient for appellant to point to the error and rest there.’ ” (Paterno v. State

2024Because of the need to consider the particulars of the given case, rather than the type of error, the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] These principles are derived from the axiom that prejudice is not presumed and the burden is on the appealing party to demonstrate that prejudice has occurred.” (Adams v. MHC Colony Park, L.P. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 614 (Adams).) “ ‘Where any error is relied on for a reversal it is not sufficient for appellant to point to the error and rest there.’ ” (Paterno v. State

2021However, in determining whether or not the instructions given are correct, we must assume that the jury might have believed the evidence upon which the instruction favorable to the losing party was predicated, and that if the correct instruction had been given upon that subject the jury might have rendered a verdict in favor of the losing party.’ (See also Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628 , 643–644 [ 220 P.2d 897 ]; Oettinger v. Stewart [(1944)] 24 Cal.2d 133, 140 .)” (Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 674 .) 16 The last three Soule factors are not r

2013No precise formula can be drawn.’ ” (Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 670-671 .) In determining whether plaintiffs were prejudiced by the court giving CACI No. 452, we examine the Soule factors: the evidence, counsel’s arguments, the effect of other instructions, and any indication by the jury itself that it was misled.

2020(Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1087 .) Here, a properly instructed jury might have decided in Sun Pacific’s favor on the negligence cause of action based on the first three Soule factors.

2020(Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1087 .) Here, a properly instructed jury might have decided in Sun Pacific’s favor on the negligence cause of action based on the first three Soule factors.

2024(See Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 364, 379-381 ; Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 374, 393-398 ; Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390 , 412-417.) And the fourth and final case, Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709 (Thomas), was decided before our Supreme Court issued its decision in Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th 548 , where it held “there is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice 8 applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission[,]” and summarized the multi-factor framework gove

2024(See Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 364, 379-381 ; Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 374, 393-398 ; Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390 , 412-417.) And the fourth and final case, Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709 (Thomas), was decided before our Supreme Court issued its decision in Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th 548 , where it held “there is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice 8 applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission[,]” and summarized the multi-factor framework gove

2024(See Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 364, 379-381 ; Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 374, 393-398 ; Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390 , 412-417.) And the fourth and final case, Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709 (Thomas), was decided before our Supreme Court issued its decision in Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th 548 , where it held “there is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice 8 applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission[,]” and summarized the multi-factor framework gove

2024(See Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 364, 379-381 ; Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 374, 393-398 ; Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390 , 412-417.) And the fourth and final case, Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709 (Thomas), was decided before our Supreme Court issued its decision in Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th 548 , where it held “there is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice 8 applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission[,]” and summarized the multi-factor framework gove

2024(See Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 364, 379-381 ; Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 374, 393-398 ; Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390 , 412-417.) And the fourth and final case, Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709 (Thomas), was decided before our Supreme Court issued its decision in Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th 548 , where it held “there is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice 8 applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission[,]” and summarized the multi-factor framework gove

2024(See Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 364, 379-381 ; Buzgheia v. Leasco Sierra Grove (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 374, 393-398 ; Khoiny v. Dignity Health (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 390 , 412-417.) And the fourth and final case, Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709 (Thomas), was decided before our Supreme Court issued its decision in Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th 548 , where it held “there is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’ prejudice 8 applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission[,]” and summarized the multi-factor framework gove

2024On the contrary, we expressly said that prejudice is not presumed, and extensively discussed and applied the Soule factors. ( Veronese, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-32.) In discussing the state of the evidence, we evaluated the evidence most favorably to the appealing party (see id. at pp. 30-31) consistent with the principle that, in evaluating a claim of instructional error, we must assume the jury might have believed the appellant’s version of the facts (id. at pp. 4-5).

2024On the contrary, we expressly said that prejudice is not presumed, and extensively discussed and applied the Soule factors. ( Veronese, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-32.) In discussing the state of the evidence, we evaluated the evidence most favorably to the appealing party (see id. at pp. 30-31) consistent with the principle that, in evaluating a claim of instructional error, we must assume the jury might have believed the appellant’s version of the facts (id. at pp. 4-5).

2021However, in determining whether or not the instructions given are correct, we must assume that the jury might have believed the evidence upon which the instruction favorable to the losing party was predicated, and that if the correct instruction had been given upon that subject the jury might have rendered a verdict in favor of the losing party.’ (See also Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628 , 643–644 [ 220 P.2d 897 ]; Oettinger v. Stewart [(1944)] 24 Cal.2d 133, 140 .)” (Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 674 .) 16 The last three Soule factors are not r

2021However, in determining whether or not the instructions given are correct, we must assume that the jury might have believed the evidence upon which the instruction favorable to the losing party was predicated, and that if the correct instruction had been given upon that subject the jury might have rendered a verdict in favor of the losing party.’ (See also Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628 , 643–644 [ 220 P.2d 897 ]; Oettinger v. Stewart [(1944)] 24 Cal.2d 133, 140 .)” (Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 674 .) 16 The last three Soule factors are not r

2021However, in determining whether or not the instructions given are correct, we must assume that the jury might have believed the evidence upon which the instruction favorable to the losing party was predicated, and that if the correct instruction had been given upon that subject the jury might have rendered a verdict in favor of the losing party.’ (See also Clement v. State Reclamation Board (1950) 35 Cal.2d 628 , 643–644 [ 220 P.2d 897 ]; Oettinger v. Stewart [(1944)] 24 Cal.2d 133, 140 .)” (Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 674 .) 16 The last three Soule factors are not r

2015Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to ZOLL (see Freeze, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53), as well as considering the other Soule factors, we conclude the instructional error here was prejudicial in that “ ‘it seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ [Citations.]” (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580 .) In view of our conclusion that there was instructional error that requires reversal, we need not address ZOLL’s second, alternative argument that the judgment must be reversed due to insufficiency of the evidence to support Baharestani’s claim of wrongful

2015Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to ZOLL (see Freeze, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53), as well as considering the other Soule factors, we conclude the instructional error here was prejudicial in that “ ‘it seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ [Citations.]” (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 580 .) In view of our conclusion that there was instructional error that requires reversal, we need not address ZOLL’s second, alternative argument that the judgment must be reversed due to insufficiency of the evidence to support Baharestani’s claim of wrongful

1995We applied the Soule analysis to the asbestos context, focusing on the “ ‘crucial question’ ” as to “ ‘whether the circumstances of the product’s failure permit an inference that the product’s design performed below the legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety assumptions of its ordinary consumers.’ ” (Sparks, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 474 , quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 568-569.) Ultimately, we concluded that Soule did not preclude plaintiffs from relying on a consumer expectations theory because, among other things, “[t]here were neither ‘complicated de

1995We applied the Soule analysis to the asbestos context, focusing on the “ ‘crucial question’ ” as to “ ‘whether the circumstances of the product’s failure permit an inference that the product’s design performed below the legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety assumptions of its ordinary consumers.’ ” (Sparks, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 474 , quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 568-569.) Ultimately, we concluded that Soule did not preclude plaintiffs from relying on a consumer expectations theory because, among other things, “[t]here were neither ‘complicated de