appearance of impropriety standard in Colorado

2022See People v. Perez , 201 P.3d 1220, 1229 ( Colo. 2009 ) ( " [T] he statute enumerates the only circumstances under which a district attorney may be disqualified." ( emphasis omitted ) ) ; People v. Loper , 241 P.3d 543, 546 ( Colo. 2010 ) (same) . [4] Of course, disqualification of an elected district attorney in this context results in the disqualification of his or her entire office. [5] Consistent with the trial court 's order, we limit our analysis to the most recent incident in question-Struble's violation of the screening policy with regard to Mr. Flores-Molina.

2010In N.R., however, we made it clear that the 2002 amendment to section 20-1-107 eliminated the appearance of impropriety standard and that the cireumstances enumerated in the statute were the only bases for disqualifying the district attorney. 189 P.38d at 675; People v. Peres, 201 P.3d 1220, 1229 (Colo.2009) ("[The statute enumerates the only cireumstances under which a district attorney may be disqualified." (emphasis in original)).

2006See In re Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo.2006) ("[W]e have often noted that courts have the inherent power to ensure both the reality and appearance of integrity and fairness in proceedings before them; and to that end, they necessarily retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation.") (citing People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo.1985)); Garcia, 698 P.2d at 805-06 (upholding trial court's order disqualifying district attorney because of an "appearance of impropriety" and relying on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes

2006See In re Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo.2006) ("[W]e have often noted that courts have the inherent power to ensure both the reality and appearance of integrity and fairness in proceedings before them; and to that end, they necessarily retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation.") (citing People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo.1985)); Garcia, 698 P.2d at 805-06 (upholding trial court's order disqualifying district attorney because of an "appearance of impropriety" and relying on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes

2022In People in Interest of N.R. , 139 P.3d 671, 675 ( Colo. 2006 ) , however, we made it clear that the 2002 amendment to section 20-1-107 eliminated the appearance of impropriety standard and that the circumstances enumerated in the statute were the only bases for disqualifying the district attorney.

2022In People in Interest of N.R. , 139 P.3d 671, 675 ( Colo. 2006 ) , however, we made it clear that the 2002 amendment to section 20-1-107 eliminated the appearance of impropriety standard and that the circumstances enumerated in the statute were the only bases for disqualifying the district attorney.

2022See People v. Perez , 201 P.3d 1220, 1229 ( Colo. 2009 ) ( " [T] he statute enumerates the only circumstances under which a district attorney may be disqualified." ( emphasis omitted ) ) ; People v. Loper , 241 P.3d 543, 546 ( Colo. 2010 ) (same) . [4] Of course, disqualification of an elected district attorney in this context results in the disqualification of his or her entire office. [5] Consistent with the trial court 's order, we limit our analysis to the most recent incident in question-Struble's violation of the screening policy with regard to Mr. Flores-Molina.

2022See People v. Perez , 201 P.3d 1220, 1229 ( Colo. 2009 ) ( " [T] he statute enumerates the only circumstances under which a district attorney may be disqualified." ( emphasis omitted ) ) ; People v. Loper , 241 P.3d 543, 546 ( Colo. 2010 ) (same) . 4 Of course, disqualification of an elected district attorney in this context results in the disqualification of his or her entire office. 5 Consistent with the trial court 's order, we limit our analysis to the most recent incident in question — Struble's violation of the screening policy with regard to Mr. Flores-Molina.

2006See In re Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo.2006) ("[W]e have often noted that courts have the inherent power to ensure both the reality and appearance of integrity and fairness in proceedings before them; and to that end, they necessarily retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation.") (citing People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo.1985)); Garcia, 698 P.2d at 805-06 (upholding trial court's order disqualifying district attorney because of an "appearance of impropriety" and relying on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes

2006See In re Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo.2006) ("[W]e have often noted that courts have the inherent power to ensure both the reality and appearance of integrity and fairness in proceedings before them; and to that end, they necessarily retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation.”) (citing People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo. 1985)); Garcia, 698 P.2d at 805-06 (upholding trial court’s order disqualifying district attorney because of an "appearance of impropriety” and relying on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profe

2006Lindsley v. Dist. Court, 29 Colo. 5, 15-16 , 66 P. 896 , 899 (1901) (holding that, where the trial court suspected that the district attorney may have been involved in a crime, the court had authority to appoint an attorney from outside the district attorney's office, in part because "[t]he district court has the inherent power to protect itself and direct investigations in a manner which will render them thorough and impartial") (citing Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213 , 17 P. 637 (1888)); Roberts, 11 Colo. at 215 , 17 P. at 638 (noting that even in the absence of statutory grounds that suppor

2006Lindsley v. Dist. Court, 29 Colo. 5, 15-16 , 66 P. 896 , 899 (1901) (holding that, where the trial court suspected that the district attorney may have been involved in a crime, the court had authority to appoint an attorney from outside the district attorney's office, in part because "[t]he district court has the inherent power to protect itself and direct investigations in a manner which will render them thorough and impartial") (citing Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213 , 17 P. 637 (1888)); Roberts, 11 Colo. at 215 , 17 P. at 638 (noting that even in the absence of statutory grounds that suppor

2006Lindsley v. Dist. Court, 29 Colo. 5, 15-16 , 66 P. 896 , 899 (1901) (holding that, where the trial court suspected that the district attorney may have been involved in a crime, the court had authority to appoint an attorney from outside the district attorney's office, in part because "[t]he district court has the inherent power to protect itself and direct investigations in a manner which will render them thorough and impartial") (citing Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213 , 17 P. 637 (1888)); Roberts, 11 Colo. at 215 , 17 P. at 638 (noting that even in the absence of statutory grounds that suppor

2006Lindsley v. Dist. Court, 29 Colo. 5, 15-16 , 66 P. 896 , 899 (1901) (holding that, where the trial court suspected that the district attorney may have been involved in a crime, the court had authority to appoint an attorney from outside the district attorney’s office, in part because ”[t]he district court has the inherent power to protect itself and direct investigations in a manner which will render them thorough and impartial”) (citing Roberts v. People, 11 Colo. 213 , 17 P. 637 (1888)); Roberts, 11 Colo, at 215, 17 P. at 638 (noting that even in the absence of statutory grounds that support

1986Cleary v. District Court, 704 P.2d 866 (Colo.1985); Osborn v. District Court, 619 P.2d 41 (Colo.1980).

1986Cleary v. District Court, 704 P.2d 866 (Colo.1985); Osborn v. District Court, 619 P.2d 41 (Colo.1980).

2006See In re Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo.2006) ("[W]e have often noted that courts have the inherent power to ensure both the reality and appearance of integrity and fairness in proceedings before them; and to that end, they necessarily retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation.") (citing People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo.1985)); Garcia, 698 P.2d at 805-06 (upholding trial court's order disqualifying district attorney because of an "appearance of impropriety" and relying on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes

2006See In re Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo.2006) ("[W]e have often noted that courts have the inherent power to ensure both the reality and appearance of integrity and fairness in proceedings before them; and to that end, they necessarily retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation.”) (citing People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo. 1985)); Garcia, 698 P.2d at 805-06 (upholding trial court’s order disqualifying district attorney because of an "appearance of impropriety” and relying on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profe

2003Generally, we have defined appearance of impropriety as a circumstance where the district attorney again has ‘an interest’ in the matter aside from his or her “professional responsibility of upholding the law.” Sandstrom, 884 P.2d at 711 (quoting People v. Dist.

2003See Palomo, 31 P.3d at 882 (recognizing that disqualification can be based on a finding of an appearance of impropriety, but reversing the trial court’s order due to insufficient evidence that such a result would transpire); Sandstrom, 884 P.2d at 710-11 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying the district attorney, as the district attorney’s involvement in both a criminal case and a civil forfeiture case was too attenuated to constitute an actual conflict of interest or an appearance of impropriety); Garcia, 698 P.2d at 806 (recognizing the appearance of improprie

2021United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (10th Cir. 1988).

2013See Schupper, 124 P.3d at 858 .

2003See Palomo, 31 P.3d at 882 (recognizing that disqualification can be based on a finding of an appearance of impropriety, but reversing the trial court’s order due to insufficient evidence that such a result would transpire); Sandstrom, 884 P.2d at 710-11 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying the district attorney, as the district attorney’s involvement in both a criminal case and a civil forfeiture case was too attenuated to constitute an actual conflict of interest or an appearance of impropriety); Garcia, 698 P.2d at 806 (recognizing the appearance of improprie

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002I do not go so far. [5] See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002The only case that the majority cites that directly supports its holding is Owens v. State, 13 S.W.3d 742, 757 (Tenn.Crim.App.).

2002The only case that the majority cites that directly supports its holding is Owens v. State, 13 S.W.3d 742, 757 (Tenn.Crim.App.).

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2002See Payne v. State, 48 Ala.App. 401 , 265 So.2d 185, 191-92 (1972) (containing no discussion of the appearance of impropriety standard or what circumstances might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality; decided before the Code of Judicial Conduct was even developed); Lofton v. State, 57 Ark.App. 226 , 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997) (holding that the judge's refusal to recuse himself was not reversible error under the Code of Judicial Conduct because the defendant had not alleged that he was actually biased or prejudiced at trial); People v. Burnett, 73 Ill.App.3d 750 , 29 Ill.

2001In First American Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 802 Ark. 86 , 92, 787 SW.2d 669, 672 (1990), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that, although not expressly adopted in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the appearance of impropriety standard could be found in "what the preamble to the Rules refers to as 'moral and ethical considerations' that should guide lawyers, who have 'special responsibility for the quality of justice.'" In Turbin v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 195 , 797 P.2d 784 (Ct.App.1990), the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument that, under the state's version of the Mo