Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
14 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Mercedegreen2 sentences2020In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) PSE Con- sulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279 , 328–29, 838 A.2d 135 (2004). ‘‘The law defining the relevance of evidence is well settled. 2020In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) PSE Con- sulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279 , 328–29, 838 A.2d 135 (2004). ‘‘The law defining the relevance of evidence is well settled. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Allen, 205 Conn. 370, 380 , 533 A.2d 559 (1987) (‘‘[t]he reopening of a criminal case either to present omitted evidence or to add further testimony after either of the parties has rested is within the sound discretion of the [t]rial [c]ourt’’ (internal quo- tation marks omitted)). 2024See, e.g., State v. Allen, 205 Conn. 370, 380 , 533 A.2d 559 (1987) (‘‘[t]he reopening of a criminal case either to present omitted evidence or to add further testimony after either of the parties has rested is within the sound discretion of the [t]rial [c]ourt’’ (internal quo- tation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Kellygreen2 sentences2021See Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn. App. 813 , 826–27, 949 A.2d 557 (2008) (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 85 Conn. App. 794, 799 , 859 A.2d 60 (2004)). ‘‘Decisions to grant or to deny continuances are very often matters involving judicial economy, docket man- agement or courtroom proceedings and, therefore, are particularly within the province of a trial court. . . . 2021See Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn. App. 813 , 826–27, 949 A.2d 557 (2008) (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 85 Conn. App. 794, 799 , 859 A.2d 60 (2004)). ‘‘Decisions to grant or to deny continuances are very often matters involving judicial economy, docket man- agement or courtroom proceedings and, therefore, are particularly within the province of a trial court. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Watrous v. Watrousgreen2 sentences2021See Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn. App. 813 , 826–27, 949 A.2d 557 (2008) (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 85 Conn. App. 794, 799 , 859 A.2d 60 (2004)). ‘‘Decisions to grant or to deny continuances are very often matters involving judicial economy, docket man- agement or courtroom proceedings and, therefore, are particularly within the province of a trial court. . . . 2021See Watrous v. Watrous, 108 Conn. App. 813 , 826–27, 949 A.2d 557 (2008) (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 85 Conn. App. 794, 799 , 859 A.2d 60 (2004)). ‘‘Decisions to grant or to deny continuances are very often matters involving judicial economy, docket man- agement or courtroom proceedings and, therefore, are particularly within the province of a trial court. . . . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 593 n.24, 10 A.3d 1005 (‘‘the abuse of discre- tion standard reflects the context specific nature of evidentiary rulings, which are made in the heat of battle by the trial judge, who is in a unique position to [observe] the context in which particular evidentiary issues arise and who is therefore in the best position to weigh the potential benefits and harms accompanying the admission of particular evidence’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S. Ct. 314 , 181 L. 2020See, e.g., State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 593 n.24, 10 A.3d 1005 (‘‘the abuse of discre- tion standard reflects the context specific nature of evidentiary rulings, which are made in the heat of battle by the trial judge, who is in a unique position to [observe] the context in which particular evidentiary issues arise and who is therefore in the best position to weigh the potential benefits and harms accompanying the admission of particular evidence’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S. Ct. 314 , 181 L. | 1 | 1 |
Cobble v. Owensgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 593 n.24, 10 A.3d 1005 (‘‘the abuse of discre- tion standard reflects the context specific nature of evidentiary rulings, which are made in the heat of battle by the trial judge, who is in a unique position to [observe] the context in which particular evidentiary issues arise and who is therefore in the best position to weigh the potential benefits and harms accompanying the admission of particular evidence’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S. Ct. 314 , 181 L. | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Thalergreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 593 n.24, 10 A.3d 1005 (‘‘the abuse of discre- tion standard reflects the context specific nature of evidentiary rulings, which are made in the heat of battle by the trial judge, who is in a unique position to [observe] the context in which particular evidentiary issues arise and who is therefore in the best position to weigh the potential benefits and harms accompanying the admission of particular evidence’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S. Ct. 314 , 181 L. | 1 | 1 |
Barnwell v. Matthewsgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 593 n.24, 10 A.3d 1005 (‘‘the abuse of discre- tion standard reflects the context specific nature of evidentiary rulings, which are made in the heat of battle by the trial judge, who is in a unique position to [observe] the context in which particular evidentiary issues arise and who is therefore in the best position to weigh the potential benefits and harms accompanying the admission of particular evidence’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S. Ct. 314 , 181 L. | 1 | 1 |
Strouth v. Pools by Murphy & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2019See Strouth v. Pools by Murphy & Sons, Inc., 79 Conn. App. 55, 59 , 829 A.2d 102 (2003). 21 The defendants ignore the court’s oral ruling, at the conclusion of the second day of trial on May 19, 2016, in which it ruled on the viability of the fourth special defense pertaining to the delays in the property renovations allegedly caused by Girouard. 2019See Strouth v. Pools by Murphy & Sons, Inc., 79 Conn. App. 55, 59 , 829 A.2d 102 (2003). 21 The defendants ignore the court’s oral ruling, at the conclusion of the second day of trial on May 19, 2016, in which it ruled on the viability of the fourth special defense pertaining to the delays in the property renovations allegedly caused by Girouard. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Tayler F.green2 sentences2016See, e.g., In re Tayler F., 296 Conn. 524, 537 , 995 A.2d 611 (2010). 2016See, e.g., In re Tayler F., 296 Conn. 524, 537 , 995 A.2d 611 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
In re Amneris P.green2 sentences2015When the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions, the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving harm.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 824–25; see also In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 382 , 784 A.2d 457 (2001) (respondent parent challenging admissibility of evidence had burden of demonstrating harmful error). 2015When the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions, the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving harm.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 824–25; see also In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 382 , 784 A.2d 457 (2001) (respondent parent challenging admissibility of evidence had burden of demonstrating harmful error). | 1 | 1 |
Wiseman v. Armstronggreen1 sentence2014See id., 109–10 (citing various types of legal claims to which court has applied harmless error review); Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 216 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996) (‘‘[w]here claims of trial court impropriety have been properly preserved and, therefore, are entitled to ple- nary review, we determine whether the ruling of the trial court is legally correct and, if it is not, whether the error was likely to have affected the verdict’’); see, e.g., PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 291, 295 , 838 A.2d 135 (2004) (con- cluding, after conducting plenary revi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thorpe v. Comm'r of Corr.
green
2 sentences2019The harmfulness of an improper ruling is material irrespective of whether the ruling is subject to review under an abuse of discre- tion standard or a plenary review standard. . . . [If] the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions, the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving harm.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toro, 172 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 162 A.3d 63 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 905 , 170 A.3d 2 (2017). 2017When the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions, the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving harm.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toro, 172 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 162 A.3d 63 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 905 , A.3d (2017). ‘‘It is a fundamental rule of appellate review of eviden- tiary rulings that if [the] error is not of constitutional dimensions, an appellant has the burden of establishing that there has been an erroneous ruling which was probably harmful to him.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 817. | 2 | 2017–2019 |
State v. Toro
green
2 sentences2019The harmfulness of an improper ruling is material irrespective of whether the ruling is subject to review under an abuse of discre- tion standard or a plenary review standard. . . . [If] the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions, the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving harm.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toro, 172 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 162 A.3d 63 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 905 , 170 A.3d 2 (2017). 2019The harmfulness of an improper ruling is material irrespective of whether the ruling is subject to review under an abuse of discre- tion standard or a plenary review standard. . . . [If] the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions, the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving harm.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toro, 172 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 162 A.3d 63 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 905 , 170 A.3d 2 (2017). | 2 | 2017–2019 |
STRANO v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2016Under the abuse of discre- tion standard for review, [an appellate court] will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus] review of such rulings is lim- ited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680 , 701–702, 981 A.2d 497 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 923 , 985 A.2d 1062 (2009). 2016Under the abuse of discre- tion standard for review, [an appellate court] will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus] review of such rulings is lim- ited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680 , 701–702, 981 A.2d 497 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 923 , 985 A.2d 1062 (2009). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Label Systems Corp. v. Samad Aghamohammadi
green
2 sentences2016With respect to common-law causes of action, ‘‘[t]o furnish a basis for recovery of punitive damages, the pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wan- ton or wilful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such damages are being sought.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 335 , 852 A.2d 703 (2004). ‘‘It is clear in our law that an award of punitive damages cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff’s expenses of litiga- tion in the 2016With respect to common-law causes of action, ‘‘[t]o furnish a basis for recovery of punitive damages, the pleadings must allege and the evidence must show wan- ton or wilful malicious misconduct, and the language contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that such damages are being sought.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 335 , 852 A.2d 703 (2004). ‘‘It is clear in our law that an award of punitive damages cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff’s expenses of litiga- tion in the | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Perez v. D AND L TRACTOR TRAILER SCHOOL
green
2 sentences2016Under the abuse of discre- tion standard for review, [an appellate court] will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus] review of such rulings is lim- ited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680 , 701–702, 981 A.2d 497 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 923 , 985 A.2d 1062 (2009). 2016Under the abuse of discre- tion standard for review, [an appellate court] will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus] review of such rulings is lim- ited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680 , 701–702, 981 A.2d 497 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 923 , 985 A.2d 1062 (2009). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. FOURTIN
green
2 sentences2016Under the abuse of discre- tion standard for review, [an appellate court] will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus] review of such rulings is lim- ited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680 , 701–702, 981 A.2d 497 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 923 , 985 A.2d 1062 (2009). 2016Under the abuse of discre- tion standard for review, [an appellate court] will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus] review of such rulings is lim- ited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. D & L Tractor Trailer School, 117 Conn. App. 680 , 701–702, 981 A.2d 497 , cert. denied, 294 Conn. 923 , 985 A.2d 1062 (2009). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown
green
2 sentences2025General Statutes § 42-110g (d) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]n any action brought by a person under [CUTPA], the court may award . . . costs and reason- able attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably per- formed by an attorney . . . .’’ This court has held that § 42-110g (d) ‘‘relates solely to claims related to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim and not to all claims.’’ Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 57 Conn. App. 189, 200 , 752 A.2d 1098 (2000). 2025General Statutes § 42-110g (d) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]n any action brought by a person under [CUTPA], the court may award . . . costs and reason- able attorneys’ fees based on the work reasonably per- formed by an attorney . . . .’’ This court has held that § 42-110g (d) ‘‘relates solely to claims related to the prosecution of a CUTPA claim and not to all claims.’’ Jacques All Trades Corp. v. Brown, 57 Conn. App. 189, 200 , 752 A.2d 1098 (2000). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Noyes v. Antiques at Pompey Hollow, LLC
green
2 sentences2025Under the abuse of discre- tion standard of review, [w]e will make every reason- able presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discre- tion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Noyes v. Antiques at Pompey Hollow, LLC, 144 Conn. App. 582, 597 , 73 A.3d 794 (2013). 2025Under the abuse of discre- tion standard of review, [w]e will make every reason- able presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discre- tion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Noyes v. Antiques at Pompey Hollow, LLC, 144 Conn. App. 582, 597 , 73 A.3d 794 (2013). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Tang v. Bou-Fakhreddine
green
2 sentences2020Section 37-3a provides in relevant part that ‘‘interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.’’ We review an award of prejudgment interest under the abuse of discretion standard. ‘‘The allowance of pre- judgment interest as an element of damages is an equita- ble determination and a matter lying within the discre- tion of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tang v. Bou-Fakhreddine, 75 Conn. App. 334, 346 , 815 A.2d 1276 (2003). ‘‘Under the abuse of d 2020Section 37-3a provides in relevant part that ‘‘interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.’’ We review an award of prejudgment interest under the abuse of discretion standard. ‘‘The allowance of pre- judgment interest as an element of damages is an equita- ble determination and a matter lying within the discre- tion of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tang v. Bou-Fakhreddine, 75 Conn. App. 334, 346 , 815 A.2d 1276 (2003). ‘‘Under the abuse of d | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bobinski v. Kalinowski
neutral
2 sentences2020Ed. 2d 193 (2011); Bobinski v. Kalinowski, 107 Conn. App. 622 , 628–29, 946 A.2d 283 (‘‘‘we may not alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion, for the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of each case’ ’’), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 919 , 958 A.2d 150 (2008). 2020Ed. 2d 193 (2011); Bobinski v. Kalinowski, 107 Conn. App. 622 , 628–29, 946 A.2d 283 (‘‘‘we may not alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion, for the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of each case’ ’’), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 919 , 958 A.2d 150 (2008). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Gaida v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Shelton
green
1 sentence2020Ed. 2d 193 (2011); Bobinski v. Kalinowski, 107 Conn. App. 622 , 628–29, 946 A.2d 283 (‘‘‘we may not alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion, for the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of each case’ ’’), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 919 , 958 A.2d 150 (2008). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Hirsch
green
2 sentences2020Section 37-3a provides in relevant part that ‘‘interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.’’ We review an award of prejudgment interest under the abuse of discretion standard. ‘‘The allowance of pre- judgment interest as an element of damages is an equita- ble determination and a matter lying within the discre- tion of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tang v. Bou-Fakhreddine, 75 Conn. App. 334, 346 , 815 A.2d 1276 (2003). ‘‘Under the abuse of d 2020Section 37-3a provides in relevant part that ‘‘interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions . . . as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.’’ We review an award of prejudgment interest under the abuse of discretion standard. ‘‘The allowance of pre- judgment interest as an element of damages is an equita- ble determination and a matter lying within the discre- tion of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tang v. Bou-Fakhreddine, 75 Conn. App. 334, 346 , 815 A.2d 1276 (2003). ‘‘Under the abuse of d | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Christiani v. Benefitpoint, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Ed. 2d 193 (2011); Bobinski v. Kalinowski, 107 Conn. App. 622 , 628–29, 946 A.2d 283 (‘‘‘we may not alter an award of attorney’s fees unless the trial court has clearly abused its discretion, for the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances of each case’ ’’), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 919 , 958 A.2d 150 (2008). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sousa v. Sousa
green
1 sentence2019The harmfulness of an improper ruling is material irrespective of whether the ruling is subject to review under an abuse of discre- tion standard or a plenary review standard. . . . [If] the ruling at issue is not of constitutional dimensions, the party challenging the ruling bears the burden of proving harm.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toro, 172 Conn. App. 810, 816 , 162 A.3d 63 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 905 , 170 A.3d 2 (2017). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Santopietro v. City of New Haven
green
2 sentences2014See id., 109–10 (citing various types of legal claims to which court has applied harmless error review); Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 216 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996) (‘‘[w]here claims of trial court impropriety have been properly preserved and, therefore, are entitled to ple- nary review, we determine whether the ruling of the trial court is legally correct and, if it is not, whether the error was likely to have affected the verdict’’); see, e.g., PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 291, 295 , 838 A.2d 135 (2004) (con- cluding, after conducting plenary revi 2014See id., 109–10 (citing various types of legal claims to which court has applied harmless error review); Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 216 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996) (‘‘[w]here claims of trial court impropriety have been properly preserved and, therefore, are entitled to ple- nary review, we determine whether the ruling of the trial court is legally correct and, if it is not, whether the error was likely to have affected the verdict’’); see, e.g., PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 291, 295 , 838 A.2d 135 (2004) (con- cluding, after conducting plenary revi | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Doyle v. Kamm
green
2 sentences2014See id., 109–10 (citing various types of legal claims to which court has applied harmless error review); Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 216 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996) (‘‘[w]here claims of trial court impropriety have been properly preserved and, therefore, are entitled to ple- nary review, we determine whether the ruling of the trial court is legally correct and, if it is not, whether the error was likely to have affected the verdict’’); see, e.g., PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 291, 295 , 838 A.2d 135 (2004) (con- cluding, after conducting plenary revi 2014See id., 109–10 (citing various types of legal claims to which court has applied harmless error review); Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 216 , 682 A.2d 106 (1996) (‘‘[w]here claims of trial court impropriety have been properly preserved and, therefore, are entitled to ple- nary review, we determine whether the ruling of the trial court is legally correct and, if it is not, whether the error was likely to have affected the verdict’’); see, e.g., PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 267 Conn. 279, 291, 295 , 838 A.2d 135 (2004) (con- cluding, after conducting plenary revi | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.