action or making defense in Connecticut

2016We further note that "[w]hile ... [i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party ... we are also aware that [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Keating v. Ferrandino, 125 Conn.A

2016We further note that "[w]hile ... [i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party ... we are also aware that [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Keating v. Ferrandino, 125 Conn.A

2016A motion to open a default judgment is governed by General Statutes § 52-212, which provides in relevant part: "Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket, on such terms in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable, upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition

2016A motion to open a default judgment is governed by General Statutes § 52-212, which provides in relevant part: "Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket, on such terms in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable, upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition

2015Furthermore, § 52-212 (b) requires that ‘[t]he complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plain- tiff or defendant failed to appear.’’ In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41, 45 , 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 , 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘It is thus clear that to obtain relief from a judgment rendered after a default, two things must concur.

2015Furthermore, § 52-212 (b) requires that ‘[t]he complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plain- tiff or defendant failed to appear.’’ In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41, 45 , 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 , 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘It is thus clear that to obtain relief from a judgment rendered after a default, two things must concur.

2015Furthermore, § 52-212 (b) requires that ‘[t]he complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plain- tiff or defendant failed to appear.’’ In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41, 45 , 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 , 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘It is thus clear that to obtain relief from a judgment rendered after a default, two things must concur.

2015Furthermore, § 52-212 (b) requires that ‘[t]he complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plain- tiff or defendant failed to appear.’’ In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41, 45 , 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 , 943 A.2d 475 (2008). ‘‘It is thus clear that to obtain relief from a judgment rendered after a default, two things must concur.

2011Co. of Pennsylvania v. Waterfield, 102 Conn. App. 277, 284 , 925 A.2d 451 (2007). *248 General Statutes § 52-212 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plainti

2011Co. of Pennsylvania v. Waterfield, 102 Conn. App. 277, 284 , 925 A.2d 451 (2007). *248 General Statutes § 52-212 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plainti

2009Accordingly, a discussion of McHenry does not have aplace in our current analysis. 3 General Statutes § 52-212 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passag

2009Accordingly, a discussion of McHenry does not have aplace in our current analysis. 3 General Statutes § 52-212 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passag

2009Accordingly, a discussion of McHenry does not have aplace in our current analysis. 3 General Statutes § 52-212 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passag

2009Accordingly, a discussion of McHenry does not have aplace in our current analysis. 3 General Statutes § 52-212 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passag

2004“Although the opening of a judgment properly rendered is a discretionary act of the court ... a judgment improperly rendered, as a matter of law, must be set aside.” (Citation omitted.) CAS Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc., 60 Conn. App. 294, 299 , 759 A.2d 555 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 928 , 767 A.2d 101 (2001).

2004“Although the opening of a judgment properly rendered is a discretionary act of the court ... a judgment improperly rendered, as a matter of law, must be set aside.” (Citation omitted.) CAS Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc., 60 Conn. App. 294, 299 , 759 A.2d 555 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 928 , 767 A.2d 101 (2001).

2004“Although the opening of a judgment properly rendered is a discretionary act of the court ... a judgment improperly rendered, as a matter of law, must be set aside.” (Citation omitted.) CAS Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc., 60 Conn. App. 294, 299 , 759 A.2d 555 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 928 , 767 A.2d 101 (2001).

2004“Although the opening of a judgment properly rendered is a discretionary act of the court ... a judgment improperly rendered, as a matter of law, must be set aside.” (Citation omitted.) CAS Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc., 60 Conn. App. 294, 299 , 759 A.2d 555 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 928 , 767 A.2d 101 (2001).

2003That being the case, the defendant had the right to raise that issue irrespective of the four month time limit codified in General Statutes § 52-212 and Practice Book § 17-4. “[T]he Superior Court . . . may exercise jurisdiction over a person only if that person has been properly served with process, has consented to the jurisdiction of the court or has waived any objection to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bove v. Bove, 77 Conn. App. 355, 362 , 823 A.2d 383 (2003).

2003That being the case, the defendant had the right to raise that issue irrespective of the four month time limit codified in General Statutes § 52-212 and Practice Book § 17-4. “[T]he Superior Court . . . may exercise jurisdiction over a person only if that person has been properly served with process, has consented to the jurisdiction of the court or has waived any objection to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bove v. Bove, 77 Conn. App. 355, 362 , 823 A.2d 383 (2003).

2002General Statutes § 52-212 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from pro

2002General Statutes § 52-212 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from pro

2001The aggrieved person must show reasonable cause, or that a good defense existed at the time of the judgment, and that the movant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from making the defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McLaughlin v. Smoron, 62 Conn. App. 367, 372 , 771 A.2d 201 (2001).

2001The aggrieved person must show reasonable cause, or that a good defense existed at the time of the judgment, and that the movant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from making the defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McLaughlin v. Smoron, 62 Conn. App. 367, 372 , 771 A.2d 201 (2001).

2000Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212 , a court may reopen a default judgment upon a showing that the "defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense." "Although §§ 52-212 and 52-212a normally limit the authority to open judgment to a four month period, these statutes do not preclude the opening of a default judgment that is rendered without jurisdiction over a defendant." Wilkinson v. Boats Unlimited, Inc. , 236 Conn. 78 , 83 , 670 A.2d 1296 (1996).

2000Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212 , a court may reopen a default judgment upon a showing that the "defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense." "Although §§ 52-212 and 52-212a normally limit the authority to open judgment to a four month period, these statutes do not preclude the opening of a default judgment that is rendered without jurisdiction over a defendant." Wilkinson v. Boats Unlimited, Inc. , 236 Conn. 78 , 83 , 670 A.2d 1296 (1996).

1997Noethe v. Noethe, 18 Conn. App. 589, 595-96 , 559 A.2d 1149 (1989).

1997Noethe v. Noethe, 18 Conn. App. 589, 595-96 , 559 A.2d 1149 (1989).

1983A judgment rendered upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside only if the moving party demonstrates that he has been prejudiced by the judgment, that “reasonable cause” or a “good cause of action or defense . . . existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment” and that the movant was prevented by “mistake, accident or other reasonable . cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.” 5 General Statutes § 52-212; Practice Book § 377; Pantlin & Chananie Development Corporation v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 188 Conn. 253, 258 , 449 A.2d 165 (1982); Smelling & Snelling

1983A judgment rendered upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside only if the moving party demonstrates that he has been prejudiced by the judgment, that “reasonable cause” or a “good cause of action or defense . . . existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment” and that the movant was prevented by “mistake, accident or other reasonable . cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.” 5 General Statutes § 52-212; Practice Book § 377; Pantlin & Chananie Development Corporation v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 188 Conn. 253, 258 , 449 A.2d 165 (1982); Smelling & Snelling

1983A judgment rendered upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside only if the moving party demonstrates that he has been prejudiced by the judgment, that “reasonable cause” or a “good cause of action or defense . . . existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment” and that the movant was prevented by “mistake, accident or other reasonable . cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.” 5 General Statutes § 52-212; Practice Book § 377; Pantlin & Chananie Development Corporation v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 188 Conn. 253, 258 , 449 A.2d 165 (1982); Smelling & Snelling

1983A judgment rendered upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside only if the moving party demonstrates that he has been prejudiced by the judgment, that “reasonable cause” or a “good cause of action or defense . . . existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment” and that the movant was prevented by “mistake, accident or other reasonable . cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.” 5 General Statutes § 52-212; Practice Book § 377; Pantlin & Chananie Development Corporation v. Hartford Cement & Building Supply Co., 188 Conn. 253, 258 , 449 A.2d 165 (1982); Smelling & Snelling