14 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1884–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weisser v. PNC BANK, NAgreen2 sentences2015Compare Weisser v. PNC Bank, N.A., 967 So.2d 327 (Fla. Sd DCA 2007) (holding forum selection clause mandatory notwithstanding use of phrase “consent to jurisdiction”, where the remainder of the clause provided words of exclusivity: “The parties further consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of either the United States District Court for the District of Kansas or the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, for the judicial resolution of any disputes ....”) (emphasis added). 2015Compare 15 Weisser v. PNC Bank, N.A., 967 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding forum selection clause mandatory notwithstanding use of phrase “consent to jurisdiction”, where the remainder of the clause provided words of exclusivity: “The parties further consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of either the United States District Court for the District of Kansas or the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, for the judicial resolution of any disputes. . . . “) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Harvey v. Duggergreen2 sentences2006See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1995). [3] In Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d at 1256 , we found the remainder of this claim to be procedurally barred, with the exception of the portion of the claim relating to the booking sheet, because the issue of the suppression of Harvey's confession was raised on direct appeal and rejected by this Court. [4] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.171(c)(1) provides: Defense counsel shall not conclude any plea agreement on behalf of a defendant-client without the client's full and complete consent thereto, being certain that any decision to plead guil 2006See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1995). [3] In Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d at 1256 , we found the remainder of this claim to be procedurally barred, with the exception of the portion of the claim relating to the booking sheet, because the issue of the suppression of Harvey's confession was raised on direct appeal and rejected by this Court. [4] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.171(c)(1) provides: Defense counsel shall not conclude any plea agreement on behalf of a defendant-client without the client's full and complete consent thereto, being certain that any decision to plead guil | 2 | 2 |
McCrae v. Wainwrightgreen1 sentence2025Florida courts have also ruled that the unobjected-to omission of an instruction on the presumption of innocence is not a reversible error unless the appellant demonstrates that the omission “caused fundamental unfairness.” McCrae v. 6 Wainwright, 439 So. 2d 868, 872 (Fla. 1983); see also Spells v. State, 283 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (holding that omission of instruction on presumption of innocence was “harmless because the remainder of that instruction adequately explains that the presumption of innocence does not leave the defendant unless and until every material allegation of the | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2025Florida courts have also ruled that the unobjected-to omission of an instruction on the presumption of innocence is not a reversible error unless the appellant demonstrates that the omission “caused fundamental unfairness.” McCrae v. 6 Wainwright, 439 So. 2d 868, 872 (Fla. 1983); see also Spells v. State, 283 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (holding that omission of instruction on presumption of innocence was “harmless because the remainder of that instruction adequately explains that the presumption of innocence does not leave the defendant unless and until every material allegation of the | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Armstrong v. State, 579 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1991) (holding that by affirmatively requesting an abbreviated instruction on excusable homicide, which the trial court gave, the defendant waived any claim of error in the instruction). 8 any weapon was used or that there was a loss of consciousness or that it reached the level of being a felony. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bivonagreen2 sentences2016See State v. Bivona, 496 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1986) (“[T]he specific provision of (b)(1) supersedes any general provision of the remainder of the rule.”); M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 , 106 n.31 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] specific statute governing a particular subject takes precedence over a conflicting more general statute.”). 2016See State v. Bivona; 496 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla.1986) (“[T]he specific provision of (b)(1) supersedes any general provision of the remainder of the rule.”); M.W. v. Davis, 7S6 So.2d 90, 106 n. 31 (Fla.2000) '(“[A] specific statute -governing "a particular subject takes precedence over’ a conflicting more general statute.”). | 1 | 1 |
MH v. Stategreen1 sentence2016M.H. v. State, 936 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (noting statutory definition of burglary explicitly makes burglary a specific intent .crime). | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Even if the facts of the McGowan burglary did not bring this count within the Battle exception, however, the instruction given would be acceptable under the reasoning of Freeman v. State, 787 So.2d 152, 153 (Fla. 4th DCÁ 2001) (concluding that any error in an instruction referring to intent to commit “the offense of burglary” was cured by the remainder of the instruction’s specific reference to theft as the required offense). .Here, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that “intent to comrriit an offense ” in the structure was an element of the crime of burglary, coupled with the corr 2016Even if the facts of the McGowan burglary did not bring this count within the Battle exception, however, the instruction given would be acceptable under the reasoning of Freeman v. State, 787 So. 2d 152, 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (concluding that any error in an instruction referring to intent to commit “the offense of burglary” was cured by the remainder of the instruction’s specific reference to theft as the required offense). | 1 | 1 |
MW v. Davisgreen1 sentence2016See State v. Bivona, 496 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1986) (“[T]he specific provision of (b)(1) supersedes any general provision of the remainder of the rule.”); M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 , 106 n.31 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] specific statute governing a particular subject takes precedence over a conflicting more general statute.”). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995); Roberts v. State, 568 So.2d 1255, 1258 (Fla.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Sims v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2006See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1995). [3] In Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d at 1256 , we found the remainder of this claim to be procedurally barred, with the exception of the portion of the claim relating to the booking sheet, because the issue of the suppression of Harvey's confession was raised on direct appeal and rejected by this Court. [4] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.171(c)(1) provides: Defense counsel shall not conclude any plea agreement on behalf of a defendant-client without the client's full and complete consent thereto, being certain that any decision to plead guil 2006See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1995). [3] In Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d at 1256 , we found the remainder of this claim to be procedurally barred, with the exception of the portion of the claim relating to the booking sheet, because the issue of the suppression of Harvey's confession was raised on direct appeal and rejected by this Court. [4] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.171(c)(1) provides: Defense counsel shall not conclude any plea agreement on behalf of a defendant-client without the client's full and complete consent thereto, being certain that any decision to plead guil | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by 2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Napue v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by 2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by 2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Giglio v. United States
green
2 sentences2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by 2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by | 1 | 2000–2000 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by 2000The remainder of this claim was summarily denied by the circuit court. [2] The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access to the files and records pertaining to Huff's case in the possession of certain state agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff's emotional state precluded him from giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective assistance by | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Farr v. Clement
green
1 sentence1999Subsection (3) states that any claim not timely filed is barred even if no objection is filed, unless the court grants an extension upon the grounds of fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of the claims period. [2] Medicaid blames its belated amendment on the fact that its original claim was based on computer records which covered only the last 18 months of the decedent's life; for the remainder of its claim, Medicaid had to go through the tedious process of manually researching microfiche. [3] Section 733.704 provides, "If a bona fide attempt to file a claim is made by a creditor but the cl | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bell v. Harris
green
1 sentence1999Subsection (3) states that any claim not timely filed is barred even if no objection is filed, unless the court grants an extension upon the grounds of fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of the claims period. [2] Medicaid blames its belated amendment on the fact that its original claim was based on computer records which covered only the last 18 months of the decedent's life; for the remainder of its claim, Medicaid had to go through the tedious process of manually researching microfiche. [3] Section 733.704 provides, "If a bona fide attempt to file a claim is made by a creditor but the cl | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Witt v. State
green
1 sentence1990None of the decisions relied upon in connection with these claims is such a change in the law as to preclude a procedural bar under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 , 101 S.Ct. 796 , 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Rolle v. State
green
1 sentence1990The instruction in this case is distinguishable from that given in Rolle v. State, 528 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), which was found to be unconstitutional. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Adams v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
green
1 sentence1990None of the decisions relied upon in connection with these claims is such a change in the law as to preclude a procedural bar under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 , 101 S.Ct. 796 , 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Jarrett v. Jarrett
green
1 sentence1990None of the decisions relied upon in connection with these claims is such a change in the law as to preclude a procedural bar under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 , 101 S.Ct. 796 , 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Metzger v. State
green
1 sentence1884The State, 18 Fla., 481 , does not go to the extent of prohibiting the court from charging on this question; it only decides that it is not error for court to refuse to charge. “ Counsel may read the act to the court and jury, if they desire to do so, and the Judge may give it to the jury if desired.” The remainder of the clause so objected to is as follows: “ It is not the purpose nor the spirit of the law that the enforcement of the penalty should be set aside, unless in the calm, deliberate judgment of the jury they are decided iu this conviction of a just mitigation of the death penalty to | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.