remainder clause in Pennsylvania

1941McClure’s Appeal, 72 Pa. 414 . *128 Canons of legal construction, of course, must give way to the intention of the testator where it can be ascertained.

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

2025This Court in Edmiston was presented with the same problem that we face today when construing the “timely manner” clause: to wit, the statute says that the motion must be for the purpose of proving “actual innocence” and not to cause “delay,” but it “does not otherwise define timeliness.” 118 Absent any other definition of a “timely manner,” the Edmiston Court relied principally upon the remainder of the clause in which those words appear, i.e., that the motion must be made “for the purpose of demonstrating the applicant’s actual innocence and not to delay the execution of sentence or administ

2025This Court in Edmiston was presented with the same problem that we face today when construing the “timely manner” clause: to wit, the statute says that the motion must be for the purpose of proving “actual innocence” and not to cause “delay,” but it “does not otherwise define timeliness.” 118 Absent any other definition of a “timely manner,” the Edmiston Court relied principally upon the remainder of the clause in which those words appear, i.e., that the motion must be made “for the purpose of demonstrating the applicant’s actual innocence and not to delay the execution of sentence or administ

2014A term of a contract “is unconscionable, and therefore avoidable, when there was a lack of meaningful choice in the acceptance of the challenged provision and the provision unreasonably favors the party asserting it.” Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 592 Pa. 323 , 925 A.2d 115 (2007).

2014A term of a contract “is unconscionable, and therefore avoidable, when there was a lack of meaningful choice in the acceptance of the challenged provision and the provision unreasonably favors the party asserting it.” Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 592 Pa. 323 , 925 A.2d 115 (2007).

2013Id.

1990The officers appealed to this Court with respect to the qualified immunity question, claiming that this issue was immediately appealable pursuant to Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), and petitioned the trial court to certify the remainder of the immunity defenses for interlocutory appeal.

1990The officers appealed to this Court with respect to the qualified immunity question, claiming that this issue was immediately appealable pursuant to Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), and petitioned the trial court to certify the remainder of the immunity defenses for interlocutory appeal.

1987This is because the nature of the burden that "shifts" to the defendant when a prima facie case is established is simply to produce evidence of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. *130 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 , 103 S.Ct. at 1481 ; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-96 ; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957

1987This is because the nature of the burden that "shifts" to the defendant when a prima facie case is established is simply to produce evidence of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. *130 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 , 103 S.Ct. at 1481 ; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-96 ; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957

1987This is because the nature of the burden that "shifts" to the defendant when a prima facie case is established is simply to produce evidence of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. *130 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 , 103 S.Ct. at 1481 ; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-96 ; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957

1987This is because the nature of the burden that "shifts" to the defendant when a prima facie case is established is simply to produce evidence of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. *130 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 , 103 S.Ct. at 1481 ; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-96 ; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957

1987This is because the nature of the burden that "shifts" to the defendant when a prima facie case is established is simply to produce evidence of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. *130 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 , 103 S.Ct. at 1481 ; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-96 ; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957

1987This is because the nature of the burden that "shifts" to the defendant when a prima facie case is established is simply to produce evidence of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. *130 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 , 103 S.Ct. at 1481 ; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-96 ; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957

1987This is because the nature of the burden that "shifts" to the defendant when a prima facie case is established is simply to produce evidence of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. *130 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 , 103 S.Ct. at 1481 ; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-96 ; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957

1987This is because the nature of the burden that "shifts" to the defendant when a prima facie case is established is simply to produce evidence of a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the discharge. *130 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 , 93 S.Ct. at 1824 ; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 , 103 S.Ct. at 1481 ; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-58 , 101 S.Ct. at 1094-96 ; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 , 99 S.Ct. 295, 295-96 , 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 , 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950 , 57 L.Ed.2d 957

1951In Bricker’s Estate, 335 Pa. 300 , it was decided that a residuary clause in a will is one which covers all of the estate not disposed of after providing for debts and particular legacies and devises, and no technical mode of expression is necessary to constitute such a clause.

1941In Scott’s Estate, 301 Pa. 509 , 152 A. 560 , Mr. Justice Simpson refers to a long line of cases where the principle has been applied, p. 514, (to which may be added, Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , 186 A. 740 ; Estate of Andrew Berg, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 ; Selser’s Estate, 135 Pa. Superior Ct. 480 , 5 A. 2d 632 ) and, referring to the “authorities which, in the course of ninety years since the opinion in Moore v. Smith was rendered, are supposed to qualify it,” said that “each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of the entire will there being construed, it appeared t

1941In Scott’s Estate, 301 Pa. 509 , 152 A. 560 , Mr. Justice Simpson refers to a long line of cases where the principle has been applied, p. 514, (to which may be added, Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , 186 A. 740 ; Estate of Andrew Berg, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 ; Selser’s Estate, 135 Pa. Superior Ct. 480 , 5 A. 2d 632 ) and, referring to the “authorities which, in the course of ninety years since the opinion in Moore v. Smith was rendered, are supposed to qualify it,” said that “each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of the entire will there being construed, it appeared t

1941In Scott’s Estate, 301 Pa. 509 , 152 A. 560 , Mr. Justice Simpson refers to a long line of cases where the principle has been applied, p. 514, (to which may be added, Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , 186 A. 740 ; Estate of Andrew Berg, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 ; Selser’s Estate, 135 Pa. Superior Ct. 480 , 5 A. 2d 632 ) and, referring to the “authorities which, in the course of ninety years since the opinion in Moore v. Smith was rendered, are supposed to qualify it,” said that “each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of the entire will there being construed, it appeared t

1941In Scott’s Estate, 301 Pa. 509 , 152 A. 560 , Mr. Justice Simpson refers to a long line of cases where the principle has been applied, p. 514, (to which may be added, Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , 186 A. 740 ; Estate of Andrew Berg, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 ; Selser’s Estate, 135 Pa. Superior Ct. 480 , 5 A. 2d 632 ) and, referring to the “authorities which, in the course of ninety years since the opinion in Moore v. Smith was rendered, are supposed to qualify it,” said that “each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of the entire will there being construed, it appeared t

1941In Scott’s Estate, 301 Pa. 509 , 152 A. 560 , Mr. Justice Simpson refers to a long line of cases where the principle has been applied, p. 514, (to which may be added, Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , 186 A. 740 ; Estate of Andrew Berg, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 ; Selser’s Estate, 135 Pa. Superior Ct. 480 , 5 A. 2d 632 ) and, referring to the “authorities which, in the course of ninety years since the opinion in Moore v. Smith was rendered, are supposed to qualify it,” said that “each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of the entire will there being construed, it appeared t

1941In Scott’s Estate, 301 Pa. 509 , 152 A. 560 , Mr. Justice Simpson refers to a long line of cases where the principle has been applied, p. 514, (to which may be added, Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , 186 A. 740 ; Estate of Andrew Berg, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 ; Selser’s Estate, 135 Pa. Superior Ct. 480 , 5 A. 2d 632 ) and, referring to the “authorities which, in the course of ninety years since the opinion in Moore v. Smith was rendered, are supposed to qualify it,” said that “each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of the entire will there being construed, it appeared t

1941In Scott’s Estate, 301 Pa. 509 , 152 A. 560 , Mr. Justice Simpson refers to a long line of cases where the principle has been applied, p. 514, (to which may be added, Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , 186 A. 740 ; Estate of Andrew Berg, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 125 ; Selser’s Estate, 135 Pa. Superior Ct. 480 , 5 A. 2d 632 ) and, referring to the “authorities which, in the course of ninety years since the opinion in Moore v. Smith was rendered, are supposed to qualify it,” said that “each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of the entire will there being construed, it appeared t

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

1930A study of these cases will show that none of them affects the principle upon which those already referred to were decided; but each of them is based on the conclusion that, from a consideration of *515 the entire will there being construed, it appeared that a vesting was intended at the death of testator, and hence effect was given to that conclusion, though, if the particular remainder clause had been standing alone, a different result might have been reached: McClure’s App., 72 Pa. 414 ; Little’s App., 117 Pa. 14 ; Smith’s Est., 226 Pa. 304 ; Neel’s Est., 252 Pa. 394 ; Eau’s Est., 254 Pa. 4

1901She might have claimed her exemption partly in money and partly in any of the securities, or wholly in the latter, but she did not, and we think the learned court was right in restricting the claim to the cash on hand, when the claim was made.” It has also been decided in Thomas’s Estate, 152 Pa. 68 , that “ if a widow makes a demand for an appraisement of real estate, she could claim her exemption out of the fund arising from the sale of the real estate, although no appraisement has been actually made thereof.” In this case the entire claim was out of the Shaw security, and to the remainder o