remainder instruction in California

2016(People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152 .) The instruction at issue in Villatoro began with language virtually identical to that of the instruction at issue in this case: “‘The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the crime of rape as alleged in counts 2, 4, 7, 9, 12 and 15 and the crime of sodomy as alleged in count 14.’” (Id. at p. 1167.) The Villatoro Court noted the remainder of the instruction “clearly told the jury that all offenses must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, even those used to draw an inference of propensity,” and reasoned on that basis that “there w

2014(Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1167 .) The instruction at issue in Villatoro began with language virtually identical to that of the instruction at issue in this case: “‘The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the crime of rape as alleged in counts 2, 4, 7, 9, 12 and 15 and the crime of sodomy as alleged in count 14. . . .’” (Ibid.) The Court noted that the remainder of the instruction “clearly told the jury that all offenses must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, even those used to draw an inference of propensity,” and reasoned on that basis that “there was no risk t

2014Proc., § 170.6]; Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713 , 715–716 [considering whether respondent court’s practice of transferring criminal cases among branch courthouses was consistent with the vicinage requirement of the 6th Amend. of the U.S. Const.].) 4 address petitioner’s separation of powers argument first, as our analysis of it informs the remainder of our analysis.

2014Proc., § 170.6]; Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713 , 715–716 [considering whether respondent court’s practice of transferring criminal cases among branch courthouses was consistent with the vicinage requirement of the 6th Amend. of the U.S. Const.].) 4 address petitioner’s separation of powers argument first, as our analysis of it informs the remainder of our analysis.

1967(See Goad v. Montgomery, supra, 119 Cal. 552, 557 ; and Estate of Weinreich, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 303, 307 , as discussed infra.) If the remainder clause is ineffective or limited because of matters which existed at the time the preliminary decree was entered, the attack should have been made at the hearing on that phase of the proceedings.

1967(See Goad v. Montgomery, supra, 119 Cal. 552, 557 ; and Estate of Weinreich, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 303, 307 , as discussed infra.) If the remainder clause is ineffective or limited because of matters which existed at the time the preliminary decree was entered, the attack should have been made at the hearing on that phase of the proceedings.

1967(See Goad v. Montgomery, supra, 119 Cal. 552, 557 ; and Estate of Weinreich, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 303, 307 , as discussed infra.) If the remainder clause is ineffective or limited because of matters which existed at the time the preliminary decree was entered, the attack should have been made at the hearing on that phase of the proceedings.

1967(See Goad v. Montgomery, supra, 119 Cal. 552, 557 ; and Estate of Weinreich, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 303, 307 , as discussed infra.) If the remainder clause is ineffective or limited because of matters which existed at the time the preliminary decree was entered, the attack should have been made at the hearing on that phase of the proceedings.

2025“The very definition of ‘premeditation’ encompasses the idea that a defendant thought about or considered the act beforehand.” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443 .) The challenged portion of the instruction adequately conveyed this concept because it required the jury to determine that Razdan’s decision to kill preceded his death-causing acts.

2025(People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120 , 1131 [natural and probable consequences instructions, including under CALCRIM No. 417, permitted jury to apply that theory to premeditation and deliberation findings].) The remainder of the instruction reinforced this interpretation by explaining what must be shown under a natural and probable consequences theory to find a defendant “guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 1 through 3.” As noted, counts 2 and 3 charged appellants with “willful, deliberate and premeditated” attempted murder.

2024The Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘In the context of first degree murder, “ ‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1216 .) In the context of the instruction given here, there is no meaningful distinction between “ ‘ “ ‘considered beforehand’ ” ’ ” (ibid.) and “decided to kill before” (CALCRIM No. 521).

2024“However, even if there were several mitigating factors that might weigh in favor of probation, this does not necessarily mean that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding against granting probation.” (People v. Ramirez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1512 , 1530–1531.) The remainder of the factors upon which the trial court relied were criteria listed as relevant under the California Rules of Court, rule 4.414 and were reasonable grounds for finding him unsuitable for probation.

2024In Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 494 the court evaluated an argument similar to Ramos’s.

2024In Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 494 the court evaluated an argument similar to Ramos’s.

2024Analysis Esqueda takes issue with the following sentence from CALCRIM No. 521: “The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act that caused death.” He complains that this sentence “inaccurately told the jurors that appellant had premeditated the killing as 52 long as he decided to kill [Ryan] before stabbing him,” but that this is “tantamount to merely requiring a finding that the defendant killed intentionally.” Esqueda argues that the remainder of the instruction “did not rectify the inaccuracy.”17 Although we review challenges to jury instructions de n

2024Analysis Esqueda takes issue with the following sentence from CALCRIM No. 521: “The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act that caused death.” He complains that this sentence “inaccurately told the jurors that appellant had premeditated the killing as 52 long as he decided to kill [Ryan] before stabbing him,” but that this is “tantamount to merely requiring a finding that the defendant killed intentionally.” Esqueda argues that the remainder of the instruction “did not rectify the inaccuracy.”17 Although we review challenges to jury instructions de n

2024Robinson Co. (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3d 1251, 1273 .) In Poublon, the court limited one unenforceable provision, and severed another provision “that permits [the defendant], but not [the plaintiff], to seek judicial resolution of specified claims”; the court stated the provision could be extirpated without affecting the remainder of the clause “and is ‘collateral to the main purpose of the contract,’ which is to require arbitration of disputes.” (Poublon, at p. 1273.) The same is true here.

2023We acknowledge that the use notes to CALCRIM No. 570 make the broad statement that words may satisfy the provocation element needed to reduce a murder to 21 manslaughter: “The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal,” as defendant urges, but defendant has omitted the remainder of the rule, “the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.” (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 , citing People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 ; People v. Valentine (1946) 28

2023We acknowledge that the use notes to CALCRIM No. 570 make the broad statement that words may satisfy the provocation element needed to reduce a murder to 21 manslaughter: “The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal,” as defendant urges, but defendant has omitted the remainder of the rule, “the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.” (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 , citing People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 ; People v. Valentine (1946) 28

2023We acknowledge that the use notes to CALCRIM No. 570 make the broad statement that words may satisfy the provocation element needed to reduce a murder to 21 manslaughter: “The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal,” as defendant urges, but defendant has omitted the remainder of the rule, “the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.” (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 , citing People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 ; People v. Valentine (1946) 28

2022(Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1563 ; Sabek, Inc. v. Engelhard Corp. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 992, 997 ; U.S. v. Balin (1992 7th Cir.) 977 F.2d 270 , 276.) “Direct estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in ‘a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the claim; issues common to both parts of the claim are precluded, even though new issues remain to be decided.’ [Citation.] Consider, as an example, a civil case for l

2022(Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1563 ; Sabek, Inc. v. Engelhard Corp. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 992, 997 ; U.S. v. Balin (1992 7th Cir.) 977 F.2d 270 , 276.) “Direct estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in ‘a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the claim; issues common to both parts of the claim are precluded, even though new issues remain to be decided.’ [Citation.] Consider, as an example, a civil case for l

2022(Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1563 ; Sabek, Inc. v. Engelhard Corp. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 992, 997 ; U.S. v. Balin (1992 7th Cir.) 977 F.2d 270 , 276.) “Direct estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a fact which was already determined against it in ‘a decision that finally disposes of a part of a claim on the merits but does not preclude all further action on the remainder of the claim; issues common to both parts of the claim are precluded, even though new issues remain to be decided.’ [Citation.] Consider, as an example, a civil case for l

2022(See Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956 .) Lee also complains that he was deprived of his due process right to a fair and impartial judge when, at an October 16, 2020 hearing, the family court denied his motion to vacate the 13 As we explained in Discussion, part A, ante, aside from his claim of error concerning section 128.5’s safe harbor provision, we do not address Lee’s challenges to the $15,000 sanction imposed under that statute. 21 June 1, 2020 order, denied his request to stay the execution of the June 1, 2020 order, and imposed a new $5,000 sanction against him.

2022(See Yu, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 787 .) Lee waives the remainder of this claim of error because he fails to cite any legal authority demonstrating the award was excessive.

2020This zone of risk is termed the ‘kill zone.’” As in Canizales, the instruction failed to define the term “kill zone,” other than its reference to “a particular zone of risk.” (See Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 613 .) The remainder of the instruction did not remedy this defect.

2020(Compare Frandsen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153 with Castellano, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 489 .) We need not weigh in on this forfeiture issue here because, even assuming the remainder of this claim is properly preserved for review, there was no constitutional violation.

2020(Compare Frandsen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1153 with Castellano, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 489 .) We need not weigh in on this forfeiture issue here because, even assuming the remainder of this claim is properly preserved for review, there was no constitutional violation.

2019Section 18 of the agreement provides: "If any provision of this [a]greement is held to be void, voidable, or unenforceable, the remaining portions of the [a]greement shall remain in full force and effect." This clause "evidence[s] the parties' intent that, to the extent possible, the valid provisions of the [agreement] be given effect, even if some provision is found to be invalid or unlawful." (Baeza v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1230 .) We thus conclude that the portion of section 4 of the termination agreement that contravenes sections 53260 and 53261 inasmuch as it promise

2017(See, e.g., People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 361, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1175-1178, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 .) As we have discussed, here the relevant circumstances include not only the colloquy, but also defendant's prior criminal history, other events before and after the waiver was entered, and the fact that defendant was represented by counsel. 9 The dissenting justices' misreading of the colloquy saturates the remainder of their analysis, causing it to go astray in numerous respects.

2017(See, e.g., People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353 , 361, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 262 , 92 P.3d 841 ; Howard , supra , 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1175-1178, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 .) As we have discussed, here the relevant circumstances include not only the colloquy, but also defendant's prior criminal history, other events before and after the waiver was entered, and the fact that defendant was represented by counsel. 9 The dissenting justices' misreading of the colloquy saturates the remainder of their analysis, causing it to go astray in numerous respects.