7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1918–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Franklingreen2 sentences2014We must now consider the remainder of the instruction, as well as "consider a reasonable jury's understanding in the context of the jury instructions and the record as a whole." State v. Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 21 , 284 P.3d 695 , cert. granted, 298 P.3d 69 (Utah 2013); see also State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) ("[JJury instructions are to be considered as a whole..."). "'Other instructions [and the record] might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable jurly] could not have considered the charge to have ereated an unconstitutional presumption. 2014We must now consider the remainder of the instruction, as well as "consider a reasonable jury's understanding in the context of the jury instructions and the record as a whole." State v. Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 21 , 284 P.3d 695 , cert. granted, 298 P.3d 69 (Utah 2013); see also State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) ("[JJury instructions are to be considered as a whole..."). "'Other instructions [and the record] might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable jurly] could not have considered the charge to have ereated an unconstitutional presumption. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kelsongreen2 sentences2014We must now consider the remainder of the instruction, as well as "consider a reasonable jury's understanding in the context of the jury instructions and the record as a whole." State v. Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 21 , 284 P.3d 695 , cert. granted, 298 P.3d 69 (Utah 2013); see also State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) ("[JJury instructions are to be considered as a whole..."). "'Other instructions [and the record] might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable jurly] could not have considered the charge to have ereated an unconstitutional presumption. 2014We must now consider the remainder of the instruction, as well as "consider a reasonable jury's understanding in the context of the jury instructions and the record as a whole." State v. Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 21 , 284 P.3d 695 , cert. granted, 298 P.3d 69 (Utah 2013); see also State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) ("[JJury instructions are to be considered as a whole..."). "'Other instructions [and the record] might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable jurly] could not have considered the charge to have ereated an unconstitutional presumption. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2014We must now consider the remainder of the instruction, as well as "consider a reasonable jury's understanding in the context of the jury instructions and the record as a whole." State v. Kelson, 2012 UT App 217, ¶ 21 , 284 P.3d 695 , cert. granted, 298 P.3d 69 (Utah 2013); see also State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) ("[JJury instructions are to be considered as a whole..."). "'Other instructions [and the record] might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable jurly] could not have considered the charge to have ereated an unconstitutional presumption. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dennis Mooregreen1 sentence2005The remainder of rule 11(e) delineates such circumstances, none of which is applicable here. [6] See United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir.1981) (holding that "a district court is under no duty to consider a negotiated plea agreement"); United States v. Stamey, 569 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.1978) (similar); United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145, 1148 (4th Cir.1977) ("In our opinion each individual judge is free to decide whether, and to what degree, he will entertain plea bargains, and his refusal to consider any plea bargaining whatsoever will not vitiate a guilty plea which has othe | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leroy Jacksongreen1 sentence2005The remainder of rule 11(e) delineates such circumstances, none of which is applicable here. [6] See United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir.1981) (holding that "a district court is under no duty to consider a negotiated plea agreement"); United States v. Stamey, 569 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.1978) (similar); United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145, 1148 (4th Cir.1977) ("In our opinion each individual judge is free to decide whether, and to what degree, he will entertain plea bargains, and his refusal to consider any plea bargaining whatsoever will not vitiate a guilty plea which has othe | 1 | 1 |
Serio v. Baltimore Countygreen2 sentences2003Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1990); see also Serio v. Baltimore County, 115 F.Supp.2d 509 , 515 n. 6 (D.Md.2000) (mem.) (concluding defendant's firearms were not contraband per se where defendant was a convicted felon without possessory rights in the firearms, but where the possession of firearms, standing alone, was not a crime); but see Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 178 (1st Cir.2000) {concluding that a wild raccoon, which could not be lawfully possessed without a permit, was contraband per se in the hands of a permitless defendant). 127 The lead opinion then be 2003Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1990); see also Serio v. Baltimore County, 115 F.Supp.2d 509 , 515 n. 6 (D.Md.2000) (mem.) (concluding defendant's firearms were not contraband per se where defendant was a convicted felon without possessory rights in the firearms, but where the possession of firearms, standing alone, was not a crime); but see Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir.2000) *995 (concluding that a wild raccoon, which could not be lawfully possessed without a permit, was contraband per se in the hands of a permitless defendant). ¶ 27 The lead opinion t | 1 | 1 |
Earl Roy Cooper v. City of Greenwood, Mississippi and Leflore County, Mississippi, Earl Roy Cooper v. City of Greenwood, Mississippigreen2 sentences2003Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1990); see also Serio v. Baltimore County, 115 F.Supp.2d 509 , 515 n. 6 (D.Md.2000) (mem.) (concluding defendant's firearms were not contraband per se where defendant was a convicted felon without possessory rights in the firearms, but where the possession of firearms, standing alone, was not a crime); but see Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 178 (1st Cir.2000) {concluding that a wild raccoon, which could not be lawfully possessed without a permit, was contraband per se in the hands of a permitless defendant). 127 The lead opinion then be 2003Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1990); see also Serio v. Baltimore County, 115 F.Supp.2d 509 , 515 n. 6 (D.Md.2000) (mem.) (concluding defendant's firearms were not contraband per se where defendant was a convicted felon without possessory rights in the firearms, but where the possession of firearms, standing alone, was not a crime); but see Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir.2000) *995 (concluding that a wild raccoon, which could not be lawfully possessed without a permit, was contraband per se in the hands of a permitless defendant). ¶ 27 The lead opinion t | 1 | 1 |
Condemarin v. University Hospitalgreen1 sentence1990See discussion of this point in Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 351-52 (Utah 1989). 11 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bilida v. McCleodgreen2 sentences2003Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1990); see also Serio v. Baltimore County, 115 F.Supp.2d 509 , 515 n. 6 (D.Md.2000) (mem.) (concluding defendant's firearms were not contraband per se where defendant was a convicted felon without possessory rights in the firearms, but where the possession of firearms, standing alone, was not a crime); but see Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 178 (1st Cir.2000) {concluding that a wild raccoon, which could not be lawfully possessed without a permit, was contraband per se in the hands of a permitless defendant). 127 The lead opinion then be 2003Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1990); see also Serio v. Baltimore County, 115 F.Supp.2d 509 , 515 n. 6 (D.Md.2000) (mem.) (concluding defendant's firearms were not contraband per se where defendant was a convicted felon without possessory rights in the firearms, but where the possession of firearms, standing alone, was not a crime); but see Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir.2000) *995 (concluding that a wild raccoon, which could not be lawfully possessed without a permit, was contraband per se in the hands of a permitless defendant). ¶ 27 The lead opinion t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grayned v. City of Rockford
green
1 sentence2008Hoyer argues that by distinguishing "other animal[s] including wildlife" from animals generally, see id., subsection A removes reptilian wildlife from the general category of animals throughout the remainder of the rule. 1 See generally Nephi City v. Hansen, 719 P.2d 673 , 675 ("[Where general terms follow specific ones, the rules of con *98 struction, ... require that the general terms be given a meaning that is restricted to a sense analogous to the preceding specific terms."). {13 We disagree with Hoyer's argument for several reasons. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Decorso
green
2 sentences2005However, if the court determines that the evidence is being offered only to show the defendant’s propensity- to commit crime, then it is inadmissible and must be excluded at that point.” Id. ¶ 72 Under, the second part of 'this test, evidence, is admissible only if it is relevant. 2005However, if the court determines that the evidence is being offered only to show the defendant's propensity to commit crime, then it is inadmissible and must be excluded at that point." Id. ¶ 72 Under the second part of this test, evidence is admissible only if it is relevant. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Clyde Wallace Stamey
green
1 sentence2005The remainder of rule 11(e) delineates such circumstances, none of which is applicable here. [6] See United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir.1981) (holding that "a district court is under no duty to consider a negotiated plea agreement"); United States v. Stamey, 569 F.2d 805 (4th Cir.1978) (similar); United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145, 1148 (4th Cir.1977) ("In our opinion each individual judge is free to decide whether, and to what degree, he will entertain plea bargains, and his refusal to consider any plea bargaining whatsoever will not vitiate a guilty plea which has othe | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bailey v. Bayles
green
2 sentences2003DAVIS, Judge, (concurring and dissenting): ¶ 24 First, I concur in the analysis in footnote 2 of the lead opinion relative to the accrual of Jones's conversion claim, but dissent with respect to the remainder of the analysis. ¶ 25 The lead opinion summarily disposes of Jones's conversion claim for "failure to state a legal claim" for conversiona ground not argued to or ruled upon by the trial court or argued by either party to this courta concern I expressed in Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, ¶ 18 , 18 P.3d 1129 (Davis, J., dissenting), aff'd, 2002 UT 58 , 52 P.3d 1158 . 2003DAVIS, Judge, (concurring and dissenting): ¶ 24 First, I concur in the analysis in footnote 2 of the lead opinion relative to the accrual of Jones's conversion claim, but dissent with respect to the remainder of the analysis. ¶ 25 The lead opinion summarily disposes of Jones's conversion claim for "failure to state a legal claim" for conversiona ground not argued to or ruled upon by the trial court or argued by either party to this courta concern I expressed in Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, ¶ 18 , 18 P.3d 1129 (Davis, J., dissenting), aff'd, 2002 UT 58 , 52 P.3d 1158 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bailey v. Bayles
green
2 sentences2003DAVIS, Judge, (concurring and dissenting): ¶ 24 First, I concur in the analysis in footnote 2 of the lead opinion relative to the accrual of Jones's conversion claim, but dissent with respect to the remainder of the analysis. ¶ 25 The lead opinion summarily disposes of Jones's conversion claim for "failure to state a legal claim" for conversiona ground not argued to or ruled upon by the trial court or argued by either party to this courta concern I expressed in Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, ¶ 18 , 18 P.3d 1129 (Davis, J., dissenting), aff'd, 2002 UT 58 , 52 P.3d 1158 . 2003DAVIS, Judge, (concurring and dissenting): ¶ 24 First, I concur in the analysis in footnote 2 of the lead opinion relative to the accrual of Jones's conversion claim, but dissent with respect to the remainder of the analysis. ¶ 25 The lead opinion summarily disposes of Jones's conversion claim for "failure to state a legal claim" for conversiona ground not argued to or ruled upon by the trial court or argued by either party to this courta concern I expressed in Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, ¶ 18 , 18 P.3d 1129 (Davis, J., dissenting), aff'd, 2002 UT 58 , 52 P.3d 1158 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Fernández Diez v. District Court of Puerto Rico
green
1 sentence1918In support of this contention appellant cites a ease decided by this court, Lester v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 27 Utah, 470 , 76 Pac. 341 , 101 Am. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Lester v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.
green
1 sentence1918In support of this contention appellant cites a ease decided by this court, Lester v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 27 Utah, 470 , 76 Pac. 341 , 101 Am. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.