Baker motion in Georgia

2024Under OCGA § 24-4-401 (“Rule 401”), “relevant evidence” is evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” “The test for relevance is generally a liberal one, and [r]elevance is a binary concept—evidence is relevant or it is not.” Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 262 ( 875 SE2d 659 ) (2022) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2024Under OCGA § 24-4-401 (“Rule 401”), “relevant evidence” is evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” “The test for relevance is generally a liberal one, and [r]elevance is a binary concept—evidence is relevant or it is not.” Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 262 (875 SE2d 659) (2022) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2024See also Reese, 317 Ga. at 198 (3); Horton, 310 Ga. at 323 (3) (c); Lofton, 309 Ga. at 352 (1).

2024See Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 263-264 (2) ( 773 SE2d 263 ) (2015).

2024See Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 263-264 (2) ( 773 SE2d 263 ) (2015).

2022The trial court concluded that Baker’s motion to withdraw was untimely because “[t]he plea had been accepted over five and a half years prior.” But “[i]t is well settled that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within the same term of court as the sentence entered on the guilty plea.” Young v. State, 328 Ga. App. 91, 92 ( 761 SE2d 504 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied) (“trial court then erred in its analysis by reasoning, not that [defendant] had filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea outside the term of 2 court when he was sentenced, but that hi

2022The trial court concluded that Baker’s motion to withdraw was untimely because “[t]he plea had been accepted over five and a half years prior.” But “[i]t is well settled that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within the same term of court as the sentence entered on the guilty plea.” Young v. State, 328 Ga. App. 91, 92 ( 761 SE2d 504 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied) (“trial court then erred in its analysis by reasoning, not that [defendant] had filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea outside the term of 2 court when he was sentenced, but that hi

2022Dillard, P. J., and Pinson, J., concur. 4 “A defendant . . . has an absolute right to withdraw his plea before sentence is pronounced, but after sentencing the decision whether to grant a withdrawal motion lies within the trial court’s discretion.” See Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (2007); see also Martinez -Chavez v. State, 352 Ga. App. 142 , 144 (2) ( 834 SE2d 139 ) (2019). 6

2022Dillard, P. J., and Pinson, J., concur. 4 “A defendant . . . has an absolute right to withdraw his plea before sentence is pronounced, but after sentencing the decision whether to grant a withdrawal motion lies within the trial court’s discretion.” See Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (2007); see also Martinez -Chavez v. State, 352 Ga. App. 142 , 144 (2) ( 834 SE2d 139 ) (2019). 6

2007See Giacini v. State, 281 Ga. App. 426, 428 (1) ( 636 SE2d 145 ) (2006) (“The uncontradicted testimony of [a] supervisor that he was a supervising officer authorized to implement roadblocks is sufficient to establish the fact. [Cit.]”); see also Baker, supra, 252 Ga. App. at 699-700 (1) (check for driver’s licenses, proof of insurance, and other violations of Georgia law proper primary purpose).

2007See Giacini v. State, 281 Ga. App. 426, 428 (1) ( 636 SE2d 145 ) (2006) (“The uncontradicted testimony of [a] supervisor that he was a supervising officer authorized to implement roadblocks is sufficient to establish the fact. [Cit.]”); see also Baker, supra, 252 Ga. App. at 699-700 (1) (check for driver’s licenses, proof of insurance, and other violations of Georgia law proper primary purpose).

2007See Giacini v. State, 281 Ga. App. 426, 428 (1) ( 636 SE2d 145 ) (2006) (“The uncontradicted testimony of [a] supervisor that he was a supervising officer authorized to implement roadblocks is sufficient to establish the fact. [Cit.]”); see also Baker, supra, 252 Ga. App. at 699-700 (1) (check for driver’s licenses, proof of insurance, and other violations of Georgia law proper primary purpose).

2007See Giacini v. State, 281 Ga. App. 426, 428 (1) ( 636 SE2d 145 ) (2006) (“The uncontradicted testimony of [a] supervisor that he was a supervising officer authorized to implement roadblocks is sufficient to establish the fact. [Cit.]”); see also Baker, supra, 252 Ga. App. at 699-700 (1) (check for driver’s licenses, proof of insurance, and other violations of Georgia law proper primary purpose).

2006See In the Interest of S. H., 181 Ga. App. 438, 438-439 ( 352 SE2d 621 ) (1987) (because the father offered no reasonable excuse for his admitted failure to support his child for several years, he was not entitled to custody of the child after the child’s mother died); Bridgman v. Elders, 213 Ga. 257, 258 (1) ( 98 SE2d 547 ) (1957) (accord).

2006See In the Interest of S. H., 181 Ga. App. 438, 438-439 ( 352 SE2d 621 ) (1987) (because the father offered no reasonable excuse for his admitted failure to support his child for several years, he was not entitled to custody of the child after the child’s mother died); Bridgman v. Elders, 213 Ga. 257, 258 (1) ( 98 SE2d 547 ) (1957) (accord).

2006See In the Interest of S. H., 181 Ga. App. 438, 438-439 ( 352 SE2d 621 ) (1987) (because the father offered no reasonable excuse for his admitted failure to support his child for several years, he was not entitled to custody of the child after the child’s mother died); Bridgman v. Elders, 213 Ga. 257, 258 (1) ( 98 SE2d 547 ) (1957) (accord).

2006See In the Interest of S. H., 181 Ga. App. 438, 438-439 ( 352 SE2d 621 ) (1987) (because the father offered no reasonable excuse for his admitted failure to support his child for several years, he was not entitled to custody of the child after the child’s mother died); Bridgman v. Elders, 213 Ga. 257, 258 (1) ( 98 SE2d 547 ) (1957) (accord).

2002In connection with such a motion, the trial court does not sit as the trier of fact, but "review[s] the evidence and determine[s] whether a prima facie case has been proven by the movant." Dental One Assoc. v. JKR Realty Assoc., 269 Ga. 616, 618 (1), 501 S.E.2d 497 (1998).

2002In connection with such a motion, the trial court does not sit as the trier of fact, but "review[s] the evidence and determine[s] whether a prima facie case has been proven by the movant." Dental One Assoc. v. JKR Realty Assoc., 269 Ga. 616, 618 (1), 501 S.E.2d 497 (1998).

1980While this court has held that “[a] question as to the con *318 stitutionality of a law can not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial” Stone v. State, 202 Ga. 203, 204 ( 42 SE2d 727 ) (1947), we have more recently noted that a defendant cannot waive his right to litigate, by writ of habeas corpus, the constitutionality of a statute under which he has been convicted, and that, therefore, in order to avoid future habeas corpus litigation, we will adjudicate untimely challenges to a statute’s constitutionality on direct appeal.

1980While this court has held that “[a] question as to the con *318 stitutionality of a law can not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial” Stone v. State, 202 Ga. 203, 204 ( 42 SE2d 727 ) (1947), we have more recently noted that a defendant cannot waive his right to litigate, by writ of habeas corpus, the constitutionality of a statute under which he has been convicted, and that, therefore, in order to avoid future habeas corpus litigation, we will adjudicate untimely challenges to a statute’s constitutionality on direct appeal.