Baker hearing in Texas

2024This preliminary showing—known as a Baker hearing—is essential “to assure the court that valuable judicial resources will not be wasted by conducting a spurious ‘full- blown’ examination of the merits.” Id.

2024This preliminary showing—known as a Baker hearing—is essential “to assure the court that valuable judicial resources will not be wasted by conducting a spurious ‘full- blown’ examination of the merits.” Id.

2024See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 ; Pope v. Perrault, No. 01-21-00648-CV, 2023 WL 4003516 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (fact that trial court and parties at times addressed issues other than meritorious defenses did not convert Baker hearing into trial on the merits); Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (prior to Baker hearing, trial court may consider and rule on bill-of-review elements other than meritorious defense if raised in summary judgment motion or in separate trial); Jones v. Texas Dep’t of Protect

2023However, in a pretrial Baker 23 hearing, “the only relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner has presented prima facie proof of a meritorious defense.” Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’ decision affirming trial court’s dismissal of bill of review after Baker hearing on ground other than lack of prima facie proof of meritorious defense); Maree, 502 S.W.3d at 366–67 (reversing trial court’s dismissal of bill of review based on petitioner’s failure to prove at Baker hearing that judgment was rendered unmixed with any fault or negligence on petitioner’s part).

2023See id. 19 Perrault argues on appeal that Pope did not prove her non-service claim at the Baker hearing and urges that the Court must give “proper deference” to “the trial court’s resolution of historical facts and conflicts in testimony.” We decline to do so.

2023Whether the trial court considered the bill of review hearing a pretrial Baker hearing or a trial on the bill of review merits, the trial court did not properly apply the law to the facts, see $217,590.00 in U.S. Currency, 18 S.W.3d at 632 , and its error was reversible, see Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 97–98; Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409 ; In re RPH Capital Partners, 2017 WL 2561562 , at *2; see also Boateng, 171 S.W.3d at 494 (noting that harm analysis does not apply).

2015Some courts of appeals have referred solely to the two rules in determining the propriety of a spoliation instruction, see, e.g., Brumfield v. Exxon Corp., 63 S.W.3d 912, 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied), while others—including the court of appeals in the instant case—have referred to both Justice Baker’s framework and the two rules in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging [**20] the jury with a spoliation instruction, S.W.3d , ; see also Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Whiteside v

2014Some courts of appeals have referred solely to the two rules in determining the propriety of a spoliation instruction, see, e.g., Brumfield v. Exxon Corp., 63 S.W.3d 912, 920 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied), while others — including the court of appeals in the instant case — have referred to both Justice Baker’s framework and the two rules in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging the jury with a spoliation instruction, 438 S.W.3d 9, 28 ; see also Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40, 56 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Whitesid

2015Some courts of appeals have referred solely to the two rules in determining the propriety of a spoliation instruction, see, e.g., Brumfield v. Exxon Corp., 63 S.W.3d 912, 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied), while others—including the court of appeals in the instant case—have referred to both Justice Baker’s framework and the two rules in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging [**20] the jury with a spoliation instruction, S.W.3d , ; see also Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Whiteside v

2014Some courts of appeals have referred solely to the two rules in determining the propriety of a spoliation instruction, see, e.g., Brumfield v. Exxon Corp., 63 S.W.3d 912, 920 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied), while others — including the court of appeals in the instant case — have referred to both Justice Baker’s framework and the two rules in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging the jury with a spoliation instruction, 438 S.W.3d 9, 28 ; see also Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40, 56 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Whitesid

2015Some courts of appeals have referred solely to the two rules in determining the propriety of a spoliation instruction, see, e.g., Brumfield v. Exxon Corp., 63 S.W.3d 912, 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied), while others—including the court of appeals in the instant case—have referred to both Justice Baker’s framework and the two rules in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging [**20] the jury with a spoliation instruction, S.W.3d , ; see also Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Whiteside v

2014Some courts of appeals have referred solely to the two rules in determining the propriety of a spoliation instruction, see, e.g., Brumfield v. Exxon Corp., 63 S.W.3d 912, 920 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied), while others — including the court of appeals in the instant case — have referred to both Justice Baker’s framework and the two rules in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging the jury with a spoliation instruction, 438 S.W.3d 9, 28 ; see also Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40, 56 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Whitesid

2024Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359 , 362 n.2, 365 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enters., L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 481, 492 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“The trial court had discretion to entertain cross-motions for summary judgment before conducting a Baker hearing.”). 9 awarded in the agreed final divorce decree.

2024See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 ; Pope v. Perrault, No. 01-21-00648-CV, 2023 WL 4003516 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (fact that trial court and parties at times addressed issues other than meritorious defenses did not convert Baker hearing into trial on the merits); Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (prior to Baker hearing, trial court may consider and rule on bill-of-review elements other than meritorious defense if raised in summary judgment motion or in separate trial); Jones v. Texas Dep’t of Protect

2024Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359 , 362 n.2, 365 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enters., L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 481, 492 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“The trial court had discretion to entertain cross-motions for summary judgment before conducting a Baker hearing.”). 9 awarded in the agreed final divorce decree.

2024Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359 , 362 n.2, 365 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Boateng v. Trailblazer Health Enters., L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 481, 492 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“The trial court had discretion to entertain cross-motions for summary judgment before conducting a Baker hearing.”). 9 awarded in the agreed final divorce decree.

2024Co., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex. 1988) (explaining that bill-of-review plaintiff failed to preserve its complaint that the trial was merely a Baker hearing when—once it was clear that the trial court intended to proceed with a trial—he failed to move for a continuance or to otherwise object); cf. Nava v. Schmidt, No. 04-22-00686-CV, 2023 WL 7005843 , at *6–8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 25, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reversing denial of bill of review when disputed material facts on lack of notice determined the applicable procedure but “[t]he trial court did not call for opening statements,

2024Co., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex. 1988) (explaining that bill-of-review plaintiff failed to preserve its complaint that the trial was merely a Baker hearing when—once it was clear that the trial court intended to proceed with a trial—he failed to move for a continuance or to otherwise object); cf. Nava v. Schmidt, No. 04-22-00686-CV, 2023 WL 7005843 , at *6–8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 25, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reversing denial of bill of review when disputed material facts on lack of notice determined the applicable procedure but “[t]he trial court did not call for opening statements,

2005See Orbmann, 999 S.W.2d at 87-88 .

2005See Orbmann, 999 S.W.2d at 87-88 .

2005See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’s erroneous re-view of the merits of bill-of-review petition on appeal from trial court’s Baker hearing ruling, without inquiring into whether such error was harmful); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 494 (rejecting appellee’s argument on appeal from Baker hearing dismissal that the petitions for bill of review failed based on lack of due diligence because that issue was not before the trial court in the Baker hearing); Mocega, 79 S.W.3d at 64-65 (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on m

2005See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’s erroneous re-view of the merits of bill-of-review petition on appeal from trial court’s Baker hearing ruling, without inquiring into whether such error was harmful); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 494 (rejecting appellee’s argument on appeal from Baker hearing dismissal that the petitions for bill of review failed based on lack of due diligence because that issue was not before the trial court in the Baker hearing); Mocega, 79 S.W.3d at 64-65 (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on m

2005See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’s erroneous re-view of the merits of bill-of-review petition on appeal from trial court’s Baker hearing ruling, without inquiring into whether such error was harmful); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 494 (rejecting appellee’s argument on appeal from Baker hearing dismissal that the petitions for bill of review failed based on lack of due diligence because that issue was not before the trial court in the Baker hearing); Mocega, 79 S.W.3d at 64-65 (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on m

2005See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’s erroneous re-view of the merits of bill-of-review petition on appeal from trial court’s Baker hearing ruling, without inquiring into whether such error was harmful); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 494 (rejecting appellee’s argument on appeal from Baker hearing dismissal that the petitions for bill of review failed based on lack of due diligence because that issue was not before the trial court in the Baker hearing); Mocega, 79 S.W.3d at 64-65 (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on m

2024See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 ; Pope v. Perrault, No. 01-21-00648-CV, 2023 WL 4003516 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (fact that trial court and parties at times addressed issues other than meritorious defenses did not convert Baker hearing into trial on the merits); Maree v. Zuniga, 502 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (prior to Baker hearing, trial court may consider and rule on bill-of-review elements other than meritorious defense if raised in summary judgment motion or in separate trial); Jones v. Texas Dep’t of Protect

2005See Baker , 582 S.W.2d at 408 B 09; Jones v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Servs ., 85 S.W.3d 483 , 488 B 89 (Tex. App. C Austin 2002, pet. denied) (holding that record revealed hearing in trial court was a Baker hearing rather than trial on the merits of the petition for bill of review, despite confusion among the parties as to the nature of the hearing).

2005See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’s erroneous re-view of the merits of bill-of-review petition on appeal from trial court’s Baker hearing ruling, without inquiring into whether such error was harmful); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 494 (rejecting appellee’s argument on appeal from Baker hearing dismissal that the petitions for bill of review failed based on lack of due diligence because that issue was not before the trial court in the Baker hearing); Mocega, 79 S.W.3d at 64-65 (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on m

2005See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’s erroneous re-view of the merits of bill-of-review petition on appeal from trial court’s Baker hearing ruling, without inquiring into whether such error was harmful); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 494 (rejecting appellee’s argument on appeal from Baker hearing dismissal that the petitions for bill of review failed based on lack of due diligence because that issue was not before the trial court in the Baker hearing); Mocega, 79 S.W.3d at 64-65 (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on m

2005See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’s erroneous re-view of the merits of bill-of-review petition on appeal from trial court’s Baker hearing ruling, without inquiring into whether such error was harmful); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 494 (rejecting appellee’s argument on appeal from Baker hearing dismissal that the petitions for bill of review failed based on lack of due diligence because that issue was not before the trial court in the Baker hearing); Mocega, 79 S.W.3d at 64-65 (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on m

2005See Beck, 771 S.W.2d at 142 (reversing court of appeals’s erroneous re-view of the merits of bill-of-review petition on appeal from trial court’s Baker hearing ruling, without inquiring into whether such error was harmful); Jones, 85 S.W.3d at 494 (rejecting appellee’s argument on appeal from Baker hearing dismissal that the petitions for bill of review failed based on lack of due diligence because that issue was not before the trial court in the Baker hearing); Mocega, 79 S.W.3d at 64-65 (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on m

2023Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988))).

2023Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988))).

2013See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 877–78.

2013See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 877–78.

2009See Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex. 1983); Cathey v. Meyer, 115 S.W.3d 644, 663 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003), rev’d in part on other grounds, 167 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam).

2009See Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex.1983); Cathey v. Meyer, 115 S.W.3d 644, 663 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003), rev’d in part on other grounds, 167 S.W.3d 327 (Tex.2005) (per curiam).

2009See Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex. 1983); Cathey v. Meyer, 115 S.W.3d 644, 663 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003), rev’d in part on other grounds, 167 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam).

2009See Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex.1983); Cathey v. Meyer, 115 S.W.3d 644, 663 (Tex.App.-Waco 2003), rev’d in part on other grounds, 167 S.W.3d 327 (Tex.2005) (per curiam).

2008See, e.g., Ross v. Nat’l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 796-97 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (default judgment); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex.2003) (alleging 1883 agreed judgment was erroneously rendered by a conspiracy between defendant and plaintiffs counsel); Davis, 227 S.W.3d at 301 (dismissal for want of prosecution); Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 204 (alleging attorney husband’s failure to disclose forthcoming settlement which would yield fee in excess of $200 million and threats to render his law practice worthless if wife sought an appraisal prev

2008See, e.g., Ross v. Nat’l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 796-97 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (default judgment); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex.2003) (alleging 1883 agreed judgment was erroneously rendered by a conspiracy between defendant and plaintiffs counsel); Davis, 227 S.W.3d at 301 (dismissal for want of prosecution); Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 204 (alleging attorney husband’s failure to disclose forthcoming settlement which would yield fee in excess of $200 million and threats to render his law practice worthless if wife sought an appraisal prev

2008The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by summarily determining this issue without a trial but did not reverse until it determined that this was “harmful error.” Id. at 98 ; see also Elliott v. Elliott, 21 S.W.3d 913, 921-22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (holding that the bill-of-review plaintiff was not harmed by trial court’s exclusion of expert opinion testimony during preliminary Baker hearing).

2008The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by summarily determining this issue without a trial but did not reverse until it determined that this was “harmful error.” Id. at 98; see also Elliott v. Elliott, 21 S.W.3d 913, 921-22 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (holding that the bill-of-review plaintiff was not harmed by trial court’s exclusion of expert opinion testimony during preliminary Baker hearing).

2008See, e.g., Ross v. Nat’l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 796-97 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (default judgment); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex.2003) (alleging 1883 agreed judgment was erroneously rendered by a conspiracy between defendant and plaintiffs counsel); Davis, 227 S.W.3d at 301 (dismissal for want of prosecution); Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 204 (alleging attorney husband’s failure to disclose forthcoming settlement which would yield fee in excess of $200 million and threats to render his law practice worthless if wife sought an appraisal prev

2008See, e.g., Ross v. Nat’l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 796-97 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (default judgment); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex.2003) (alleging 1883 agreed judgment was erroneously rendered by a conspiracy between defendant and plaintiffs counsel); Davis, 227 S.W.3d at 301 (dismissal for want of prosecution); Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 204 (alleging attorney husband’s failure to disclose forthcoming settlement which would yield fee in excess of $200 million and threats to render his law practice worthless if wife sought an appraisal prev

2008See, e.g., Ross v. Nat’l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 796-97 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (default judgment); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex.2003) (alleging 1883 agreed judgment was erroneously rendered by a conspiracy between defendant and plaintiffs counsel); Davis, 227 S.W.3d at 301 (dismissal for want of prosecution); Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 204 (alleging attorney husband’s failure to disclose forthcoming settlement which would yield fee in excess of $200 million and threats to render his law practice worthless if wife sought an appraisal prev

2008See, e.g., Ross v. Nat’l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 796-97 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (default judgment); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex.2003) (alleging 1883 agreed judgment was erroneously rendered by a conspiracy between defendant and plaintiffs counsel); Davis, 227 S.W.3d at 301 (dismissal for want of prosecution); Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 204 (alleging attorney husband’s failure to disclose forthcoming settlement which would yield fee in excess of $200 million and threats to render his law practice worthless if wife sought an appraisal prev

2008See, e.g., Ross v. Nat’l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 796-97 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (default judgment); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex.2003) (alleging 1883 agreed judgment was erroneously rendered by a conspiracy between defendant and plaintiffs counsel); Davis, 227 S.W.3d at 301 (dismissal for want of prosecution); Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 204 (alleging attorney husband’s failure to disclose forthcoming settlement which would yield fee in excess of $200 million and threats to render his law practice worthless if wife sought an appraisal prev

2008See, e.g., Ross v. Nat’l Center for the Employment of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 796-97 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (default judgment); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex.2003) (alleging 1883 agreed judgment was erroneously rendered by a conspiracy between defendant and plaintiffs counsel); Davis, 227 S.W.3d at 301 (dismissal for want of prosecution); Nelson, 135 S.W.3d at 204 (alleging attorney husband’s failure to disclose forthcoming settlement which would yield fee in excess of $200 million and threats to render his law practice worthless if wife sought an appraisal prev

2006See In re Ford Motor Co. , 988 S.W.2d 714, 720 (Tex. 1998) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in granting sanctions based on conduct that formed basis for dispute parties had previously settled).

2006See In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d 714, 720 (Tex.1998) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in granting sanctions based on conduct that formed basis for dispute parties had previously settled).

2022E.g., Harris, 724 F.3d 458 (applying the Baker factors to determine whether the case is justiciable); Carmichael, 572 F.3d 1271 (same). 47 556 S.W.3d at 256. 16 helicopter both before and after M1’s maintenance,” and it attached the petitioners’ general criticisms of the Navy’s maintenance practices.

2022E.g., Harris, 724 F.3d 458 (applying the Baker factors to determine whether the case is justiciable); Carmichael, 572 F.3d 1271 (same). 47 556 S.W.3d at 256. 16 helicopter both before and after M1’s maintenance,” and it attached the petitioners’ general criticisms of the Navy’s maintenance practices.