Baker claim in Kansas

2015Baker v. State, 42 Kan.

2013On appeal, tire Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding that the motion was untimely filed and remanded for “further proceedings and a determination by the trial court of whether Baker’s K.S.A. 60-1507 motion raised a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact regarding whether trial counsel was ineffective. ” Baker v. State, 42 Kan.

2026State v. Dooley, 308 Kan. 641 , 647, 423 P.3d 469 (2018).

2026State v. 5 Genson, 316 Kan. 130 , 135-36, 513 P.3d 1192 (2022) (even when exception applies, court has discretion to consider issue raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Clapp, 308 Kan. 976 , 980, 425 P.3d 605 (2018) (considering challenge to application of intermediate sanctions for the first time on appeal).

2026State v. 5 Genson, 316 Kan. 130 , 135-36, 513 P.3d 1192 (2022) (even when exception applies, court has discretion to consider issue raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Clapp, 308 Kan. 976 , 980, 425 P.3d 605 (2018) (considering challenge to application of intermediate sanctions for the first time on appeal).

2016Noting Blecha's "corporate role" at the KBI, his authority to act in the KBI's interests, and his status as the only person with authority to impose administrative leave upon and terminate Lumry, the panel held: "[T]he Baker economic reality test weighs in favor of finding that Director Blecha is an employer who a jury could potentially find individually liable under the FLSA, and the district court did not err in so finding." 49 Kan.

2016Noting Blecha's "corporate role" at the KBI, his authority to act in the KBI's interests, and his status as the only person with authority to impose administrative leave upon and terminate Lumry, the panel held: "[T]he Baker economic reality test weighs in favor of finding that Director Blecha is an employer who a jury could potentially find individually liable under the FLSA, and the district court did not err in so finding." 49 Kan.

2005Further, under the circumstances, there was no basis to conclude that Baker’s defense counsel’s performance fell below the objective reasonableness standard set out in Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 656-57 , 694 P.2d 468 (1985), by failing to foresee an interpretation of law that would not occur until sometime in the future. 20 Kan.

2005Further, under the circumstances, there was no basis to conclude that Baker’s defense counsel’s performance fell below the objective reasonableness standard set out in Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 656-57 , 694 P.2d 468 (1985), by failing to foresee an interpretation of law that would not occur until sometime in the future. 20 Kan.

2005Further, under the circumstances, there was no basis to conclude that Baker’s defense counsel’s performance fell below the objective reasonableness standard set out in Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 656-57 , 694 P.2d 468 (1985), by failing to foresee an interpretation of law that would not occur until sometime in the future. 20 Kan.