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14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Efstathiou v. Saundersgreen2 sentences1990We agree with the appellant that, under Efstathiou v. Saunders, 189 Ga. App. 470, 471-472 (3) ( 376 SE2d 413 ) (1988), this conclusion was incorrect, inasmuch as the Yost claim was not based on allegations that the appellee had asserted a claim or defense which was frivolous but on allegations that she had unjustifiably expanded the proceedings by requesting unnecessary discovery. 1990We agree with the appellant that, under Efstathiou v. Saunders, 189 Ga. App. 470, 471-472 (3) ( 376 SE2d 413 ) (1988), this conclusion was incorrect, inasmuch as the Yost claim was not based on allegations that the appellee had asserted a claim or defense which was frivolous but on allegations that she had unjustifiably expanded the proceedings by requesting unnecessary discovery. | 2 | 2 |
Vogtle v. Colemangreen2 sentences1991Bank, 196 Ga. App. 26, 27-28 (2) ( 395 SE2d 351 ) (1990), appellant elected to seek damages only under OCGA § 51-12-6, which was expressly approved in Vogtle, supra. However, unlike the movant in Wheat , in the case at bar appellee’s motion for summary judgment was not supported by evidence that its actions forming the basis of the Yost claim were unintentional and not wilful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of consequences. 1991Bank, 196 Ga. App. 26, 27-28 (2) ( 395 SE2d 351 ) (1990), appellant elected to seek damages only under OCGA § 51-12-6, which was expressly approved in Vogtle, supra. However, unlike the movant in Wheat , in the case at bar appellee’s motion for summary judgment was not supported by evidence that its actions forming the basis of the Yost claim were unintentional and not wilful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of consequences. | 1 | 4 |
Yost v. Torokyellow2 sentences1990During the trial of the Yost claim (Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92 ( 344 SE2d 414 ) (1986)), appellee’s counsel testified to his experience and his usual hourly rate, which he also testified was reasonable and customary for the type of services provided by attorneys of his experience in this area of civil law. 1990During the trial of the Yost claim (Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92 ( 344 SE2d 414 ) (1986)), appellee’s counsel testified to his experience and his usual hourly rate, which he also testified was reasonable and customary for the type of services provided by attorneys of his experience in this area of civil law. | 1 | 4 |
Juchter v. Boehm, Bendheim & Co.green1 sentence2020See, e.g., Juchter, 67 Ga. at 538-539 . | 1 | 1 |
Hyer v. Citizens & Southern National Bankgreen2 sentences1994Bank &c., 188 Ga. App. 452, 454 (2) ( 373 SE2d 391 ) (1988). 1994Bank &c., 188 Ga. App. 452, 454 (2) ( 373 SE2d 391 ) (1988). | 1 | 1 |
McDevitt & Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Service, Inc.green2 sentences1993OCGA § 9-11-50 (a).’ [Cit.]” McDevitt & Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Svc., 203 Ga. App. 640, 644 (3) ( 418 SE2d 87 ) (1992). 1993OCGA § 9-11-50 (a).’ [Cit.]” McDevitt & Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Svc., 203 Ga. App. 640, 644 (3) ( 418 SE2d 87 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Wheat v. First Union National Bankgreen2 sentences1991Bank, 196 Ga. App. 26, 27-28 (2) ( 395 SE2d 351 ) (1990), appellant elected to seek damages only under OCGA § 51-12-6, which was expressly approved in Vogtle, supra. However, unlike the movant in Wheat , in the case at bar appellee’s motion for summary judgment was not supported by evidence that its actions forming the basis of the Yost claim were unintentional and not wilful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of consequences. 1991Bank, 196 Ga. App. 26, 27-28 (2) ( 395 SE2d 351 ) (1990), appellant elected to seek damages only under OCGA § 51-12-6, which was expressly approved in Vogtle, supra. However, unlike the movant in Wheat , in the case at bar appellee’s motion for summary judgment was not supported by evidence that its actions forming the basis of the Yost claim were unintentional and not wilful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of consequences. | 1 | 1 |
Roberson v. Central Fidelity Bankgreen2 sentences1991See also Roberson v. Central Fidelity Bank, 190 Ga. App. 382 ( 378 SE2d 698 ) (1989). 1991See also Roberson v. Central Fidelity Bank, 190 Ga. App. 382 ( 378 SE2d 698 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Augusta Tennis Club, Inc. v. Legergreen2 sentences1990Thus, unlike the situation in Augusta Tennis Club, Inc. v. Leger, 186 Ga. App. 440, 443 (5) ( 367 SE2d 263 ) (1988), cited by appellant, the proof was adequate to show what portion of the total attorney fees was allocable to the claim supporting the award of attorney fees. 1990Thus, unlike the situation in Augusta Tennis Club, Inc. v. Leger, 186 Ga. App. 440, 443 (5) ( 367 SE2d 263 ) (1988), cited by appellant, the proof was adequate to show what portion of the total attorney fees was allocable to the claim supporting the award of attorney fees. | 1 | 1 |
Knight v. Stevens Logging, Inc.green2 sentences1989See generally Knight v. Stevens Logging, 173 Ga. App. 359, 360 (1) ( 326 SE2d 494 ) (1985). 1989See generally Knight v. Stevens Logging, 173 Ga. App. 359, 360 (1) ( 326 SE2d 494 ) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
West v. Veterans Administrationgreen2 sentences1988See, e.g., West v. Veterans Admin., 182 Ga. App. 767 (3) ( 357 SE2d 121 ) (1987); Smith v. Pierce, 179 Ga. App. *472 724 (4) ( 347 SE2d 692 ) (1986). 1988See, e.g., West v. Veterans Admin., 182 Ga. App. 767 (3) ( 357 SE2d 121 ) (1987); Smith v. Pierce, 179 Ga. App. *472 724 (4) ( 347 SE2d 692 ) (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McCormick v. Rissanen
green
2 sentences1991McCormick v. Rissanen, 177 Ga. App. 623 ( 340 SE2d 268 ) (1986) Therefore, there was no Yost claim available to M & M againsi Watkins. *57 Case No. A90A1606 2. 1991McCormick v. Rissanen, 177 Ga. App. 623 ( 340 SE2d 268 ) (1986) Therefore, there was no Yost claim available to M & M againsi Watkins. *57 Case No. A90A1606 2. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Moore v. Memorial Medical Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Center, 258 Ga. 696 ( 373 SE2d 204 ) (1988) the Supreme Court indicated that a common law Yost claim may be maintained after voluntary dismissal of the underlying lawsuit. 1991Center, 258 Ga. 696 ( 373 SE2d 204 ) (1988) the Supreme Court indicated that a common law Yost claim may be maintained after voluntary dismissal of the underlying lawsuit. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Thomason v. Kern & Co.
green
1 sentence1989The Supreme Court overruled Ferguson on this one limited issue (Vogtle v. Coleman, 259 Ga. 119, fn. 8 ) and held in its Division 3 that “the trial court correctly allowed Coleman these expenses [i.e., the $33,254.60] for prosecuting his Yost claim,” (emphasis in original deleted; emphasis supplied) pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11, apparently under a “right for any reason” standard. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Easley v. Clement
green
2 sentences1989In Easley v. Clement, 187 Ga. App. 799 ( 371 SE2d 416 ) (1988), the Court of Appeals held that Easley was not required to have asserted his claim for malicious use of process as a compulsory counterclaim in the initial suit because OCGA § 9-15-14 was not effective at the time of that action and because Easley could not realistically have asserted a Yost claim since Yost was announced only 5 days before judgment was entered. 1989In Easley v. Clement, 187 Ga. App. 799 ( 371 SE2d 416 ) (1988), the Court of Appeals held that Easley was not required to have asserted his claim for malicious use of process as a compulsory counterclaim in the initial suit because OCGA § 9-15-14 was not effective at the time of that action and because Easley could not realistically have asserted a Yost claim since Yost was announced only 5 days before judgment was entered. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Smith v. Pierce
green
2 sentences1988See, e.g., West v. Veterans Admin., 182 Ga. App. 767 (3) ( 357 SE2d 121 ) (1987); Smith v. Pierce, 179 Ga. App. *472 724 (4) ( 347 SE2d 692 ) (1986). 1988See, e.g., West v. Veterans Admin., 182 Ga. App. 767 (3) ( 357 SE2d 121 ) (1987); Smith v. Pierce, 179 Ga. App. *472 724 (4) ( 347 SE2d 692 ) (1986). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.