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14 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1864–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Rosivito Hoskinsgreen2 sentences2015The Court then observed that several courts have held that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary and that “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” Id. (citing United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001) (finding the defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver and that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequence 2002In Poynter , our supreme court also noted that “a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary ‘so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.’ ” 7 Id. (quoting Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 410 ). | 2 | 4 |
United States v. Lucky Iroreregreen2 sentences2015The Court then observed that several courts have held that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary and that “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” Id. (citing United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001) (finding the defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver and that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequence 2001Several courts have held, however, that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001)(finding defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver, and that trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequences of continued conduct); see also United States | 2 | 2 |
Cox v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See I.C. § 35- 38-2.6-5; cf. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013) (“[P]robation may be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition.”); Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550 (noting that “judges must have the ability to move with alacrity . . . when adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their sentences”). | 1 | 1 |
Kimberly Heaton v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2020See I.C. § 35- 38-2.6-5; cf. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013) (“[P]robation may be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition.”); Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550 (noting that “judges must have the ability to move with alacrity . . . when adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their sentences”). | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019See Rodriguez , 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (noting that "an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely."). [14] Once the assisting officer arrived and Officer Hancock spent a brief amount of time getting him up to speed about the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop and the results of his background checks, Officer Hancock reapproached Tinker's vehicle around 11:38 p.m. and asked Tinker to exit the vehicle with the purpose of giving him a verbal warning explaining the infractions that warranted the stop. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kneelandgreen1 sentence2001Several courts have held, however, that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001)(finding defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver, and that trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequences of continued conduct); see also United States | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Roman G. Weningergreen1 sentence2001Several courts have held, however, that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001)(finding defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver, and that trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequences of continued conduct); see also United States | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Frederick W. Bauergreen1 sentence2001Several courts have held, however, that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001)(finding defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver, and that trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequences of continued conduct); see also United States | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Denny Ray Hunnicuttgreen1 sentence2000See Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1350 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Keihngreen1 sentence1996The State must show either that the defendant acted with knowledge he had been adjudged an habitual traffic offender or that notice of the impending suspension had been mailed by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles ...”); Wooten v. State, 563 N.E.2d 165, 165-6 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (convic tion affirmed based on reasonable inference that defendant had actual knowledge that his license was suspended due to a prior verbal warning from a police officer to defendant that defendant’s license was suspended, despite failure of BMV to mail notice to defendant); State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963, | 1 | 1 |
Wooten v. Stategreen1 sentence1996The State must show either that the defendant acted with knowledge he had been adjudged an habitual traffic offender or that notice of the impending suspension had been mailed by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles ...”); Wooten v. State, 563 N.E.2d 165, 165-6 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (convic tion affirmed based on reasonable inference that defendant had actual knowledge that his license was suspended due to a prior verbal warning from a police officer to defendant that defendant’s license was suspended, despite failure of BMV to mail notice to defendant); State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Webb v. State
green
2 sentences2000Here, the facts articulated by Officer Johnson for detaining D.K. after giving him a verbal warning for the traffic offenses *763 (the purpose of the stop) consist of no more than "unparticularized suspicions," see Webb, 714 N.E.2d at 789 , and a refusal to voluntarily consent to a search cannot be considered to constitute grounds for suspicion. 2000Here, the facts articulated by Officer Johnson for detaining D.K. after giving him a verbal warning for the traffic of fenses (the purpose of the stop) consist of no more than “unparticularized suspicions,” see Webb, 714 N.E.2d at 789 , and a refusal to voluntarily consent to a search cannot be considered to constitute grounds for suspicion. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Leonard v. State
green
1 sentence2015The Court then observed that several courts have held that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary and that “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” Id. (citing United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001) (finding the defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver and that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequence | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009And for company employee RH., rather than impose any sanction or warning, Wirtz assigned him to another department after his "use of racial epithets" to *848 ward an African-American employee. 8 Id. at 128. "[The question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult" and "there will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 , 103 S.Ct. 1478 ). 2009And for company employee RH., rather than impose any sanction or warning, Wirtz assigned him to another department after his "use of racial epithets" to *848 ward an African-American employee. 8 Id. at 128. "[The question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult" and "there will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 , 103 S.Ct. 1478 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens
green
2 sentences2009And for company employee RH., rather than impose any sanction or warning, Wirtz assigned him to another department after his "use of racial epithets" to *848 ward an African-American employee. 8 Id. at 128. "[The question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult" and "there will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 , 103 S.Ct. 1478 ). 2009And for company employee RH., rather than impose any sanction or warning, Wirtz assigned him to another department after his "use of racial epithets" to *848 ward an African-American employee. 8 Id. at 128. "[The question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult" and "there will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 , 103 S.Ct. 1478 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
DK v. State
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 762-68 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Magley v. State
green
2 sentences1989In Magley v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 618, 641 , 335 N.E.2d 811, 825 , we said that, under normal circumstances, "[t]he fact that a piece of evidence makes an inference slightly more probable suffices to show its relevance." Experience dictates that the prosecution, partaking as it does of normal human decency, does not in normal circumstances make plea offers to the most culpable when several are facing charges for a single criminal episode. 1989In Magley v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 618, 641 , 335 N.E.2d 811, 825 , we said that, under normal circumstances, "[t]he fact that a piece of evidence makes an inference slightly more probable suffices to show its relevance." Experience dictates that the prosecution, partaking as it does of normal human decency, does not in normal circumstances make plea offers to the most culpable when several are facing charges for a single criminal episode. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Stephenson v. State
green
1 sentence1897In Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358 , the cause was reversed because of the following verbal instruction: “Gentlemen of the jury, if the State has failed to make out a case against this defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the defendant by his evidence has raised a reasonable doubt, then your verdict will be as follows: (reading form of verdict for defendant).” We do not think the oral instruction complained of is an instruction within the meaning of the statute. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Toledo & Wabash Railway Co. v. Daniels
neutral
1 sentence1864The judgment below will have to be reversed on account of a verbal instruction given to the jury under substantially the same circumstances as in the case of the same appellant against Daniels, supra. Per Curiam. | 1 | 1864–1864 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.