rate hearing in Kansas

2019To that end, Daubert provided a list of nonexclusive factors a trial judge could use to fulfill this gatekeeping requirement: whether the theory or technique can and has been tested; whether it has been subject to peer review; the rate of error; the existence and maintenance of standards; and whether the theory or technique has general acceptance among the relevant scientific community. 509 U.S. at 592 -94 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 .

2019To that end, Daubert provided a list of nonexclusive factors a trial judge could use to fulfill this gatekeeping requirement: whether the theory or technique can and has been tested; whether it has been subject to peer review; the rate of error; the existence and maintenance of standards; and whether the theory or technique has general acceptance among the relevant scientific community. 509 U.S. at 592 -94 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 .

2013This court found the audit was “sufficiently like a standard rate hearing to serve the purpose of the statute.” 31 Kan.

2012Columbus Telephone Co., 31 Kan.

2003The presumption is in favor of the rate and rule established by the rate-making authority.’ 217 Kan. at 429-30 .

2000The language of the Supreme Court of the United States, applied to an attack by the utility company upon an established rate, is conversely applicable to an attack by the ratepayer.’ ” 217 Kan. at 429 -30 (quoting Knotts v. Nollen, 206 Iowa 261, 262-63 , 218 N.W. 563 [1928] *61 and referring to San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739 , 43 L.

2000The language of the Supreme Court of the United States, applied to an attack by the utility company upon an established rate, is conversely applicable to an attack by the ratepayer.’ ” 217 Kan. at 429 -30 (quoting Knotts v. Nollen, 206 Iowa 261, 262-63 , 218 N.W. 563 [1928] *61 and referring to San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739 , 43 L.

2000The language of the Supreme Court of the United States, applied to an attack by the utility company upon an established rate, is conversely applicable to an attack by the ratepayer.’ ” 217 Kan. at 429 -30 (quoting Knotts v. Nollen, 206 Iowa 261, 262-63 , 218 N.W. 563 [1928] *61 and referring to San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739 , 43 L.

2013Interestingly, the Commission argued before this court that the case did not arise from a rate hearing and instead sought to transfer the case to the district court. 24 Kan.

2012The Kansas Supreme Court noted in Bartlett Grain Co. v. Kansas Corporation Comm’n, 292 Kan. 723, 727 , 256 P.3d 867 (2011), that the Kansas Judicial Review Act applies to all KCC appeals other than those arising from a rate hearing.

2012The Kansas Supreme Court noted in Bartlett Grain Co. v. Kansas Corporation Comm’n, 292 Kan. 723, 727 , 256 P.3d 867 (2011), that the Kansas Judicial Review Act applies to all KCC appeals other than those arising from a rate hearing.

2000The language of the Supreme Court of the United States, applied to an attack by the utility company upon an established rate, is conversely applicable to an attack by the ratepayer.’ ” 217 Kan. at 429 -30 (quoting Knotts v. Nollen, 206 Iowa 261, 262-63 , 218 N.W. 563 [1928] *61 and referring to San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739 , 43 L.

2000The language of the Supreme Court of the United States, applied to an attack by the utility company upon an established rate, is conversely applicable to an attack by the ratepayer.’ ” 217 Kan. at 429 -30 (quoting Knotts v. Nollen, 206 Iowa 261, 262-63 , 218 N.W. 563 [1928] *61 and referring to San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739 , 43 L.

1990The court concluded this was a rate hearing, and the resulting order was one “ ‘arising from a rate hearing.’ ” 10 Kan.

1985Co., 9 Kan.

1984This case is also analogous to Sunflower Pipeline Co. v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 3 Kan.

1983We do not deem the issue to be such that its consideration is necessary to serve the interests of justice orto prevent the denial of fundamental rights (State v. Puckett, 230 Kan. 596 , 640 P.2d 1198 [1982]), thus we decline to consider the issue.

1983We do not deem the issue to be such that its consideration is necessary to serve the interests of justice orto prevent the denial of fundamental rights (State v. Puckett, 230 Kan. 596 , 640 P.2d 1198 [1982]), thus we decline to consider the issue.

1981Cf. Utah Fuel Co. v. Coal Comm’n, 306 U.S. 56 , 83 L.Ed. 483 , 59 S.Ct. 409 (1939).

1981Cf. Utah Fuel Co. v. Coal Comm’n, 306 U.S. 56 , 83 L.Ed. 483 , 59 S.Ct. 409 (1939).

1968(Loucks v. McCormick, 198 Kan. 351 , 424 P. 2d 555 , and cases cited therein.) The trial court further concluded that since no evidence was introduced, establishing a contract rate for test pumping, quantum meruit applies; that the evidence established a customary rate for test pumping of $250, plus fuel, when a sale of pumping equipment is made by the pumper; when a sale is not made the rate is $500 per pumping, plus the cost of fuel used.

1968(Loucks v. McCormick, 198 Kan. 351 , 424 P. 2d 555 , and cases cited therein.) The trial court further concluded that since no evidence was introduced, establishing a contract rate for test pumping, quantum meruit applies; that the evidence established a customary rate for test pumping of $250, plus fuel, when a sale of pumping equipment is made by the pumper; when a sale is not made the rate is $500 per pumping, plus the cost of fuel used.