rate defense in California

2022(Id. at pp. 257–258.) The high court first explained that its grant of an OSC to the commission did not preclude it from “continuing to insist” that the court could not reach the merits of the rate challenge—because “the point goes to the jurisdiction of the court and it may, therefore, be raised at any stage of the proceedings.” (Clemmons, supra, 173 Cal. at p. 256 .) The court went on to agree with the commission that it could not address the merits, citing to the statutory language (now set forth in Pub.

2022(Id. at pp. 257–258.) The high court first explained that its grant of an OSC to the commission did not preclude it from “continuing to insist” that the court could not reach the merits of the rate challenge—because “the point goes to the jurisdiction of the court and it may, therefore, be raised at any stage of the proceedings.” (Clemmons, supra, 173 Cal. at p. 256 .) The court went on to agree with the commission that it could not address the merits, citing to the statutory language (now set forth in Pub.

2024(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132 .) D.

2023But Syers made clear the court “was neither required to follow the Laffey Matrix nor to adopt the rate defense counsel opined was the ‘market rate’ for services of this type.” (Id. at p. 702.) Instead, a court “may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009 .) It may also consider the experience of the attorney requesting fees.

2022(SDCWA I, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1165-1166.) We also are not persuaded by the argument that the trial court erred in its prevailing party determination because it considered “whether one party recovered greater relief in [the] Water Authority’s action for declaratory 16 relief, its petition for writ of mandate, or its reverse validation action in the rate challenge claims.” The requests for writ and declaratory relief and invalidity determination, albeit set out as “causes of action,” did not “ ‘create’ ” causes of action that “ ‘otherwise [did] not exist’ ” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2

2022(Ochs v. PacifiCare of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 782, 794 ; see Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 173 [“injunctive and declaratory relief are equitable remedies, not causes of action”]; Eilken v. Morrison (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 25, 29 [mandamus is “extraordinary remedy” appropriate when “other remedies are inadequate”].) In sum, we find unavailing Metropolitan’s contention that the operative pleadings “included other causes of action challenging the lawfulness of, and seeking to invalidate, certain rates that apply generally to services [it] provides to all of its member agencies

2021(Knox v. City of Orland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 132 , 148 & fn. 22 (Knox), superseded by constitutional amendment as noted in Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 446 .) More recently, in Plantier, supra, 7 Cal.5th 372 , we assumed for purposes of our analysis that a local water district’s rate hearing under section 6 of Proposition 218 (art.

2021(Knox v. City of Orland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 132 , 148 & fn. 22 (Knox), superseded by constitutional amendment as noted in Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 446 .) More recently, in Plantier, supra, 7 Cal.5th 372 , we assumed for purposes of our analysis that a local water district’s rate hearing under section 6 of Proposition 218 (art.

2021(Knox v. City of Orland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 132 , 148 & fn. 22 (Knox), superseded by constitutional amendment as noted in Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 446 .) More recently, in Plantier, supra, 7 Cal.5th 372 , we assumed for purposes of our analysis that a local water district’s rate hearing under section 6 of Proposition 218 (art.

2021(Knox v. City of Orland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 132 , 148 & fn. 22 (Knox), superseded by constitutional amendment as noted in Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 446 .) More recently, in Plantier, supra, 7 Cal.5th 372 , we assumed for purposes of our analysis that a local water district’s rate hearing under section 6 of Proposition 218 (art.

2009Citing language in Farmers Ins., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 842 , Insurance Companies maintain that the only proceeding to review an application for a rate increase “permitted” by chapter 9 is the public rate hearing because only a rate hearing (and not a “rate proceeding”) is specifically addressed in chapter 9 (in §§ 1861.05 and 1861.08).

1986“The rate base on which a return may be earned is the amount of property used and useful, at the time of the rate inquiry, in rendering a designated utility service.” (1 Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation (1969) p. 139.) In American Microsystems, Inc. v. City of Santa Clara, supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 1037 , ratepayers of a municipal power utility owned and operated by Santa Clara sought to compel that city to pass on to consumers certain savings in the cost of purchasing electrical power.

1986"The rate base on which a return may be earned is the amount of property used and useful, at the time of the rate inquiry, in rendering a designated utility service." (1 Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation (1969) p. 139.) [13] In American Microsystems, Inc. v. City of Santa Clara, supra, 137 Cal. App.3d 1037 , ratepayers of a municipal power utility owned and operated by Santa Clara sought to compel that city to pass on to consumers certain savings in the cost of purchasing electrical power.

1960Co., 20 F.2d 384 , 385 said: “I agree with the carriers that the evidence in the case, both the oral testimony and the structure of the tariff itself, shows plainly that the 23-eent rate was not originally drafted for the bracket 3405; but I agree with plaintiffs that the question of what the carriers intended abstractly is wholly immaterial, and that none of this evidence is relevant to the issue here joined, because in law it is an irrebut [t] able presumption that a rate filed with the Commission and published is the lawful rate, and the carrier cannot be heard to dispute the rate by such c