facts whenever claim in Maryland

1976As we said in Walker , at 695: “What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved is that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time that an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call was requested, etc.) we must make our own independent judgment as to what to make of those facts; we must, in *592 making that independent judgm

1975App. at 695 ): “What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgrnent on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved is that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time that an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call was requested, etc.) we must make our own independent judgment as to what to make of those facts; we must, in making that independent judgment, resolve for our

1991Citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 , 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764 , 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966), we said, in Whit *650 man v. State, 25 Md.App. 428, 435 , 336 A.2d 515 (1975), that “[w]ith respect to the scope of our review, we observe that in the presence of alleged infringements of constitutionally protected rights, we are required to examine the entire record and to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts.” Judge Moylan, speaking for this Court in Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 695 , 280 A.2d 260 (1971), discussed our role: What we mean, therefore, when we say

1991Citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 , 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764 , 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966), we said, in Whit *650 man v. State, 25 Md.App. 428, 435 , 336 A.2d 515 (1975), that “[w]ith respect to the scope of our review, we observe that in the presence of alleged infringements of constitutionally protected rights, we are required to examine the entire record and to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts.” Judge Moylan, speaking for this Court in Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 695 , 280 A.2d 260 (1971), discussed our role: What we mean, therefore, when we say

1991Citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 , 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764 , 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966), we said, in Whit *650 man v. State, 25 Md.App. 428, 435 , 336 A.2d 515 (1975), that “[w]ith respect to the scope of our review, we observe that in the presence of alleged infringements of constitutionally protected rights, we are required to examine the entire record and to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts.” Judge Moylan, speaking for this Court in Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 695 , 280 A.2d 260 (1971), discussed our role: What we mean, therefore, when we say

1991Citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 , 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764 , 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966), we said, in Whit *650 man v. State, 25 Md.App. 428, 435 , 336 A.2d 515 (1975), that “[w]ith respect to the scope of our review, we observe that in the presence of alleged infringements of constitutionally protected rights, we are required to examine the entire record and to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts.” Judge Moylan, speaking for this Court in Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 695 , 280 A.2d 260 (1971), discussed our role: What we mean, therefore, when we say

1990In dealing with the precisely analogous question of voluntariness in the context of confession law, we observed in Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 695 , 280 A.2d 260 (1971): “What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved is that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time that an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call

1990In dealing with the precisely analogous question of voluntariness in the context of confession law, we observed in Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 695 , 280 A.2d 260 (1971): “What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved is that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time that an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call

1990In dealing with the precisely analogous question of voluntariness in the context of confession law, we observed in Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 695 , 280 A.2d 260 (1971): “What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved is that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time that an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call

1990In dealing with the precisely analogous question of voluntariness in the context of confession law, we observed in Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 695 , 280 A.2d 260 (1971): “What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved is that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time that an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call

1984See also Fidazzo v. State, 32 Md.App. 590, 591-92 , 363 A.2d 583 (1976); Dixon v. State, 23 Md.App. 19, 35-36 , 327 A.2d 516 (1974) (and cases cited therein); Howell v. State, 18 Md.App. 429, 437 , 306 A.2d 554 (1973), rev’d on other grounds, 271 Md. 378 , 318 A.2d 189 (1974).

1984See also Fidazzo v. State, 32 Md.App. 590, 591-92 , 363 A.2d 583 (1976); Dixon v. State, 23 Md.App. 19, 35-36 , 327 A.2d 516 (1974) (and cases cited therein); Howell v. State, 18 Md.App. 429, 437 , 306 A.2d 554 (1973), rev’d on other grounds, 271 Md. 378 , 318 A.2d 189 (1974).

1984See also Fidazzo v. State, 32 Md.App. 590, 591-92 , 363 A.2d 583 (1976); Dixon v. State, 23 Md.App. 19, 35-36 , 327 A.2d 516 (1974) (and cases cited therein); Howell v. State, 18 Md.App. 429, 437 , 306 A.2d 554 (1973), rev’d on other grounds, 271 Md. 378 , 318 A.2d 189 (1974).

1984See also Fidazzo v. State, 32 Md.App. 590, 591-92 , 363 A.2d 583 (1976); Dixon v. State, 23 Md.App. 19, 35-36 , 327 A.2d 516 (1974) (and cases cited therein); Howell v. State, 18 Md.App. 429, 437 , 306 A.2d 554 (1973), rev’d on other grounds, 271 Md. 378 , 318 A.2d 189 (1974).

1984See also Fidazzo v. State, 32 Md.App. 590, 591-92 , 363 A.2d 583 (1976); Dixon v. State, 23 Md.App. 19, 35-36 , 327 A.2d 516 (1974) (and cases cited therein); Howell v. State, 18 Md.App. 429, 437 , 306 A.2d 554 (1973), rev’d on other grounds, 271 Md. 378 , 318 A.2d 189 (1974).

1984See also Fidazzo v. State, 32 Md.App. 590, 591-92 , 363 A.2d 583 (1976); Dixon v. State, 23 Md.App. 19, 35-36 , 327 A.2d 516 (1974) (and cases cited therein); Howell v. State, 18 Md.App. 429, 437 , 306 A.2d 554 (1973), rev’d on other grounds, 271 Md. 378 , 318 A.2d 189 (1974).

1975App. at 695 ): “What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgrnent on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved is that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time that an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call was requested, etc.) we must make our own independent judgment as to what to make of those facts; we must, in making that independent judgment, resolve for our

1974App. 590 , 244 A. 2d 623 , we engaged, of necessity, in constitutional fact-finding in a situation where the same issues were before us as face us now.

1974What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts whenever a claim of a constitutionally-protected right is involved is that, although we give great weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific, first-level facts (such as the time that an interrogation began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a telephone call was requested, etc.) we must make our own independent judgment as to what to make of those facts; we must, in making that independent judgment, resolve for ourselves the ultima

1972But in determining whether the court made its decision within the required constitutional framework we must do so within the rule that ‘[w]hen constitutional rights turn on the resolution of a factual dispute we are duty bound to make an independent examination of the evidence in the record.’ Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 , note 4 at p. 4.” In Walker v. State, supra, Judge Moylan, for this Court, went on to say, at page 695: “What we mean, therefore, when we say that we have the obligation to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts whenever a claim of a constitut