prevalent rule in Missouri

1932By reason of this nonaction by the General Assembly and the common-law doctrine that the result of elections if declared by supervising officials, could not be re-examined judicially, and the prevalent doctrine that equity takes no cognizance of such matters, we- hold the Circuit *306 Court of Pemiscot County is without jurisdiction of the cause there pending to annul the election in contest.” "We followed this ruling in State ex rel. v. Hackman, 295 Mo. 417 , l. c. 424, 245 S. W. 554 ; Wilson v. Washington County, 247 S. W. 185 ; Boney v. Simms, 304 Mo. 369 , l. c. 376, 378, 379, 263 S. W. 41

1932By reason of this nonaction by the General Assembly and the common-law doctrine that the result of elections if declared by supervising officials, could not be re-examined judicially, and the prevalent doctrine that equity takes no cognizance of such matters, we- hold the Circuit *306 Court of Pemiscot County is without jurisdiction of the cause there pending to annul the election in contest.” "We followed this ruling in State ex rel. v. Hackman, 295 Mo. 417 , l. c. 424, 245 S. W. 554 ; Wilson v. Washington County, 247 S. W. 185 ; Boney v. Simms, 304 Mo. 369 , l. c. 376, 378, 379, 263 S. W. 41

1976Louis Transit Co., 108 Mo.App. 6 , 82 S.W. 536 (1904): “. . . the prevalent test is the one stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Burr’s case: ‘That light impressions, which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions, which may close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.’ ” (

1976Louis Transit Co., 108 Mo.App. 6 , 82 S.W. 536 (1904): “. . . the prevalent test is the one stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Burr’s case: ‘That light impressions, which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions, which may close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.’ ” (

1934Wahl v. Speer, supra, was a mandamus action, and one of the defenses to that action was that'there was pending in the circuit court an injunction suit to prohibit the official from issuing bonds that were voted in an election on the ground that that election was fraudulently conducted.

1932Other cases in point follow: State ex rel. v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36 , l. c. 45, 149 S. W. 451 ; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551 , l. c. 565, 203 S. W. 960 ; In re Nathan Frank, 320 Mo. 1087 , l. c. 1090, 9 S. W. (2d) 153 ; State ex rel. v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615 , 91 S. W. 905 ; 9 R.

1932Other cases in point follow: State ex rel. v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36 , l. c. 45, 149 S. W. 451 ; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551 , l. c. 565, 203 S. W. 960 ; In re Nathan Frank, 320 Mo. 1087 , l. c. 1090, 9 S. W. (2d) 153 ; State ex rel. v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615 , 91 S. W. 905 ; 9 R.

1932Other cases in point follow: State ex rel. v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36 , l. c. 45, 149 S. W. 451 ; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551 , l. c. 565, 203 S. W. 960 ; In re Nathan Frank, 320 Mo. 1087 , l. c. 1090, 9 S. W. (2d) 153 ; State ex rel. v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615 , 91 S. W. 905 ; 9 R.

1932Other cases in point follow: State ex rel. v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36 , l. c. 45, 149 S. W. 451 ; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551 , l. c. 565, 203 S. W. 960 ; In re Nathan Frank, 320 Mo. 1087 , l. c. 1090, 9 S. W. (2d) 153 ; State ex rel. v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615 , 91 S. W. 905 ; 9 R.

1932Other cases in point follow: State ex rel. v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36 , l. c. 45, 149 S. W. 451 ; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551 , l. c. 565, 203 S. W. 960 ; In re Nathan Frank, 320 Mo. 1087 , l. c. 1090, 9 S. W. (2d) 153 ; State ex rel. v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615 , 91 S. W. 905 ; 9 R.

1932Other cases in point follow: State ex rel. v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36 , l. c. 45, 149 S. W. 451 ; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551 , l. c. 565, 203 S. W. 960 ; In re Nathan Frank, 320 Mo. 1087 , l. c. 1090, 9 S. W. (2d) 153 ; State ex rel. v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615 , 91 S. W. 905 ; 9 R.

1932By reason of this nonaction by the General Assembly and the common-law doctrine that the result of elections if declared by supervising officials, could not be re-examined judicially, and the prevalent doctrine that equity takes no cognizance of such matters, we- hold the Circuit *306 Court of Pemiscot County is without jurisdiction of the cause there pending to annul the election in contest.” "We followed this ruling in State ex rel. v. Hackman, 295 Mo. 417 , l. c. 424, 245 S. W. 554 ; Wilson v. Washington County, 247 S. W. 185 ; Boney v. Simms, 304 Mo. 369 , l. c. 376, 378, 379, 263 S. W. 41

1932By reason of this nonaction by the General Assembly and the common-law doctrine that the result of elections if declared by supervising officials, could not be re-examined judicially, and the prevalent doctrine that equity takes no cognizance of such matters, we- hold the Circuit *306 Court of Pemiscot County is without jurisdiction of the cause there pending to annul the election in contest.” "We followed this ruling in State ex rel. v. Hackman, 295 Mo. 417 , l. c. 424, 245 S. W. 554 ; Wilson v. Washington County, 247 S. W. 185 ; Boney v. Simms, 304 Mo. 369 , l. c. 376, 378, 379, 263 S. W. 41

1932Other cases in point follow: State ex rel. v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36 , l. c. 45, 149 S. W. 451 ; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551 , l. c. 565, 203 S. W. 960 ; In re Nathan Frank, 320 Mo. 1087 , l. c. 1090, 9 S. W. (2d) 153 ; State ex rel. v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615 , 91 S. W. 905 ; 9 R.

1932Other cases in point follow: State ex rel. v. Ross, 245 Mo. 36 , l. c. 45, 149 S. W. 451 ; State ex rel. v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551 , l. c. 565, 203 S. W. 960 ; In re Nathan Frank, 320 Mo. 1087 , l. c. 1090, 9 S. W. (2d) 153 ; State ex rel. v. Hough, 193 Mo. 615 , 91 S. W. 905 ; 9 R.

1910N. P. 89; Keenan v. Brown, 21 Vt. 86 .] Perhaps the prevalent rule is that mere failure to pay money when due will not warrant him to whom it is due to no longer keep his engagement and permit a recovery as though he had. [Palm v. Railroad, 18 Ill, 223.] Stipulations in commercial transactions are most apt to be treated as dependent and indivisible, on tbe theory that this course conforms to tbe intention of business men, who are accustomed to depend on prompt compliance with engagements and may be ruined by tolerating breaches.

1906The pointing out of this particular class of persons as exempt or excused from taking out a license to hunt, excludes all other classes, under the prevalent rule for construction of statutes, that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, and that nothing can be added to or deducted from the thing or class embraced in the terms of the exception. [State ex rel. v. Fisher, 119 Mo. 1 . c. 351, 24 S. W. 167 ; United States v. Dickson, 15 Peters 1 . c. 165.] And if section 54 is left out of view, the provisions of the other sections of the act (above quoted) clearly indicate that the

1906The pointing out of this particular class of persons as exempt or excused from taking out a license to hunt, excludes all other classes, under the prevalent rule for construction of statutes, that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, and that nothing can be added to or deducted from the thing or class embraced in the terms of the exception. [State ex rel. v. Fisher, 119 Mo. 1 . c. 351, 24 S. W. 167 ; United States v. Dickson, 15 Peters 1 . c. 165.] And if section 54 is left out of view, the provisions of the other sections of the act (above quoted) clearly indicate that the

1906The pointing out of this particular class of persons as exempt or excused from taking out a license to hunt, excludes all other classes, under the prevalent rule for construction of statutes, that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, and that nothing can be added to or deducted from the thing or class embraced in the terms of the exception. [State ex rel. v. Fisher, 119 Mo. 1 . c. 351, 24 S. W. 167 ; United States v. Dickson, 15 Peters 1 . c. 165.] And if section 54 is left out of view, the provisions of the other sections of the act (above quoted) clearly indicate that the

1906This rule has been approved as consonant to the Missouri statute which allows pleas in justification and in mitigation, to be contained in one answer, but separately pleaded. [Kansas City Star Co: v. Carlisle, 108 Fed. 344 ; See too Upton v. Hume, 24 Ore. 420 ; 21 L.

1905In State v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. 1 , 46 S. W. 609 , the State’s challenge for cause of a venireman who was opposed to capital punishment on circumstantial evidence, was allowed, and the ruling was approved by the Supreme Court, although the venireman swore he believed he could convict the defendant on such evidence, if his guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt; but that ‘it would take a great deal of it (i. e., circumstantial evidence), and it would have to be very strong.’ That man’s bias was like the bias of the juror challenged in this case, in that both were in a temper to resist the

1905In State v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. 1 , 46 S. W. 609 , the State’s challenge for cause of a venireman who was opposed to capital punishment on circumstantial evidence, was allowed, and the ruling was approved by the Supreme Court, although the venireman swore he believed he could convict the defendant on such evidence, if his guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt; but that ‘it would take a great deal of it (i. e., circumstantial evidence), and it would have to be very strong.’ That man’s bias was like the bias of the juror challenged in this case, in that both were in a temper to resist the

1903Donoho v. Iron Works, 7 Mo. A.pp. 447, 75 Mo. 401 ; Schmitz v. Railroad, 119 Mo. 256 ; Van Natta v. Railway, 133 Mo. 13 .

1903Donoho v. Iron Works, 7 Mo. A.pp. 447, 75 Mo. 401 ; Schmitz v. Railroad, 119 Mo. 256 ; Van Natta v. Railway, 133 Mo. 13 .

1903Donoho v. Iron Works, 7 Mo. A.pp. 447, 75 Mo. 401 ; Schmitz v. Railroad, 119 Mo. 256 ; Van Natta v. Railway, 133 Mo. 13 .

1902In which case the prevalent rule of construction in this country appears to be that if no restrictive words be used, no terms expressly or impliedly prohibiting holding over, then such continuance in official power and life is permissible and valid, until a successor be chosen,” etc. [State ex rel. v. Perkins, 139 Mo. 106 .] The same rule is announced in Dillon on Municipal Corpprations (4 Ed.), secs. 219, 220; Tiedeman on Munic.

1899It is unnecessary to go into the errors assigned except the following one: It is the prevalent rule in this State, that when a defendant is a witness; you may attack his general moral character, to wit, his reputation in order to impeach him as a witness. [State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 ; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507 ; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 ; State v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 .] But while this is so, it is equally well settled both in this State and elsewhere, that in order to impeach a witness you can not attack his character or reputation by proof of specific criminal acts. [State v. Grant, sup

1899It is unnecessary to go into the errors assigned except the following one: It is the prevalent rule in this State, that when a defendant is a witness; you may attack his general moral character, to wit, his reputation in order to impeach him as a witness. [State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 ; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507 ; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 ; State v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 .] But while this is so, it is equally well settled both in this State and elsewhere, that in order to impeach a witness you can not attack his character or reputation by proof of specific criminal acts. [State v. Grant, sup

1899It is unnecessary to go into the errors assigned except the following one: It is the prevalent rule in this State, that when a defendant is a witness; you may attack his general moral character, to wit, his reputation in order to impeach him as a witness. [State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 ; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507 ; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 ; State v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 .] But while this is so, it is equally well settled both in this State and elsewhere, that in order to impeach a witness you can not attack his character or reputation by proof of specific criminal acts. [State v. Grant, sup

1899It is unnecessary to go into the errors assigned except the following one: It is the prevalent rule in this State, that when a defendant is a witness; you may attack his general moral character, to wit, his reputation in order to impeach him as a witness. [State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 ; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507 ; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 ; State v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 .] But while this is so, it is equally well settled both in this State and elsewhere, that in order to impeach a witness you can not attack his character or reputation by proof of specific criminal acts. [State v. Grant, sup

1899It is unnecessary to go into the errors assigned except the following one: It is the prevalent rule in this State, that when a defendant is a witness; you may attack his general moral character, to wit, his reputation in order to impeach him as a witness. [State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 ; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507 ; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 ; State v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 .] But while this is so, it is equally well settled both in this State and elsewhere, that in order to impeach a witness you can not attack his character or reputation by proof of specific criminal acts. [State v. Grant, sup

1899It is unnecessary to go into the errors assigned except the following one: It is the prevalent rule in this State, that when a defendant is a witness; you may attack his general moral character, to wit, his reputation in order to impeach him as a witness. [State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 ; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507 ; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 ; State v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 .] But while this is so, it is equally well settled both in this State and elsewhere, that in order to impeach a witness you can not attack his character or reputation by proof of specific criminal acts. [State v. Grant, sup

1899It is unnecessary to go into the errors assigned except the following one: It is the prevalent rule in this State, that when a defendant is a witness; you may attack his general moral character, to wit, his reputation in order to impeach him as a witness. [State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 ; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507 ; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 ; State v. Miller, 71 Mo. 590 .] But while this is so, it is equally well settled both in this State and elsewhere, that in order to impeach a witness you can not attack his character or reputation by proof of specific criminal acts. [State v. Grant, sup

1897In which case the prevalent rule of construction in this country appears to be that if no restrictive words be used, no terms expressly or impliedly prohibiting holding over, that there such continuance in official power' and life is permissible and valid, until a successor be chosen, etc. In illustration of this may be cited the Queen v. Durham, 10 Mod. 146, where it was held that though a town clerk be “annuatim eligibilis,” he may continue town clerk, and will do so, until they choose another,” but that “ if the return had been ‘ eligibilis pro uno anno tantum’ (i. e., “ for one year only”)

1897Corp. [4 Ed.], secs. 219, 220, and cases cited; McCall v. Byram, etc., 6 Conn. 427 ; State v. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434 ; Mechem’s Pub.

1888Love v. Miller, 53 Ind. 294 ; Rice v. Mayo, 107 Mass. 550 ; Veazie v. Parker, 72 Me. 443 ; Goss v. Stevens, 32 Minn. 472 ; Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush [Ky.] 358; Keyes v. Johnson, 68 Pa. St. 42; D uclose v. Kissick, 102 N. Y. 678 ; Knapp v. Wallace, 41 N. Y. 477 ; Gonzales v. Brood, 57 Cal. 224 ; McCrary v. Green, 38 Mich. 184, 185 ; Sheperd v. Hedden, 5 Dutch. [N. J.

1888Love v. Miller, 53 Ind. 294 ; Rice v. Mayo, 107 Mass. 550 ; Veazie v. Parker, 72 Me. 443 ; Goss v. Stevens, 32 Minn. 472 ; Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush [Ky.] 358; Keyes v. Johnson, 68 Pa. St. 42; D uclose v. Kissick, 102 N. Y. 678 ; Knapp v. Wallace, 41 N. Y. 477 ; Gonzales v. Brood, 57 Cal. 224 ; McCrary v. Green, 38 Mich. 184, 185 ; Sheperd v. Hedden, 5 Dutch. [N. J.

1888Love v. Miller, 53 Ind. 294 ; Rice v. Mayo, 107 Mass. 550 ; Veazie v. Parker, 72 Me. 443 ; Goss v. Stevens, 32 Minn. 472 ; Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush [Ky.] 358; Keyes v. Johnson, 68 Pa. St. 42; D uclose v. Kissick, 102 N. Y. 678 ; Knapp v. Wallace, 41 N. Y. 477 ; Gonzales v. Brood, 57 Cal. 224 ; McCrary v. Green, 38 Mich. 184, 185 ; Sheperd v. Hedden, 5 Dutch. [N. J.