constitutional sovereign immunity in New Mexico

2016See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 13 (“[I]t is within the sole province of the Legislature to waive the State’s constitutional sovereign immunity.”).

2016In Cockrell, this Court stated “that any waiver of the State’s constitutional sovereign immunity must be clear and unambiguous.” 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 24 .

2004If left intact, that analysis would inappropriately extend our state constitutional sovereign immunity beyond what is necessary to protect New Mexico's core sovereign interests, and beyond the bounds of "good faith" and the federalist compact, as described by the United States Supreme Court in Alden and by this Court in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 28 , 132 N.M. 156 , 45 P.3d 876 ("[C]onstitutional sovereign immunity `does not bar certain actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief.'") (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 757 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 ). {14} Although a state's constitutio

2004If left intact, that analysis would inappropriately extend our state constitutional sovereign immunity beyond what is necessary to protect New Mexico's core sovereign interests, and beyond the bounds of "good faith" and the federalist compact, as described by the United States Supreme Court in Alden and by this Court in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 28 , 132 N.M. 156 , 45 P.3d 876 ("[C]onstitutional sovereign immunity `does not bar certain actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief.'") (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 757 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 ). {14} Although a state's constitutio

2014Contrary to Plaintiffs argument, we conclude that the statutes relied on by Plaintiff do not meet the requisite specificity required to determine that the Legislature has intended to waive the State’s constitutional sovereign immunity to private USERRA suits for damages. {20} A state’s waiver of its constitutional sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“[W]e will find waiver only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from th

2014Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, we conclude that the statutes relied on by Plaintiff do not meet the requisite specificity required to determine that the Legislature has intended to waive the State’s constitutional sovereign immunity to private USERRA suits for damages. {20} A state’s waiver of its constitutional sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“[W]e will find waiver only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from t

2014Contrary to Plaintiffs argument, we conclude that the statutes relied on by Plaintiff do not meet the requisite specificity required to determine that the Legislature has intended to waive the State’s constitutional sovereign immunity to private USERRA suits for damages. {20} A state’s waiver of its constitutional sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“[W]e will find waiver only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from th

2014Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, we conclude that the statutes relied on by Plaintiff do not meet the requisite specificity required to determine that the Legislature has intended to waive the State’s constitutional sovereign immunity to private USERRA suits for damages. {20} A state’s waiver of its constitutional sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (“[W]e will find waiver only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from t

2012Thus, if this action is based on 20 U.S.C. § 7709 , as the State claims, it would be barred under the doctrine of constitutional sovereign immunity. {11} As United States Supreme Court Justice Cardozo said: "Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 115 , 57 S.Ct. 96 , 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936).

2012Thus, if this action is based on 20 U.S.C. § 7709 , as the State claims, it would be barred under the doctrine of constitutional sovereign immunity. {11} As United States Supreme Court Justice Cardozo said: "Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit." Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 115 , 57 S.Ct. 96 , 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936).

2004Unlike the decision "to do away with common law principles," [ Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 590 , 544 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1975)], which is within this Court's power, the decision to waive this State's constitutional sovereign immunity would represent an alteration of the constitutional balance of power between the Federal Government and the State of New Mexico that was struck by the Supreme Court in Alden [v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999)].

2004Unlike the decision "to do away with common law principles," [ Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 590 , 544 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1975)], which is within this Court's power, the decision to waive this State's constitutional sovereign immunity would represent an alteration of the constitutional balance of power between the Federal Government and the State of New Mexico that was struck by the Supreme Court in Alden [v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999)].

2004See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment, § 5 authority, in enacting the enforcement provisions of the ADEA).

2004See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment, § 5 authority, in enacting the enforcement provisions of the ADEA).

2004We sua sponte raised sovereign immunity because we are persuaded that the State’s sovereign immunity as discussed in Cockrell is not merely immunity from liability for damages, it is immunity from a suit seeking such damages, see Handmaker v. Henney, 1999-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 12-14 , 128 N.M. 328 , 992 P.2d 879 (contrasting State’s immunity from suit on unwritten contract with State’s immunity from liability under Tort Claims Act); and, that reaching the merits of a federal claim that is barred by the State’s sovereign immunity deprives the State of its “entitlement not to ... face the ... burdens of

2004We sua sponte raised sovereign immunity because we are persuaded that the State’s sovereign immunity as discussed in Cockrell is not merely immunity from liability for damages, it is immunity from a suit seeking such damages, see Handmaker v. Henney, 1999-NMSC-043, ¶¶ 12-14 , 128 N.M. 328 , 992 P.2d 879 (contrasting State’s immunity from suit on unwritten contract with State’s immunity from liability under Tort Claims Act); and, that reaching the merits of a federal claim that is barred by the State’s sovereign immunity deprives the State of its “entitlement not to ... face the ... burdens of

2002See Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 597 , 830 P.2d at 149 (“[W]e cannot agree ... that Hicks’s sweeping abolition of sovereign immunity carried away all defenses of governmental entities, based on their role as state-created entities, regardless of the nature of the claims asserted or the relief sought.”). {13} Indeed, being presented with this issue for the first time, we do not believe that it is within this Court’s province to decide whether the State should subject itself to liability for a federal claim filed in state court.

2002See Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 597 , 830 P.2d at 149 (“[W]e cannot agree ... that Hicks’s sweeping abolition of sovereign immunity carried away all defenses of governmental entities, based on their role as state-created entities, regardless of the nature of the claims asserted or the relief sought.”). {13} Indeed, being presented with this issue for the first time, we do not believe that it is within this Court’s province to decide whether the State should subject itself to liability for a federal claim filed in state court.

2002See Connelly v. State, 26 P.3d 1246, 1259 (Kan.2001) (“The consent to suit or waiver of sovereign immunity must be based on State action which we deem to be legislative enactments expressing the will of elected officials and cannot be based on acts of agents.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 813 , 151 L.Ed.2d 698 (2002).

2002See Connelly v. State, 26 P.3d 1246, 1259 (Kan.2001) (“The consent to suit or waiver of sovereign immunity must be based on State action which we deem to be legislative enactments expressing the will of elected officials and cannot be based on acts of agents.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 813 , 151 L.Ed.2d 698 (2002).

2002See Connelly v. State, 26 P.3d 1246, 1259 (Kan.2001) (“The consent to suit or waiver of sovereign immunity must be based on State action which we deem to be legislative enactments expressing the will of elected officials and cannot be based on acts of agents.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 813 , 151 L.Ed.2d 698 (2002).

2002See generally Dick v. Merillat, 139 Ohio App.3d 716 , 745 N.E.2d 507, 510 (2000) (discussing a statute that expressly exempts from immunity “civil claims based upon alleged violations of the constitution or statutes of the United States”).

2002See generally Dick v. Merillat, 139 Ohio App.3d 716 , 745 N.E.2d 507, 510 (2000) (discussing a statute that expressly exempts from immunity “civil claims based upon alleged violations of the constitution or statutes of the United States”).