case from the general rule in New York

1998Defendant has not alleged any conduct by plaintiffs that would remove this case from the general rule that parents are not liable to their children for their negligent failure to provide adequate supervision (see, Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35, 40-41 ; Burgess v Cappola, 251 AD2d 1001 ; Navaro v Ieraci, 214 AD2d 713, 714 ).

1997The defendant third-party plaintiff Brooklyn Union Gas Company has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct required of a parent to exclude this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzola, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1997The amendment was, in essence, a clarification of the earlier law, and does not present a question of bad faith such as would remove this case from the general rule (see, Matter of Pokoik v Selsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Buffolino v Board of Zoning & Appeals, supra).

1988Furthermore, the record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (see, Matter of Amsterdam-Manhattan Assocs. v Joy, 42 NY2d 941 ; Matter of Pokoik v Silsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Aversano v Two Family Use Bd., 117 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Golisano v Town Bd., 31 AD2d 85 ).

1998Defendant has not alleged any conduct by plaintiffs that would remove this case from the general rule that parents are not liable to their children for their negligent failure to provide adequate supervision (see, Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35, 40-41 ; Burgess v Cappola, 251 AD2d 1001 ; Navaro v Ieraci, 214 AD2d 713, 714 ).

1995The defendants’ proposed amended answer failed to allege "the type of affirmative conduct needed by a parent to remove this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable” (Navaro v Ieraci, 214 AD2d 713, 714 ).

1997The defendant third-party plaintiff Brooklyn Union Gas Company has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct required of a parent to exclude this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzola, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1995The defendant has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct needed by a parent to remove this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzolla, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1997The defendant third-party plaintiff Brooklyn Union Gas Company has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct required of a parent to exclude this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzola, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1995The defendant has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct needed by a parent to remove this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzolla, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1997The defendant third-party plaintiff Brooklyn Union Gas Company has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct required of a parent to exclude this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzola, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1995The defendant has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct needed by a parent to remove this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzolla, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1997The defendant third-party plaintiff Brooklyn Union Gas Company has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct required of a parent to exclude this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzola, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1995The defendant has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct needed by a parent to remove this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzolla, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1997The defendant third-party plaintiff Brooklyn Union Gas Company has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct required of a parent to exclude this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzola, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1995The defendant has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct needed by a parent to remove this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzolla, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1997The defendant third-party plaintiff Brooklyn Union Gas Company has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct required of a parent to exclude this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzola, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1995The defendant has not alleged, and the record does not reveal, the type of affirmative conduct needed by a parent to remove this case from the general rule that mere negligent supervision of a child is not actionable (see, 2C Warren’s New York Negligence § 80.02 [3] [a]; Nolechek v Gesuale, 46 NY2d 332 ; Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35 ; Young v Greenberg, 181 AD2d 492 ; Grivas v Grivas, 113 AD2d 264 ; Acquaviva v Piazzolla, 100 AD2d 502 ; Goedkoop v Ward Pavement Corp., 51 AD2d 542 ; Morales v Moss, 44 AD2d 687 ).

1988Furthermore, the record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (see, Matter of Amsterdam-Manhattan Assocs. v Joy, 42 NY2d 941 ; Matter of Pokoik v Silsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Aversano v Two Family Use Bd., 117 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Golisano v Town Bd., 31 AD2d 85 ).

1987The record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (see, Matter of Amsterdam-Manhattan Assocs. v Joy, 42 NY2d 941 ; Matter of Pokoik v Silsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Aversano v Two Family Use Bd., 117 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Golisano v Town Bd., 31 AD2d 85 ).

1988Furthermore, the record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (see, Matter of Amsterdam-Manhattan Assocs. v Joy, 42 NY2d 941 ; Matter of Pokoik v Silsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Aversano v Two Family Use Bd., 117 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Golisano v Town Bd., 31 AD2d 85 ).

1987The record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (see, Matter of Amsterdam-Manhattan Assocs. v Joy, 42 NY2d 941 ; Matter of Pokoik v Silsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Aversano v Two Family Use Bd., 117 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Golisano v Town Bd., 31 AD2d 85 ).

1988Furthermore, the record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (see, Matter of Amsterdam-Manhattan Assocs. v Joy, 42 NY2d 941 ; Matter of Pokoik v Silsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Aversano v Two Family Use Bd., 117 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Golisano v Town Bd., 31 AD2d 85 ).

1987The record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (see, Matter of Amsterdam-Manhattan Assocs. v Joy, 42 NY2d 941 ; Matter of Pokoik v Silsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Aversano v Two Family Use Bd., 117 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Golisano v Town Bd., 31 AD2d 85 ).

1998Defendant has not alleged any conduct by plaintiffs that would remove this case from the general rule that parents are not liable to their children for their negligent failure to provide adequate supervision (see, Holodook v Spencer, 36 NY2d 35, 40-41 ; Burgess v Cappola, 251 AD2d 1001 ; Navaro v Ieraci, 214 AD2d 713, 714 ).

1997The amendment was, in essence, a clarification of the earlier law, and does not present a question of bad faith such as would remove this case from the general rule (see, Matter of Pokoik v Selsdorf, 40 NY2d 769 ; Matter of Buffolino v Board of Zoning & Appeals, supra).

1993Inasmuch as the Board’s determination constitutes a credibility determination within its sole province to resolve (see, e.g., Matter of Baker [Hartnett], 147 AD2d 790 , appeal dismissed 74 NY2d 714 ) and is otherwise supported by substantial evidence, we find lacking the existence of any basis for us to disturb these findings.

1990The absence of such an express limitation is ordinarily fatal to a breach of contract cause of action (see, Rosen v Vassar Coll., 135 AD2d 248 , lv denied 72 NY2d 805 ; Brumbach v Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 126 AD2d 841 ), but plaintiff alleges that he received certain oral assurances which remove this case from the general rule.

1990The absence of such an express limitation is ordinarily fatal to a breach of contract cause of action (see, Rosen v Vassar Coll., 135 AD2d 248 , lv denied 72 NY2d 805 ; Brumbach v Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 126 AD2d 841 ), but plaintiff alleges that he received certain oral assurances which remove this case from the general rule.

1989Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (Matter of Mascony Transp. & Ferry Serv. v Richmond, 71 AD2d 896 , affd 49 NY2d 969 ; Matter of West Lane Props, v Lombardi, 139 AD2d 748 ).

1989Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (Matter of Mascony Transp. & Ferry Serv. v Richmond, 71 AD2d 896 , affd 49 NY2d 969 ; Matter of West Lane Props, v Lombardi, 139 AD2d 748 ).

1989We have reviewed the plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them to be without merit (Matter of West Lane Props, v Lombardi, supra; Tilles Inv.

1989Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the record contains no "special facts” which would except this case from the general rule that a case must be decided on the law as it exists at the time of the decision (Matter of Mascony Transp. & Ferry Serv. v Richmond, 71 AD2d 896 , affd 49 NY2d 969 ; Matter of West Lane Props, v Lombardi, 139 AD2d 748 ).

1987Moreover, there is no merit to the plaintiffs’ contention that the respondent’s decision to reduce the water pressure in the pumping station during off-peak hours constituted an "affirmative act” which removes this case from the general rule of nonliability with respect to governmental agencies (see, Blancovitch v City of New York, 131 AD2d 418 ).

1958This distinguishes this case from the general rule which may be applicable (cf. Totoritus v. Stefan, 6 A D 2d 123, affg. 10 Misc 2d 881 ; Nadav v. Kozlowski, 15 Misc 2d 343 ).

1958This distinguishes this case from the general rule which may be applicable (cf. Totoritus v. Stefan, 6 A D 2d 123, affg. 10 Misc 2d 881 ; Nadav v. Kozlowski, 15 Misc 2d 343 ).

1930In Field v. Empire Case Goods Co. ( 179 App. Div. 253 ) it was held: “ It is clear, therefore, that an action cannot be maintained upon the facts alleged in the complaint, which do not remove the case from the general rule that an action for negligence cannot be mavn tained by a third person against the manufacturer of an article not in and of itself imminently and inherently dangerous.” (Italics are the writer’s.) It seems to us, therefore, where, as in this case, there is an entire absence of privity of contract between the manufacturer of the toy and the plaintiff there can be no recovery f

1920The court said in Matter of Stevens ( 187 N. Y. 471, 477 ): “ We, therefore, adhere to the rule declared in the Baker case, that in the absence of a clear direction in the will to the contrary, where investments are made by the trustee, the principal must be maintained intact from loss by payment of premium on securities having only a definite term to ran, while if the bonds are received from the estate of the testator, then the rale in the McLouth case prevails, and the whole interest should be treated as income.

1891Similar language was considered and construed in Delafield v. Shipman, 103 N. Y. 463 , 9 N. E.