excellent analysis in Ohio

2013Licking App. No.2006-CA-41, 2006-Ohio-5823, ¶ 54 . {¶9} As was noted in Firouzmandi, an excellent analysis of the misconception surrounding the concept of "abuse of discretion" was set forth by the Arizona Supreme Court sitting en banc: The phrase “within the discretion of the trial court” is often used but the reason for that phrase being applied to certain issues is seldom examined.

2010State v. Firouzmandi, Licking App. No. 2006-CA-41, 2006-Ohio-5823 , 2006 WL 3185175 , at ¶ 54. {¶ 21} As we noted in Firouzmandi, an excellent analysis of the misconception surrounding the concept of “abuse of discretion” was set forth by the Arizona Supreme Court sitting en banc: “The phrase ‘within the discretion of the trial court’ is often used but the reason for that phrase being applied to certain issues is seldom examined.

2013I agree with the majority’s excellent analysis of the other-acts evidence the trial court allowed into evidence and likewise conclude that the trial court erred in its admission pursuant to State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521 , 2012-Ohio-5695 , 983 N.E.2d 1278 . {¶127} I cannot find, however, that the admission of the other-acts evidence was harmless error.

2013I agree with the majority’s excellent analysis of the other-acts evidence the trial court allowed into evidence and likewise conclude that the trial court erred in its admission pursuant to State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521 , 2012-Ohio-5695 , 983 N.E.2d 1278 . {¶127} I cannot find, however, that the admission of the other-acts evidence was harmless error.

1998(July 10, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950887, unreported, 1996 WL 382965 . 4 . (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 829, 833 , 615 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 . 5 . (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 72 , 75 O.O.2d 150 , 346 N.E.2d 151 . 6 . (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 99 , 26 OBR 274, 498 N.E.2d 204 .

1998(July 10, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950887, unreported, 1996 WL 382965 . 4 . (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 829, 833 , 615 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 . 5 . (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 72 , 75 O.O.2d 150 , 346 N.E.2d 151 . 6 . (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 99 , 26 OBR 274, 498 N.E.2d 204 .

1998(July 10, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950887, unreported, 1996 WL 382965 . 4 . (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 829, 833 , 615 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 . 5 . (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 72 , 75 O.O.2d 150 , 346 N.E.2d 151 . 6 . (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 99 , 26 OBR 274, 498 N.E.2d 204 .

1998(July 10, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950887, unreported, 1996 WL 382965 . 4 . (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 829, 833 , 615 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 . 5 . (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 72 , 75 O.O.2d 150 , 346 N.E.2d 151 . 6 . (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 99 , 26 OBR 274, 498 N.E.2d 204 .

1998For an excellent analysis of the development of the law in this area, see State v. Myers (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 376 , 695 N.E.2d 327 . 3 .

1998For an excellent analysis of the development of the law in this area, see State v. Myers (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 376 , 695 N.E.2d 327 . 3 .

1998(July 10, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950887, unreported, 1996 WL 382965 . 4 . (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 829, 833 , 615 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 . 5 . (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 72 , 75 O.O.2d 150 , 346 N.E.2d 151 . 6 . (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 99 , 26 OBR 274, 498 N.E.2d 204 .

1998(July 10, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950887, unreported, 1996 WL 382965 . 4 . (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 829, 833 , 615 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 . 5 . (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 72 , 75 O.O.2d 150 , 346 N.E.2d 151 . 6 . (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 99 , 26 OBR 274, 498 N.E.2d 204 .

1997An excellent test of the application of the statute in this case can be found in State v. Conger (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 91, 96 , 646 N.E.2d 238 , 241: “In construing a statute, a court’s paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.

1997An excellent test of the application of the statute in this case can be found in State v. Conger (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 91, 96 , 646 N.E.2d 238 , 241: “In construing a statute, a court’s paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.

1997State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594 , 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 .

1997State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594 , 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 .

1989Relations Bd. (1986), 26 Ohio St. 3d 50 , 26 OBR 42, 496 N.E. 2d 983 .

1989Relations Bd. (1986), 26 Ohio St. 3d 50 , 26 OBR 42, 496 N.E. 2d 983 .

1988I. duPont de Nemours & Co. (1985), 101 N.J. 161 , 501 A. 2d 505 , developed an excellent analysis in this area and established criteria which are worthy of note and reference by this court. 21 Therein, the court considered those “categories of employer conduct [which] will be sufficiently flagrant so as to constitute an ‘intentional wrong,’ thereby entitling a plaintiff to avoid the ‘exclusivity’ bar * * *.

1988I. duPont de Nemours & Co. (1985), 101 N.J. 161 , 501 A. 2d 505 , developed an excellent analysis in this area and established criteria which are worthy of note and reference by this court. 21 Therein, the court considered those “categories of employer conduct [which] will be sufficiently flagrant so as to constitute an ‘intentional wrong,’ thereby entitling a plaintiff to avoid the ‘exclusivity’ bar * * *.

1988An excellent analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of instruction is found in United States v. Tsanas (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 340 , certiorari denied (1978), 435 U.S. 995 , and is quoted here with approval: “The instruction given here [requiring unanimity] has the merit, from the Government’s standpoint, of tending to avoid the danger that the jury will not adequately discharge its duties with respect to the greater offense, and instead will move too quickly to the lesser one.

1988An excellent analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each type of instruction is found in United States v. Tsanas (C.A. 2, 1978), 572 F. 2d 340 , certiorari denied (1978), 435 U.S. 995 , and is quoted here with approval: “The instruction given here [requiring unanimity] has the merit, from the Government’s standpoint, of tending to avoid the danger that the jury will not adequately discharge its duties with respect to the greater offense, and instead will move too quickly to the lesser one.

1985(Cincinnati Daily Tribune Co. v. Bruck [1900], 61 Ohio St. 489 ; Woodruff v. Paschen [1922], 105 Ohio St. 396 ; Melanowski v. Judy [1921], 102 Ohio St. 153 ; and Levering v. National Bank [1912], 87 Ohio St. 117 , approved and followed.)” To adopt a syllabus in any case a vote of four justices for the proposed syllabus is required.

1984Mitchell, v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 481 , cited in the per curiam opinion, contains an excellent standard for the commission to follow: to state specifically the evidence on which it relied and the reasons the claimant is or is not entitled to the benefits requested.

1972In the excellent analysis of the principle of unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty by Judge Potter in State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79 at p. 83 , and paraphrasing his apt language therein, the challenged regulation LCc-1-52, to be valid, must describe an act which is “definable,” and it is required to be definable “if we are to elude the ‘vice of vagueness’ ” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ) and “if we are to prevent the trier of the cause from creating his own standard in each case” (Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 ; Smith

1972In the excellent analysis of the principle of unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty by Judge Potter in State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79 at p. 83 , and paraphrasing his apt language therein, the challenged regulation LCc-1-52, to be valid, must describe an act which is “definable,” and it is required to be definable “if we are to elude the ‘vice of vagueness’ ” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ) and “if we are to prevent the trier of the cause from creating his own standard in each case” (Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 ; Smith

1972In the excellent analysis of the principle of unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty by Judge Potter in State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79 at p. 83 , and paraphrasing his apt language therein, the challenged regulation LCc-1-52, to be valid, must describe an act which is “definable,” and it is required to be definable “if we are to elude the ‘vice of vagueness’ ” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ) and “if we are to prevent the trier of the cause from creating his own standard in each case” (Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 ; Smith

1972In the excellent analysis of the principle of unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty by Judge Potter in State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79 at p. 83 , and paraphrasing his apt language therein, the challenged regulation LCc-1-52, to be valid, must describe an act which is “definable,” and it is required to be definable “if we are to elude the ‘vice of vagueness’ ” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ) and “if we are to prevent the trier of the cause from creating his own standard in each case” (Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 ; Smith

1972In the excellent analysis of the principle of unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty by Judge Potter in State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79 at p. 83 , and paraphrasing his apt language therein, the challenged regulation LCc-1-52, to be valid, must describe an act which is “definable,” and it is required to be definable “if we are to elude the ‘vice of vagueness’ ” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ) and “if we are to prevent the trier of the cause from creating his own standard in each case” (Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 ; Smith

1972In the excellent analysis of the principle of unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty by Judge Potter in State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79 at p. 83 , and paraphrasing his apt language therein, the challenged regulation LCc-1-52, to be valid, must describe an act which is “definable,” and it is required to be definable “if we are to elude the ‘vice of vagueness’ ” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ) and “if we are to prevent the trier of the cause from creating his own standard in each case” (Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 ; Smith

1972In the excellent analysis of the principle of unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty by Judge Potter in State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79 at p. 83 , and paraphrasing his apt language therein, the challenged regulation LCc-1-52, to be valid, must describe an act which is “definable,” and it is required to be definable “if we are to elude the ‘vice of vagueness’ ” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ) and “if we are to prevent the trier of the cause from creating his own standard in each case” (Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 ; Smith

1972In the excellent analysis of the principle of unconstitutional vagueness and uncertainty by Judge Potter in State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App. 2d 79 at p. 83 , and paraphrasing his apt language therein, the challenged regulation LCc-1-52, to be valid, must describe an act which is “definable,” and it is required to be definable “if we are to elude the ‘vice of vagueness’ ” (Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 ) and “if we are to prevent the trier of the cause from creating his own standard in each case” (Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 ; Smith

1952The appellee herein insists that the law of this case has been heretofore decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Coal Company v. Cardox, 152 Ohio St., 437 , when it stated at page 447: “ ‘The petition alleges that defendant was licensed to transact business in Ohio as a foreign corporation.