fact-based inquiry in Oregon

2025Id. at 174 n 7 (citing Bolduc, 238 Or App at 6301 ).

2020It is the dominant estate owner’s burden to demon- strate a “substantial” or “unreasonable” interference with their right to use the easement, which “turns on whether the conduct of the servient estate owners deprived the dominant estate owners of a degree of use to which they were entitled by the easement.”7 Craft v. Weakland, 174 Or App 185, 189 , 23 P3d 413 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Although that generally is a fact-based inquiry, Bolduc, 238 Or App at 630 , as noted above, in this case, it reduces to a purely legal issue—whether, Cite as 306 Or App 167 (2020) 175 As rele

2011See, e.g., United Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 307 Or 428, 431 , 770 P2d 43 (1989) (“[W]hen this court evaluates and then either accepts or rejects various theories of valuation offered by the parties, it almost always does so as a finder of fact on de novo review of the record made in the Tax Court.”); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 286 Or 529, 533 , 596 P2d 912 (1979) (“[WJhether in any given assessment one [valuation] approach should be used exclusive of the others or is preferable to another or to a combination of approaches is a question of fact to be determined by the

2011See, e.g., United Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 307 Or 428, 431 , 770 P2d 43 (1989) (“[W]hen this court evaluates and then either accepts or rejects various theories of valuation offered by the parties, it almost always does so as a finder of fact on de novo review of the record made in the Tax Court.”); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 286 Or 529, 533 , 596 P2d 912 (1979) (“[WJhether in any given assessment one [valuation] approach should be used exclusive of the others or is preferable to another or to a combination of approaches is a question of fact to be determined by the

2020It is the dominant estate owner’s burden to demon- strate a “substantial” or “unreasonable” interference with their right to use the easement, which “turns on whether the conduct of the servient estate owners deprived the dominant estate owners of a degree of use to which they were entitled by the easement.”7 Craft v. Weakland, 174 Or App 185, 189 , 23 P3d 413 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Although that generally is a fact-based inquiry, Bolduc, 238 Or App at 630 , as noted above, in this case, it reduces to a purely legal issue—whether, Cite as 306 Or App 167 (2020) 175 As rele

2020It is the dominant estate owner’s burden to demon- strate a “substantial” or “unreasonable” interference with their right to use the easement, which “turns on whether the conduct of the servient estate owners deprived the dominant estate owners of a degree of use to which they were entitled by the easement.”7 Craft v. Weakland, 174 Or App 185, 189 , 23 P3d 413 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Although that generally is a fact-based inquiry, Bolduc, 238 Or App at 630 , as noted above, in this case, it reduces to a purely legal issue—whether, Cite as 306 Or App 167 (2020) 175 As rele

2020In support of that position, they rely primarily on Craft and Clark v. Kuhn, 171 Or App 29 , 15 P3d 37 (2000).

2020In support of that position, they rely primarily on Craft and Clark v. Kuhn, 171 Or App 29 , 15 P3d 37 (2000).

2020It is the dominant estate owner’s burden to demon- strate a “substantial” or “unreasonable” interference with their right to use the easement, which “turns on whether the conduct of the servient estate owners deprived the dominant estate owners of a degree of use to which they were entitled by the easement.”7 Craft v. Weakland, 174 Or App 185, 189 , 23 P3d 413 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Although that generally is a fact-based inquiry, Bolduc, 238 Or App at 630 , as noted above, in this case, it reduces to a purely legal issue—whether, Cite as 306 Or App 167 (2020) 175 As rele

2018The scope of an invitation to be on or to use property is inherently a fact-based inquiry that is affected by property-law principles, see State v. Howard/Dawson , 342 Or. 635 , 642, 157 P.3d 1189 (2007) (recognizing that property law bears on Article I, section 9, privacy interests), and societal norms, see State v. Mast , 250 Or.

2018The scope of an invitation to be on or to use property is inherently a fact-based inquiry that is affected by property-law principles, see State v. Howard/Dawson , 342 Or. 635 , 642, 157 P.3d 1189 (2007) (recognizing that property law bears on Article I, section 9, privacy interests), and societal norms, see State v. Mast , 250 Or.

2018The scope of an invitation to be on or to use property is inherently a fact-based inquiry that is affected by property-law principles, see State v. Howard/Dawson , 342 Or. 635 , 642, 157 P.3d 1189 (2007) (recognizing that property law bears on Article I, section 9, privacy interests), and societal norms, see State v. Mast , 250 Or.

2014Although a trial court’s valuation of a business asset most commonly includes consideration of expert testimony, see Salgado and Salgado, 258 Or App 557 , 310 P3d 731 (2013), that is not always the case.

2014Although a trial court’s valuation of a business asset most commonly includes consideration of expert testimony, see Salgado and Salgado, 258 Or App 557 , 310 P3d 731 (2013), that is not always the case.

2011City of Bend, 242 Or App at 20 .

2002For example, in Reiling, the court applied a 25 percent discount to a minority interest in a closely held corporation because expert testimony in the case established that the “minority interests in closely held corporations are generally at the so-to-speak mercy of the other stockholders.” 66 Or App at 291 .

2002In support of his argument that there must be a sale contemplated or possible in order to justify the application of a discount, husband cites several cases in which we held that a marketability discount was inappropriate. 2 However, we have emphasized that “ Valuation is a fact-based analysis necessarily taken on a case-by-case basis.’ ” Batt and Batt, 149 Or App 517, 524 , 945 P2d 517 , rev den, 326 Or 233 (1997) (quoting Tofte and Tofte, 134 Or App 449 , 457 n 5, 895 P2d 1387 (1995)).

2002In support of his argument that there must be a sale contemplated or possible in order to justify the application of a discount, husband cites several cases in which we held that a marketability discount was inappropriate. 2 However, we have emphasized that “ Valuation is a fact-based analysis necessarily taken on a case-by-case basis.’ ” Batt and Batt, 149 Or App 517, 524 , 945 P2d 517 , rev den, 326 Or 233 (1997) (quoting Tofte and Tofte, 134 Or App 449 , 457 n 5, 895 P2d 1387 (1995)).

1997As we said in Tofte: “We are mindful of the fact that both Barlow [and Barlow, 111 Or App 179 , 826 P2d 18 , rev den 313 Or 299 (1992)] and Webber and Webber, [ 99 Or App 703 , 784 P2d 111 (1989), on recons] 102 Or App 93 , 792 P2d 484 , rev den 310 Or 282 (1990), have been construed by practitioners as establishing a requirement that there be evidence of a prospective sale to justify application of a marketability and/or minority discount to the value of a closely held corporation’s shares.

1997As we said in Tofte: “We are mindful of the fact that both Barlow [and Barlow, 111 Or App 179 , 826 P2d 18 , rev den 313 Or 299 (1992)] and Webber and Webber, [ 99 Or App 703 , 784 P2d 111 (1989), on recons] 102 Or App 93 , 792 P2d 484 , rev den 310 Or 282 (1990), have been construed by practitioners as establishing a requirement that there be evidence of a prospective sale to justify application of a marketability and/or minority discount to the value of a closely held corporation’s shares.

1997As we said in Tofte: “We are mindful of the fact that both Barlow [and Barlow, 111 Or App 179 , 826 P2d 18 , rev den 313 Or 299 (1992)] and Webber and Webber, [ 99 Or App 703 , 784 P2d 111 (1989), on recons] 102 Or App 93 , 792 P2d 484 , rev den 310 Or 282 (1990), have been construed by practitioners as establishing a requirement that there be evidence of a prospective sale to justify application of a marketability and/or minority discount to the value of a closely held corporation’s shares.

1997As we said in Tofte: “We are mindful of the fact that both Barlow [and Barlow, 111 Or App 179 , 826 P2d 18 , rev den 313 Or 299 (1992)] and Webber and Webber, [ 99 Or App 703 , 784 P2d 111 (1989), on recons] 102 Or App 93 , 792 P2d 484 , rev den 310 Or 282 (1990), have been construed by practitioners as establishing a requirement that there be evidence of a prospective sale to justify application of a marketability and/or minority discount to the value of a closely held corporation’s shares.

1997As we said in Tofte: “We are mindful of the fact that both Barlow [and Barlow, 111 Or App 179 , 826 P2d 18 , rev den 313 Or 299 (1992)] and Webber and Webber, [ 99 Or App 703 , 784 P2d 111 (1989), on recons] 102 Or App 93 , 792 P2d 484 , rev den 310 Or 282 (1990), have been construed by practitioners as establishing a requirement that there be evidence of a prospective sale to justify application of a marketability and/or minority discount to the value of a closely held corporation’s shares.

1997As we said in Tofte: “We are mindful of the fact that both Barlow [and Barlow, 111 Or App 179 , 826 P2d 18 , rev den 313 Or 299 (1992)] and Webber and Webber, [ 99 Or App 703 , 784 P2d 111 (1989), on recons] 102 Or App 93 , 792 P2d 484 , rev den 310 Or 282 (1990), have been construed by practitioners as establishing a requirement that there be evidence of a prospective sale to justify application of a marketability and/or minority discount to the value of a closely held corporation’s shares.