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16 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Calabretta, C. v. Guidi Homes Inc.green2 sentences2025See Yorty, 79 A.3d at 660 ; see Calabretta, 241 A.3d at 443 (finding appellate review under collateral review doctrine inappropriate where review of issue would require a fact-based inquiry). 2021Id. at 443 (citation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Collier, J. v. National Penn Bankgreen2 sentences2020See Collier, 128 A.3d at 312 . 2020See Collier, 128 A.3d at 312 . | 3 | 3 |
Yorty v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.green2 sentences2026See Yorty, 79 A.3d at 660 ; see Calabretta, 241 A.3d at 443 (finding appellate review under collateral review doctrine inappropriate where review of issue would require a fact-based inquiry). 2025See Yorty, 79 A.3d at 660 ; see Calabretta, 241 A.3d at 443 (finding appellate review under collateral review doctrine inappropriate where review of issue would require a fact-based inquiry). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Spennygreen2 sentences2020See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714 (defining “crime of violence” as including “burglary as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1) (relating to burglary)”); Spenny, 128 A.3d at 249-50 (holding, “by amending section 9714(g) to remove any factual analysis of the prior, out-of-state conviction,” it appears that “the Legislature did so with the intent of adopting the Supreme Court’s strict- elements interpretation” (emphasis added)). 2020See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714 (defining “crime of violence” as including “burglary as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1) (relating to burglary)”); Spenny, 128 A.3d at 249-50 (holding, “by amending section 9714(g) to remove any factual analysis of the prior, out-of-state conviction,” it appears that “the Legislature did so with the intent of adopting the Supreme Court’s strict- elements interpretation” (emphasis added)). | 2 | 2 |
Doe v. School Bd. of Broward County, Fla.green1 sentence2014Bd. of Broward Cty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir.2010) (noting issue of who is an appropriate person is "necessarily a fact-based inquiry because officials’ roles vary among school districts”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). . | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Delaware Valley Auto Spring Co.green1 sentence1997See, e.g., Smith v. Delaware Valley Auto Spring Co., 642 F.Supp. 1112 (E.D.Pa.1986). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Samuel
green
2 sentences2020“This very specific and deliberate method of defining crimes of violence in Section 9714 demonstrates the Legislature’s clear intent that with respect to all crimes except burglary, the focus is on the crime for which the defendant was convicted, not the factual scenario underlying that crime.”9 Id. ____________________________________________ 9 We acknowledge that in Commonwealth v. Samuel, 961 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2008), our Supreme Court construed the pre-2012 version of Section 9714(g), which had defined “crime of violence” as including “burglary of a structure adapted for overnight accommodation 2020“This very specific and deliberate method of defining crimes of violence in Section 9714 demonstrates the Legislature’s clear intent that with respect to all crimes except burglary, the focus is on the crime for which the defendant was convicted, not the factual scenario underlying that crime.”9 Id. ____________________________________________ 9 We acknowledge that in Commonwealth v. Samuel, 961 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2008), our Supreme Court construed the pre-2012 version of Section 9714(g), which had defined “crime of violence” as including “burglary of a structure adapted for overnight accommodation | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Northrip
green
2 sentences2020Instead, it explicitly directs the sentencing court to apply a fact-based test for determining whether the prior conviction is a crime of violence.” Id. 2020Instead, it explicitly directs the sentencing court to apply a fact-based test for determining whether the prior conviction is a crime of violence.” Id. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Peugh v. United States
green
1 sentence2016As noted above, “the essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is whether a fact is an element of the crime.” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2162 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Philadelphia v. Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals
green
1 sentence2016Nonetheless, Plaintiff points to our Supreme Court’s decision in City of Philadelphia v. Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals to support her proposition that the Snead factors must be applied to PVCS to determine whether it qualifies for immunity under the Tort Claims Act. 81 A.3d 24 (Pa. 2013). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
cluster 775215
green
1 sentence2014The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the notice requirement of Gebser to require "actual knowledge of the discriminatory conduct in question.” Baynard, 268 F.3d at 238 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Southco, Inc. v. Concord Township
green
2 sentences2009In Southco Inc., v. Concord Tp., 552 Pa. 66 , 713 A.2d 607 (1998), where our Supreme Court recognized wagering on simulcasted horse races as a use accessory to a restaurant despite acknowledgement that most restaurants do not have such a component, the Court went so far as to state “an accessory use may exist even where there is no evidence that a majority, or substantial number, of similar properties are engaged in a similar accessory use.” Id. at 75 , 713 A.2d at 611 . 6 As much as twenty-five years ago, our court recognized the lack of a workable standard for assessing customarily incidenta 2009In Southco Inc., v. Concord Tp., 552 Pa. 66 , 713 A.2d 607 (1998), where our Supreme Court recognized wagering on simulcasted horse races as a use accessory to a restaurant despite acknowledgement that most restaurants do not have such a component, the Court went so far as to state “an accessory use may exist even where there is no evidence that a majority, or substantial number, of similar properties are engaged in a similar accessory use.” Id. at 75 , 713 A.2d at 611 . 6 As much as twenty-five years ago, our court recognized the lack of a workable standard for assessing customarily incidenta | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.