fact-based inquiry in California

2021(City of Irvine, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 539-540.) The question of whether the Lands Commission acted reasonably in electing to proceed by way of a supplemental EIR is a fact-based inquiry into whether its determination was supported by substantial evidence.

2021(City of Irvine, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 539-540.) The question of whether the Lands Commission acted reasonably in electing to proceed by way of a supplemental EIR is a fact-based inquiry into whether its determination was supported by substantial evidence.

2014(Belair, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 566 .) In Locklin, the Supreme Court identified six factors for use in assessing public entity liability: "(1) The overall public purpose 7 being served by the improvement project; (2) the degree to which the plaintiff's loss is offset by reciprocal benefits; (3) the availability to the public entity of feasible alternatives with lower risks; (4) the severity of the plaintiff's damage in relation to risk-bearing capabilities; (5) the extent to which damage of the kind the plaintiff sustained is generally considered as a normal risk of land ownership; and (6) the

2011(Belair, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 566 ; Skoumbas v. City of Orinda (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 783, 796 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 ].) We review the court’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.

2025(See Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1253 ; Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 325 ; U.S. v. Gross (2001) 165 F.Supp.2d 372, 385 (Gross) [“every court has recognized that these determinations are fact-based inquiries which turn on the circumstances particular to each individual case”].) The majority subsequently states that the People’s assertions regarding the evidence are not unimpeachable and that courts can consider whether 8 they are pretextual or unsupported by the evidence; but at the same time, it reiterates that the courts are prohibited from “second-guessing” those same decisions, without

2025(See Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1253 ; Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 325 ; U.S. v. Gross (2001) 165 F.Supp.2d 372, 385 (Gross) [“every court has recognized that these determinations are fact-based inquiries which turn on the circumstances particular to each individual case”].) The majority subsequently states that the People’s assertions regarding the evidence are not unimpeachable and that courts can consider whether 8 they are pretextual or unsupported by the evidence; but at the same time, it reiterates that the courts are prohibited from “second-guessing” those same decisions, without

2021Taking Offense relies on Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC (9th Cir. 2011) 666 F.3d 1216 (Fair Housing Council), to assert that a roommate relationship qualifies for the right of intimate association.

2019(Ibid.) However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held the circumstances surrounding an unlawful seizure may be pertinent to the evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force because, pursuant to Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at pp. 394-397, an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment is ultimately a challenge to the “overall reasonableness of the seizure”: “Graham specifies ‘the severity of the crime at issue’ as one of the factors to be considered, and stresses the need to attend to the specific ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’ [Citation.] Conducting

2019Cir. 2006) 465 F.3d 46 , 62 [“[T]he reasonableness test established in Graham remains the applicable test for determining when excessive force has been used, including those cases where officers allegedly lack probable cause to arrest.”].) Thus, the Ninth Circuit has concluded “the facts that gave rise to an unlawful detention or arrest can factor into the determination whether the force used to make the arrest was excessive.” (Velazquez, supra, 793 F.3d at p. 1024 .) The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a more limited view of the relevance of an unlawful arrest or detention to an exce

2019(Ibid.) However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held the circumstances surrounding an unlawful seizure may be pertinent to the evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force because, pursuant to Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at pp. 394-397, an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment is ultimately a challenge to the “overall reasonableness of the seizure”: “Graham specifies ‘the severity of the crime at issue’ as one of the factors to be considered, and stresses the need to attend to the specific ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’ [Citation.] Conducting

2019Cir. 2006) 465 F.3d 46 , 62 [“[T]he reasonableness test established in Graham remains the applicable test for determining when excessive force has been used, including those cases where officers allegedly lack probable cause to arrest.”].) Thus, the Ninth Circuit has concluded “the facts that gave rise to an unlawful detention or arrest can factor into the determination whether the force used to make the arrest was excessive.” (Velazquez, supra, 793 F.3d at p. 1024 .) The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a more limited view of the relevance of an unlawful arrest or detention to an exce

2016Under our prior decisions, the inquiry is over.”].) An “elements-centric, ‘formal categorical approach’ . . . avoids the Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries.” (Id. at p._[ 133 S.Ct. at p. 2287 ].) In sum, under Descamps, a sentencing court considering a prior conviction for sentencing purposes is limited to an elements-centric inquiry; it cannot substitute “a fact-based inquiry for an elements-based one.” (Id. at p. _ [ 133 S.Ct. at p. 2293 ].) If there is a “mismatch in elements,” the person convicted under t

2016Under our prior decisions, the inquiry is over.”].) An “elements-centric, ‘formal categorical approach’ . . . avoids the Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries.” (Id. at p._[ 133 S.Ct. at p. 2287 ].) In sum, under Descamps, a sentencing court considering a prior conviction for sentencing purposes is limited to an elements-centric inquiry; it cannot substitute “a fact-based inquiry for an elements-based one.” (Id. at p. _ [ 133 S.Ct. at p. 2293 ].) If there is a “mismatch in elements,” the person convicted under t

2015Defendant claims the forfeiture rule does not apply where, as here, “the alleged error involves a pure question of law, which can be resolved on appeal without reference to a record developed below.” (People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 460 .) As the People correctly argue, defendant’s reliance on the fact-based factors in Lent negates his claim that the issue is purely a question of law and thus not subject to the forfeiture rule.

2015In ruling on the decertification motion, the trial court concluded, based on the parties’ respective evidentiary submissions, that the Yellow Pages’s liability to the class could not be adjudicated on a classwide basis using proof common to each class member because, under the fact-based analysis required under Harris, supra, 53 Cal.4th 170 , the determination of a given class member’s exempt status would require individualized proof.

2015In ruling on the decertification motion, the trial court concluded, based on the parties’ respective evidentiary submissions, that the Yellow Pages’s liability to the class could not be adjudicated on a classwide basis using proof common to each class member because, under the fact-based analysis required under Harris, supra, 53 Cal.4th 170 , the determination of a given class member’s exempt status would require individualized proof.

2014(See In re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1323 .) We also reject the claim on the merits.

2014(Belair, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 566 .) In Locklin, the Supreme Court identified six factors for use in assessing public entity liability: "(1) The overall public purpose 7 being served by the improvement project; (2) the degree to which the plaintiff's loss is offset by reciprocal benefits; (3) the availability to the public entity of feasible alternatives with lower risks; (4) the severity of the plaintiff's damage in relation to risk-bearing capabilities; (5) the extent to which damage of the kind the plaintiff sustained is generally considered as a normal risk of land ownership; and (6) the

2013“Cruel and[/or] unusual punishment arguments, under the 37 federal or California tests, require examination of the offense and the offender.” (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 [challenge based on People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 (Dillon)12 is fact- specific].) This fact-based inquiry must be raised in the trial court.

2013“Cruel and[/or] unusual punishment arguments, under the 37 federal or California tests, require examination of the offense and the offender.” (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 [challenge based on People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 (Dillon)12 is fact- specific].) This fact-based inquiry must be raised in the trial court.

2009The trial court believed Jones was better reasoned than Frazer, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1115 , which requires a fact-based inquiry into the express or implied authority of each employee.