14 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aylesgreen2 sentences2014See Ayles, 348 Or at 638-39 (affirming suppression of incriminating statements and physical evidence, because they were derived from illegal police conduct and the giving of Miranda warnings did not “break the causal chain” of events, which went from illegal seizure, to illegal search, to discovery of some physical evidence, to arrest and the giving of Miranda warnings, and to the defendant’s admissions and the discovery of additional physical evidence). 2014It cites the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Ayles, 348 Or 622 , 237 P3d 805 (2010), as support for its contention that “giving Miranda warnings should not be taken as effecting a restraint on a person’s liberty.” In Ayles , the court did not address the question of whether the giving of Miranda warnings is a factor to be considered in evaluating whether a person was stopped for purposes of Article I, section 9. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences2008See Hall, 339 Or at 35 n 21. 2008Thus, the state has failed to meet its burden of establishing that defendant’s decision to respond to the officer’s questions, “even if voluntary, was not the product of the preceding violation of defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Hall, 339 Or at 36 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Machaingreen1 sentence2011Accord Machain, 233 Or App at 72 (“[Defendant] had been given a ride to the police station by officers and was reliant on them for transportation.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McMillangreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., State v. McMillan, 184 Or App 63, 68 , 55 P3d 537 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 355 (2003) (holding that similar considerations compelled the giving of Miranda warnings). 2008See, e.g., State v. McMillan, 184 Or App 63, 68 , 55 P3d 537 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 355 (2003) (holding that similar considerations compelled the giving of Miranda warnings). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Roble-Baker
green
2 sentences2011On appeal, defendant does not contest those rulings. 9 Accord Holcomb v. Hill, 235 Or App 419, 434 , 233 P3d 448 , rev den, 349 Or 370 (2010) (the fact that “throughout the conversation, [an officer] had probable cause to arrest [a suspect] * * * does not render the circumstances so compelling as to require the giving of Miranda warnings”). 10 As noted, the duration of the encounter in its totality was two hours, but the final 20 to 30 minutes did not involve any questions eliciting inculpatory responses. 11 Here, in contrast to Roble-Baker, where the defendant had to rely on the police for a 2006In order to protect a person’s right against compelled self-incrimination, there are two circumstances which require the giving of Miranda warnings to a suspect prior to questioning by an officer: (1) when the suspect is in “full custody” or (2) in a setting that judges and officers should recognize to be “compelling.” State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638 , 136 P3d 22 (2006). | 2 | 2006–2011 |
State v. Ayles
green
2 sentences2010In fact, according to the state, the Court of Appeals went so far as to suggest that the giving of Miranda warnings itself has a coercive effect that negates the voluntariness of the subsequent statements, when the court stated that the warnings "`could perpetuate the person's perception that his or her liberty continued to be restrained as the officer pursued a criminal investigation by seeking consent to a search.'" Ayles, 220 Or.App. at 614 , 188 P.3d 378 (quoting State v. La France, 219 Or.App. 548, 557 , 184 P.3d 1169 (2008)). 2010In fact, according to the state, the Court of Appeals went so far as to suggest that the giving of Miranda warnings itself has a coercive effect that negates the voluntariness of the subsequent statements, when the court stated that the warnings “ ‘could perpetuate the person’s perception that his or her liberty continued to be restrained as the officer pursued a criminal investigation by seeking consent to a search.’ ” Ayles, 220 Or App at 614 (quoting State v. La France, 219 Or App 548, 557 , 184 P3d 1169 (2008)). | 2 | 2009–2010 |
State v. Turnidge
green
2 sentences2019Cf. State v. Turnidge , 359 Or. 364 , 404 n. 24, 374 P.3d 853 (2016), cert. den. , --- U.S. ----, 137 S. Ct. 665 , 196 L.Ed.2d 554 (2017). ("The reading of Miranda rights is a factor that weighs in favor of concluding that a defendant subject to police interrogation understands his or her ability to terminate questioning and to otherwise seek counsel rather than cooperate with law enforcement."). 2019Cf. State v. Turnidge , 359 Or. 364 , 404 n. 24, 374 P.3d 853 (2016), cert. den. , --- U.S. ----, 137 S. Ct. 665 , 196 L.Ed.2d 554 (2017). ("The reading of Miranda rights is a factor that weighs in favor of concluding that a defendant subject to police interrogation understands his or her ability to terminate questioning and to otherwise seek counsel rather than cooperate with law enforcement."). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Quatrine v. Berghuis
green
1 sentence2019Cf. State v. Turnidge , 359 Or. 364 , 404 n. 24, 374 P.3d 853 (2016), cert. den. , --- U.S. ----, 137 S. Ct. 665 , 196 L.Ed.2d 554 (2017). ("The reading of Miranda rights is a factor that weighs in favor of concluding that a defendant subject to police interrogation understands his or her ability to terminate questioning and to otherwise seek counsel rather than cooperate with law enforcement."). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Green v. United States
green
1 sentence2019Cf. State v. Turnidge , 359 Or. 364 , 404 n. 24, 374 P.3d 853 (2016), cert. den. , --- U.S. ----, 137 S. Ct. 665 , 196 L.Ed.2d 554 (2017). ("The reading of Miranda rights is a factor that weighs in favor of concluding that a defendant subject to police interrogation understands his or her ability to terminate questioning and to otherwise seek counsel rather than cooperate with law enforcement."). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2014In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution required that particular warnings be given when “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.” The Oregon Supreme Court requires the same warnings in those circumstances under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. 2014In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 , 86 S Ct 1602 , 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution required that particular warnings be given when “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.” The Oregon Supreme Court requires the same warnings in those circumstances under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence2011On appeal, defendant does not contest those rulings. 9 Accord Holcomb v. Hill, 235 Or App 419, 434 , 233 P3d 448 , rev den, 349 Or 370 (2010) (the fact that “throughout the conversation, [an officer] had probable cause to arrest [a suspect] * * * does not render the circumstances so compelling as to require the giving of Miranda warnings”). 10 As noted, the duration of the encounter in its totality was two hours, but the final 20 to 30 minutes did not involve any questions eliciting inculpatory responses. 11 Here, in contrast to Roble-Baker, where the defendant had to rely on the police for a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Holcomb v. Hill
green
2 sentences2011On appeal, defendant does not contest those rulings. 9 Accord Holcomb v. Hill, 235 Or App 419, 434 , 233 P3d 448 , rev den, 349 Or 370 (2010) (the fact that “throughout the conversation, [an officer] had probable cause to arrest [a suspect] * * * does not render the circumstances so compelling as to require the giving of Miranda warnings”). 10 As noted, the duration of the encounter in its totality was two hours, but the final 20 to 30 minutes did not involve any questions eliciting inculpatory responses. 11 Here, in contrast to Roble-Baker, where the defendant had to rely on the police for a 2011On appeal, defendant does not contest those rulings. 9 Accord Holcomb v. Hill, 235 Or App 419, 434 , 233 P3d 448 , rev den, 349 Or 370 (2010) (the fact that “throughout the conversation, [an officer] had probable cause to arrest [a suspect] * * * does not render the circumstances so compelling as to require the giving of Miranda warnings”). 10 As noted, the duration of the encounter in its totality was two hours, but the final 20 to 30 minutes did not involve any questions eliciting inculpatory responses. 11 Here, in contrast to Roble-Baker, where the defendant had to rely on the police for a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Shaff
green
2 sentences2010The facts of this case are more similar to those in State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639 , 175 P3d 454 (2007), than to those in Roble-Baker . 2010The facts of this case are more similar to those in State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639 , 175 P3d 454 (2007), than to those in Roble-Baker . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. La France
green
2 sentences2010In fact, according to the state, the Court of Appeals went so far as to suggest that the giving of Miranda warnings itself has a coercive effect that negates the voluntariness of the subsequent statements, when the court stated that the warnings “ ‘could perpetuate the person’s perception that his or her liberty continued to be restrained as the officer pursued a criminal investigation by seeking consent to a search.’ ” Ayles, 220 Or App at 614 (quoting State v. La France, 219 Or App 548, 557 , 184 P3d 1169 (2008)). 2010In fact, according to the state, the Court of Appeals went so far as to suggest that the giving of Miranda warnings itself has a coercive effect that negates the voluntariness of the subsequent statements, when the court stated that the warnings “ ‘could perpetuate the person’s perception that his or her liberty continued to be restrained as the officer pursued a criminal investigation by seeking consent to a search.’ ” Ayles, 220 Or App at 614 (quoting State v. La France, 219 Or App 548, 557 , 184 P3d 1169 (2008)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2009“Under the Oregon Constitution, Miranda-like warnings are required when the defendant is in full custody and may be required in circumstances that, although they do not rise to the level of full custody, create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Zelinka, 130 Or App 464, 473 , 882 P2d 624 (1994), rev den, 320 Or 508 (1995) (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990), and State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265 , 744 P2d 250 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2009“Under the Oregon Constitution, Miranda-like warnings are required when the defendant is in full custody and may be required in circumstances that, although they do not rise to the level of full custody, create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Zelinka, 130 Or App 464, 473 , 882 P2d 624 (1994), rev den, 320 Or 508 (1995) (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990), and State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265 , 744 P2d 250 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Magee
green
2 sentences2009“Under the Oregon Constitution, Miranda-like warnings are required when the defendant is in full custody and may be required in circumstances that, although they do not rise to the level of full custody, create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Zelinka, 130 Or App 464, 473 , 882 P2d 624 (1994), rev den, 320 Or 508 (1995) (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990), and State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265 , 744 P2d 250 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2009“Under the Oregon Constitution, Miranda-like warnings are required when the defendant is in full custody and may be required in circumstances that, although they do not rise to the level of full custody, create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Zelinka, 130 Or App 464, 473 , 882 P2d 624 (1994), rev den, 320 Or 508 (1995) (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990), and State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265 , 744 P2d 250 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2009In State v. Ayles, 220 Or App 606, 616 , 188 P3d 378 , rev allowed, 345 Or 460 (2008), we stated: “Miranda warnings following an unlawful seizure or entry-does not per se attenuate the taint of the prior illegal police conduct. 2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Zelinka
green
2 sentences2009“Under the Oregon Constitution, Miranda-like warnings are required when the defendant is in full custody and may be required in circumstances that, although they do not rise to the level of full custody, create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Zelinka, 130 Or App 464, 473 , 882 P2d 624 (1994), rev den, 320 Or 508 (1995) (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990), and State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265 , 744 P2d 250 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2009“Under the Oregon Constitution, Miranda-like warnings are required when the defendant is in full custody and may be required in circumstances that, although they do not rise to the level of full custody, create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Zelinka, 130 Or App 464, 473 , 882 P2d 624 (1994), rev den, 320 Or 508 (1995) (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7 , 791 P2d 836 (1990), and State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 265 , 744 P2d 250 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Artman v. Ray
green
2 sentences1984Cf, Artman v. Ray, 263 Or. 529 , 501 P.2d 63 , 502 P.2d 1376 (1972). [5] In our initial decision in State v. Roberti, 293 Or. 59 , 644 P.2d 1104 (1982), we held that a police officer's present but uncommunicated intent to arrest a stopped traffic offense suspect did not require the giving of Miranda warnings. 1984Cf, Artman v. Ray, 263 Or. 529 , 501 P.2d 63 , 502 P.2d 1376 (1972). [5] In our initial decision in State v. Roberti, 293 Or. 59 , 644 P.2d 1104 (1982), we held that a police officer's present but uncommunicated intent to arrest a stopped traffic offense suspect did not require the giving of Miranda warnings. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Roberti
green
2 sentences1984Cf, Artman v. Ray, 263 Or. 529 , 501 P.2d 63 , 502 P.2d 1376 (1972). [5] In our initial decision in State v. Roberti, 293 Or. 59 , 644 P.2d 1104 (1982), we held that a police officer's present but uncommunicated intent to arrest a stopped traffic offense suspect did not require the giving of Miranda warnings. 1984Cf, Artman v. Ray, 263 Or. 529 , 501 P.2d 63 , 502 P.2d 1376 (1972). [5] In our initial decision in State v. Roberti, 293 Or. 59 , 644 P.2d 1104 (1982), we held that a police officer's present but uncommunicated intent to arrest a stopped traffic offense suspect did not require the giving of Miranda warnings. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences1982Because defendant was not in custody, there could be no taint under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963). 1982Because defendant was not in custody, there could be no taint under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.