giving of Miranda warning in Maine

1979On a case-by-case basis, a court must consider “(1) the voluntariness of the statement (a threshold requirement); (2) the giving of Miranda warnings; (3) the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession; (4) the presence of intervening circumstances; [and,] (5) particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” 9 State v. Turner, supra at 800 .

1979On a case-by-case basis, a court must consider "(1) the voluntariness of the statement (a threshold requirement); (2) the giving of Miranda warnings; (3) the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession; (4) the presence of intervening circumstances; [and,] (5) particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." [9] State v. Turner, supra at 800 .

1983The question of suppression must be resolved in light of the following factors: (1) the voluntariness of the statement; (2) the giving of Miranda warnings; (3) the closeness in time of the arrest and the confession; (4) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (5) particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 422 U.S. at 603-04 , 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62 .

1983The question of suppression must be resolved in light of the following factors: (1) the voluntariness of the statement; (2) the giving of Miranda warnings; (3) the closeness in time of the arrest and the confession; (4) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (5) particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 422 U.S. at 603-04 , 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62 .

1992In Doyle , the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s silence following the giving of Miranda warnings (which include advising a suspect of his right to counsel) may not be used against him at trial. 426 U.S. at 619 , 96 S.Ct. at 2245 .

1992In Doyle , the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s silence following the giving of Miranda warnings (which include advising a suspect of his right to counsel) may not be used against him at trial. 426 U.S. at 619 , 96 S.Ct. at 2245 .

1989In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the United States Supreme Court noted the “vast difference between the direct consequences flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a ‘guilty secret’ freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question, ...” 470 U.S. at 312 , 105 S.Ct. at 1294 , and said: [Ajbsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made

1989In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the United States Supreme Court noted the “vast difference between the direct consequences flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a ‘guilty secret’ freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question, ...” 470 U.S. at 312 , 105 S.Ct. at 1294 , and said: [Ajbsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made

1983The Law Court has applied the criteria of Brown v. Illinois both to confessions, State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349 (Me.1981); State v. Ann Marie C., 407 A.2d 715 (Me.1979); State v. Turner, 394 A.2d 798 (Me.1978), and to non-testimonial evidence, State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072 (Me.1982).

1983The Law Court has applied the criteria of Brown v. Illinois both to confessions, State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349 (Me.1981); State v. Ann Marie C., 407 A.2d 715 (Me.1979); State v. Turner, 394 A.2d 798 (Me.1978), and to non-testimonial evidence, State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072 (Me.1982).

1983The Law Court has applied the criteria of Brown v. Illinois both to confessions, State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349 (Me.1981); State v. Ann Marie C., 407 A.2d 715 (Me.1979); State v. Turner, 394 A.2d 798 (Me.1978), and to non-testimonial evidence, State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072 (Me.1982).

1979At oral argument, the State conceded that under the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Dunaway v. New York, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), the October 24 detention was sufficiently intrusive as to constitute an arrest for constitutional purposes, that officer Snow lacked probable cause to detain defendant, and that the confession must therefore be suppressed.

1979At oral argument, the State conceded that under the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Dunaway v. New York, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), the October 24 detention was sufficiently intrusive as to constitute an arrest for constitutional purposes, that officer Snow lacked probable cause to detain defendant, and that the confession must therefore be suppressed.