giving of Miranda warning in New York

2000Those statements followed the giving of Miranda warnings, and were attenuated from any taint resulting from the preceding violations of the Fourth Amendment and Miranda rule (see, New York v Harris, 495 US 14, 19 ; Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298, 314-318 ; cf., Brown v Illinois, supra, at 604-605).

2000Those statements followed the giving of Miranda warnings, and were attenuated from any taint resulting from the preceding violations of the Fourth Amendment and Miranda rule (see, New York v Harris, 495 US 14, 19 ; Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298, 314-318 ; cf., Brown v Illinois, supra, at 604-605).

1992Although after the defendant’s first appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the giving of Miranda warnings was not sufficient to provide attenuation from an illegal warrantless arrest (see, People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434 ), that determination does not warrant reconsideration of the defendant’s contention.

1992Therefore, since this Court considered the defendant’s conten tion on a prior appeal, the law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from reconsidering the defendant’s contention (see, Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165 ; Locilento v Coleman Catholic High School, 134 AD2d 39, 43 ).

1992Therefore, since this Court considered the defendant’s conten tion on a prior appeal, the law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from reconsidering the defendant’s contention (see, Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165 ; Locilento v Coleman Catholic High School, 134 AD2d 39, 43 ).

1992Upon the defendant’s prior appeal, this Court held that the illegality was sufficiently attenuated not only by the giving of Miranda warnings, but also by the passage of time and the fact that the codefendant made a statement implicating the defendant (see, People v Conyers, 68 NY2d 982, 983 ).

1992Upon the defendant’s prior appeal, this Court held that the illegality was sufficiently attenuated not only by the giving of Miranda warnings, but also by the passage of time and the fact that the codefendant made a statement implicating the defendant (see, People v Conyers, 68 NY2d 982, 983 ).

1990As such, it was properly admitted into evidence even though it was made prior to the giving of Miranda warnings (see, People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891 ; People v Huffman, 41 NY2d 29 ; see also, People v Patterson, 138 AD2d 540 ).

1989In People v Johnson (supra), the Court of Appeals ruled that the reliability of an informant whose information formed the basis for defendant’s arrest for murder had not been established.

1988(See, e.g., Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471 .) The giving of Miranda warnings cannot attenuate the taint of the unlawful arrest.

1988The evidence is clear that he was not in custody until after he made the inculpatory statement and that the officer’s single question as to the reason for his presence in the house had an investigatory purpose which did not require the giving of Miranda warnings (see, People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 , cert denied 400 US 851 ; People v Stokley, 134 AD2d 542 , lv denied 70 NY2d 960 ).

1988The evidence is clear that he was not in custody until after he made the inculpatory statement and that the officer’s single question as to the reason for his presence in the house had an investigatory purpose which did not require the giving of Miranda warnings (see, People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 , cert denied 400 US 851 ; People v Stokley, 134 AD2d 542 , lv denied 70 NY2d 960 ).

1988The evidence is clear that he was not in custody until after he made the inculpatory statement and that the officer’s single question as to the reason for his presence in the house had an investigatory purpose which did not require the giving of Miranda warnings (see, People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 , cert denied 400 US 851 ; People v Stokley, 134 AD2d 542 , lv denied 70 NY2d 960 ).

1988In the case at bar, the People concede that under the rule enunciated in Chapple (supra) and reaffirmed in Bethea (supra), defendant’s first written statement was inadmissible as the product of a custodial interrogation without timely Miranda warnings.

1988In the case at bar, the People concede that under the rule enunciated in Chapple (supra) and reaffirmed in Bethea (supra), defendant’s first written statement was inadmissible as the product of a custodial interrogation without timely Miranda warnings.

1984The giving of Miranda warnings was apparently an excess of caution on Dun-seath’s part, for defendant was not then in custody (see People v Rowell, 59 NY2d 727; Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213 ; People v Rodney P., 21 NY2d 1 ). .

1984The giving of Miranda warnings was apparently an excess of caution on Dun-seath’s part, for defendant was not then in custody (see People v Rowell, 59 NY2d 727; Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213 ; People v Rodney P., 21 NY2d 1 ). .

1984The importance of the order is underscored by our later holding in People v Hawkins ( 55 NY2d 474 ) that the presence of counsel is not required at an investigatory lineup even though the suspect requests counsel and that a lineup need not necessarily be delayed for the presence of counsel even though the authorities are aware that the suspect has counsel.

1984The giving of Miranda warnings was apparently an excess of caution on Dun-seath’s part, for defendant was not then in custody (see People v Rowell, 59 NY2d 727; Matter of Kwok T., 43 NY2d 213 ; People v Rodney P., 21 NY2d 1 ). .

1981While we agree that the investigation may have focused on defendant once he was linked as the driver of the car in question, that alone does not mandate the giving of Miranda warnings (see People v Brosnan, 31 AD2d 975 ).