8 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gawgreen1 sentence2014Gaw, 285 S.W.3d at 324-25 (emphasis added). 6 See also State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Mo. banc 1981) ("At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court entered its order suppressing all statements made prior to the giving of Miranda warnings, but did not specifically articulate the reasons for overruling appellant's motion to suppress statements made while incarcerated. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Royalgreen2 sentences2014See also State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Mo. banc 1981) ("At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court entered its order suppressing all statements made pri- or to the giving of Miranda warnings, but did not specifically articulate the reasons for overruling appellant’s motion to suppress statements made while incarcerated. 2014Gaw, 285 S.W.3d at 324-25 (emphasis added). 6 See also State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Mo. banc 1981) ("At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court entered its order suppressing all statements made prior to the giving of Miranda warnings, but did not specifically articulate the reasons for overruling appellant's motion to suppress statements made while incarcerated. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Halegreen2 sentences1998As the Court noted in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 , 95 S.Ct. 2133 , 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), “silence following the giving of Miranda warnings was ordinarily so ambiguous as to have little probative value.” Because a defendant’s silence may be induced by the assurances contained in the Miranda warnings, the government should not be able to use that silence against him. 1998As the Court noted in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 , 95 S.Ct. 2133 , 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), “silence following the giving of Miranda warnings was ordinarily so ambiguous as to have little probative value.” Because a defendant’s silence may be induced by the assurances contained in the Miranda warnings, the government should not be able to use that silence against him. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jenkins v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1990The Eastern District cited Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), for the premise that where no governmental action induces an accused to remain silent before arrest, such as the giving of Miranda warnings, the impeachment by use of pre-arrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and is not fundamentally unfair. 1990The Eastern District cited Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 , 100 S.Ct. 2124 , 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), for the premise that where no governmental action induces an accused to remain silent before arrest, such as the giving of Miranda warnings, the impeachment by use of pre-arrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and is not fundamentally unfair. | 2 | 1988–1990 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1979(Citing cases)” (Italics added.) See also State v. Dudley, 561 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.App.1977), where an illegally seized suitcase was opened in the presence of defendant, who then, after Miranda warnings, gave a tape recorded confession, held to be fruit of the poisoned tree; and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), which applied the taint of an illegal arrest, made without warrant or probable cause, to a confession given less than two hours later, and held also that the giving of Miranda warnings did not, by themselves, purge the taint of the illegal arrest. 1979(Citing cases)” (Italics added.) See also State v. Dudley, 561 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.App.1977), where an illegally seized suitcase was opened in the presence of defendant, who then, after Miranda warnings, gave a tape recorded confession, held to be fruit of the poisoned tree; and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), which applied the taint of an illegal arrest, made without warrant or probable cause, to a confession given less than two hours later, and held also that the giving of Miranda warnings did not, by themselves, purge the taint of the illegal arrest. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
Berkemer v. McCarty
green
2 sentences2017In support of this argument, the State relies on Berkemer , in which the United States Supreme Court discussed that an officer who “lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person .briefly, in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (quotations.and footnote omitted). 2017In support of this argument, the State relies on Berkemer , in which the United States Supreme Court discussed that an officer who “lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person .briefly, in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” 468 U.S. at 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 (quotations.and footnote omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Oregon v. Mathiason
green
2 sentences1991There, Mr. Justice Marshall opined, “I trust today’s decision does not suggest that police officers can circumvent Miranda by deliberately postponing the official ‘arrest’ and the giving of Miranda warnings until the necessary incriminating statements have been obtained.” Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 499 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. at 716 n. 5 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 1991There, Mr. Justice Marshall opined, “I trust today’s decision does not suggest that police officers can circumvent Miranda by deliberately postponing the official ‘arrest’ and the giving of Miranda warnings until the necessary incriminating statements have been obtained.” Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 499 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. at 716 n. 5 (Marshall, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Masslon
green
2 sentences1990Masslon, 746 S.W.2d at 626 . 1990Masslon, 746 S.W.2d at 626 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Dudley
green
1 sentence1979(Citing cases)” (Italics added.) See also State v. Dudley, 561 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.App.1977), where an illegally seized suitcase was opened in the presence of defendant, who then, after Miranda warnings, gave a tape recorded confession, held to be fruit of the poisoned tree; and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), which applied the taint of an illegal arrest, made without warrant or probable cause, to a confession given less than two hours later, and held also that the giving of Miranda warnings did not, by themselves, purge the taint of the illegal arrest. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.