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14 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe and Supplygreen2 sentences1981Each contract or transaction in violation of this section shall constitute a separate offense punishable hereunder. [Emphasis added.] In construing Article 5069-1.06, our supreme court has held that: “By describing the conditions precedent to recovery of penalties in the disjunctive, the Legislature made it clear that only one such condition need occur to trigger penalties: either a contract for, a charge of, or receipt of usurious interest.” Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe and Supply, 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex.1977). 1977Article 5069-1.06 provides: “(1) Any person who contracts for, charges, or receives interest which is greater than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorney[s’] fees fixed by the court provided that there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error”. “(2) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is in ex *527 cess of double the amount of interest allowed by this Subtitle shall forfeit as an additional penalty, | 1 | 3 |
Moore v. Sabine National Bank of Port Arthurgreen2 sentences1977See Moore v. Sabine National Bank of Port Arthur, 527 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Tex.Civ.App. 1975, writ ref’d n. r. e.), Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 P.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.1971). 1977Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.06(1) (1971); Moore v. Sabine National Bank of Port Arthur, supra; Am. | 1 | 2 |
Esparza v. Nolan Wells Communications, Inc.green1 sentence1989Esparza v. Nolan Wells Communications, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Tyra v. Bob Carroll Construction Co.green1 sentence1988Tyra v. Bob Carroll Construction Co., 639 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.1982); Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Tri-County Farmer's Co-Op v. Bendelegreen1 sentence1984See Hagar v. Williams, supra at 789 n. 8; see also Tri-County Farmer’s Co-op v. Bendele, 641 S.W.2d 208, 209-10 (Tex.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Cochran v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n of Houstongreen1 sentence1983Cochran v. American Savings & Loan Ass’n, 586 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Tex.1979). | 1 | 1 |
Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1980Mecey also asserts that there is “. . .no evidence that the insertion of 10% interest [in a 1975 $7,500 note] was not the result of a bona fide error.” Here, Mecey seeks to come within the provision of Article 5069-1.06(1) which pro *929 vides: “. . . there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error.” In determining whether there is no evidence to back up the finding of no bona fide error, we must “. . . view the evidence in its most favorable light in support of the finding of the vital fact, considering only the evidence and the inferences which 1980Mecey also asserts that there is “. . .no evidence that the insertion of 10% interest [in a 1975 $7,500 note] was not the result of a bona fide error.” Here, Mecey seeks to come within the provision of Article 5069-1.06(1) which pro *929 vides: “. . . there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error.” In determining whether there is no evidence to back up the finding of no bona fide error, we must “. . . view the evidence in its most favorable light in support of the finding of the vital fact, considering only the evidence and the inferences which | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. United States Finance Companygreen1 sentence1974Civ.Stat.Ann., provides: “Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorney fees fixed by the court provided that there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error.” In Hernandez v. United States Finance Co., 441 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, writ dism’d), it is stated that “A contract which is not usurious on its face will not be held in violation of | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Temple Trust Co.green2 sentences1974Civ.Stat.Ann., provides: “Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorney fees fixed by the court provided that there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error.” In Hernandez v. United States Finance Co., 441 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, writ dism’d), it is stated that “A contract which is not usurious on its face will not be held in violation of 1974Civ.Stat.Ann., provides: “Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorney fees fixed by the court provided that there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error.” In Hernandez v. United States Finance Co., 441 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, writ dism’d), it is stated that “A contract which is not usurious on its face will not be held in violation of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Keller v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2015CODE ANN. § 305.101 (“A creditor is not subject to penalty under this chapter for any usurious interest that results from an accidental and bona fide error.”); Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822 ; Merry Homes, 312 S.W.3d at 943 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Merry Homes, Inc. v. Chi Hung Luu
green
1 sentence2015CODE ANN. § 305.101 (“A creditor is not subject to penalty under this chapter for any usurious interest that results from an accidental and bona fide error.”); Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822 ; Merry Homes, 312 S.W.3d at 943 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Huff v. Fidelity Union Life Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1981Id. . “(1) Any person who ... charges . .. interest which is greater than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of interest ... charged, and reasonable attorney fees fixed by the court provided that there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Cartwright v. Canode
green
2 sentences1980Mecey also asserts that there is “. . .no evidence that the insertion of 10% interest [in a 1975 $7,500 note] was not the result of a bona fide error.” Here, Mecey seeks to come within the provision of Article 5069-1.06(1) which pro *929 vides: “. . . there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error.” In determining whether there is no evidence to back up the finding of no bona fide error, we must “. . . view the evidence in its most favorable light in support of the finding of the vital fact, considering only the evidence and the inferences which 1980Mecey also asserts that there is “. . .no evidence that the insertion of 10% interest [in a 1975 $7,500 note] was not the result of a bona fide error.” Here, Mecey seeks to come within the provision of Article 5069-1.06(1) which pro *929 vides: “. . . there shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental and bona fide error.” In determining whether there is no evidence to back up the finding of no bona fide error, we must “. . . view the evidence in its most favorable light in support of the finding of the vital fact, considering only the evidence and the inferences which | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Tenneco Oil Company v. Padre Drilling Company
green
1 sentence1977Tenneco Oil Company v. Padre Drilling Company, 453 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.1970). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Townsend v. Adler
green
2 sentences1977The Millers’ loan instruments show on their face that the loan is usurious, as in Townsend supra. In such a case, the Bank has the burden to prove that the terms of the loan resulted from an accidental and bona fide error. 1977The Millers’ loan instruments show on their face that the loan is usurious, as in Townsend supra. In such a case, the Bank has the burden to prove that the terms of the loan resulted from an accidental and bona fide error. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
McDonald v. Savoy
green
1 sentence1975McDonald v. Savoy, 501 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, no writ). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Greever v. Persky
green
2 sentences1975In response appellee argues that the term, “charging,” as used in Art. 5069-8.01 and 8.02 is dependent upon the excessive charge having been contracted for in the installment contract or upon the excessive charge having been received before the penalties in those articles may be invoked. *212 Appellee relies upon Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64 , 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942), and Mays v. Pierce, 154 Tex. 489 , 281 S.W.2d 79 (1955). 1975In response appellee argues that the term, “charging,” as used in Art. 5069-8.01 and 8.02 is dependent upon the excessive charge having been contracted for in the installment contract or upon the excessive charge having been received before the penalties in those articles may be invoked. *212 Appellee relies upon Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64 , 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942), and Mays v. Pierce, 154 Tex. 489 , 281 S.W.2d 79 (1955). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Mays v. Pierce
green
1 sentence1975In response appellee argues that the term, “charging,” as used in Art. 5069-8.01 and 8.02 is dependent upon the excessive charge having been contracted for in the installment contract or upon the excessive charge having been received before the penalties in those articles may be invoked. *212 Appellee relies upon Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64 , 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942), and Mays v. Pierce, 154 Tex. 489 , 281 S.W.2d 79 (1955). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.