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14 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 2006–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc.green2 sentences2008As a result, we find it significant that the legislature did not restrict the exception in section 1506.002(b)(7) to only those policies that are limited in scope, or limited in the same particular character as the other policies on the list, but more generally excepted "other limited benefit coverage." See Cameron v. Terrell & Grant, Inc. , 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) ("[E]very word excluded from a statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose."). 2008As a result, we find it significant that the legislature did not restrict the exception in section 1506.002(b)(7) to only those policies that are limited in scope, or limited in the same particular character as the other policies on the list, but more generally excepted “other limited benefit coverage.” See Cameron v. Terrell & Grant, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) (“[E]very word excluded from a statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.”). | 3 | 3 |
Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllengreen2 sentences2015Forest Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 60 . 2014Cf. Forest Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 58 (enforcing “freely negotiated” agreement to bar claims); Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 179 (stating that parties should be able to “bargain for” agreement that precludes further disputes between them). | 2 | 6 |
Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swansongreen2 sentences2014Cf. Forest Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 58 (enforcing “freely negotiated” agreement to bar claims); Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 179 (stating that parties should be able to “bargain for” agreement that precludes further disputes between them). 2012Forest Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 60-61 ; Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 179-81 . | 2 | 5 |
Johnston v. McKinney American, Inc.green2 sentences2015Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 746 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d); see also Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271 , 280–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (“Where an affirmative defense is not pleaded or tried by consent, it is waived”; holding that a disclaimer defense was not tried by consent even though the trial court expressly found in its conclusions that the disclaimer was conspicuous and evidence of the disclaimer was introduced without objection). 9 See Monk v. Westgate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., No. 14-07-00886-CV, 2009 WL 2998985 , at *3–4 (Tex. App.— 2015Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 746 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d); see also Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271, 280-81 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) ("Where an affirmative defense is not pleaded or tried by consent, it is waived”; holding that a disclaimer defense was not tried by consent even though the trial court expressly found in its conclusions that the disclaimer was conspicuous and evidence of the disclaimer was introduced without objection). . | 2 | 3 |
Lindner v. Hillgreen1 sentence2015When a trial court makes a finding on at least one element of a defense, “any omitted findings will be deemed to support the judgment if evidence exists to support such findings.” Lindner v. Hill, 691 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. 1985) (citing Tex. R. | 1 | 1 |
City of the Colony v. North Texas Municipal Water Districtgreen2 sentences2015Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 746 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d); see also Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271 , 280–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (“Where an affirmative defense is not pleaded or tried by consent, it is waived”; holding that a disclaimer defense was not tried by consent even though the trial court expressly found in its conclusions that the disclaimer was conspicuous and evidence of the disclaimer was introduced without objection). 9 See Monk v. Westgate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., No. 14-07-00886-CV, 2009 WL 2998985 , at *3–4 (Tex. App.— 2015Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 746 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d); see also Johnston v. McKinney Am., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 271, 280-81 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) ("Where an affirmative defense is not pleaded or tried by consent, it is waived”; holding that a disclaimer defense was not tried by consent even though the trial court expressly found in its conclusions that the disclaimer was conspicuous and evidence of the disclaimer was introduced without objection). . | 1 | 1 |
Vista Medical Center Hospital v. Texas Mutual Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2014Sys. of Tex., 53 S.W.3d 483 , 489–90 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (reviewing agency decision for reversible error and noting that, under section 2001.174, a showing of injury to the claimant is necessary before reversal is the appropriate remedy). 98 See Vista, 416 S.W.3d at 25 (noting longstanding principle that “a reviewing court generally must affirm an administrative order ‘if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case,’ regardless of whether the agency purported to rely on that legal theory or even relied on an erroneous one”) (citing Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Structured Asset Services, LLCgreen2 sentences2012See Johnson v. Structured Asset Servs., LLC, 148 S.W.3d 711 , 719–20 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). 2012See id. 10 Judgment notwithstanding the verdict would not have been appropriate even if the parties had tried the disclaimer defense by consent. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nobles v. Employees Retirement System of Texas
green
1 sentence2014Sys. of Tex., 53 S.W.3d 483 , 489–90 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (reviewing agency decision for reversible error and noting that, under section 2001.174, a showing of injury to the claimant is necessary before reversal is the appropriate remedy). 98 See Vista, 416 S.W.3d at 25 (noting longstanding principle that “a reviewing court generally must affirm an administrative order ‘if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case,’ regardless of whether the agency purported to rely on that legal theory or even relied on an erroneous one”) (citing Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Centex Homes v. Buecher
green
1 sentence2006Regardless, even assuming that the disclaimer rule of Centex Homes applies here, Rauschen-berg's "agreements” with Bossier Country for repair services, though they each contain standard disclaimer language, do not "provide! ] for the manner, performance or quality of the desired [repairs].” See Centex Homes, 95 S.W.3d at 274-75 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.