safe harbor defense in Texas

2026See 20801, Inc., 249 S.W.3d at 394 (holding that alcohol providers have the burden of proof on the first two elements of the Act’s safe-harbor defense). 13 The plaintiff may be a third party or—as in the present case—the intoxicated individual himself.

2025DISCUSSION Safe-harbor defense The Dram Shop Act —which allows liability claims against alcoholic-beverage providers for damages resulting from the provision of alcohol to obviously drunk persons (over-service)—also includes a safe-harbor defense eliminating that liability under certain circumstances. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 394 (Tex. 2008); see Tex. Alco.

2025See Primera Enters., Inc. v. Autrey, 349 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (concluding that defendant bar established first two elements of safe-harbor defense with evidence that every bar employee working on night in question had TABC seller-training certifications); Yarbrough v. McCormick, No. 04-17-00283-CV, 2018 WL 3129459 , at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that bar’s production of TABC license and training certificates for employees working on night in question established first two elements of safe-harbor defense “as a matter of

2018See id. (holding owner’s affidavit confirming employees working on night of incident had - 13 - 04-17-00283-CV completed TABC seller-server training programs was sufficient evidence to conclusively establish first two elements of safe harbor defense); see also Primera Enters., Inc. v. Autrey, 349 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (stating evidence that every employee working on evening in question had seller training certifications from TABC established first two elements of safe harbor defense).

2006As mentioned above, the Gonzalez court held that summary judgment based on the safe harbor defense was improper because a conclusory affidavit did not provide sufficient evidence of the defendant’s “policy regarding compliance with the code.” 951 S.W.2d at 77 (emphasis added). 20801 cites the court’s use of the word “policy” to support its contention that the existence and nature of a provider’s alcohol policy is the sole relevant inquiry under Section 106.14.

2006As mentioned above, the Gonzalez court held that summary judgment based on the safe harbor defense was improper because a conclusory affidavit did not provide sufficient evidence of the defendant = s A policy regarding compliance with the code. @ 951 S.W.2d at 77 (emphasis added). 20801 cites the court = s use of the word A policy @ to support its contention that the existence and nature of a provider = s alcohol policy is the sole relevant inquiry under Section 106.14.

2000The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion can be based on an administrative decision if the “administrative agency [acted] in a judicial capacity and resolve[d] disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties [had] an adequate opportunity to litigate.” United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Company, 384 U.S. 394, 422 , 86 S.Ct. 1545 , 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966); Muckelroy v. Richardson Independent School District, 884 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, writ den’d); Bryant v. L.H.

1999See Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690 .